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Abstract
This exploratory study examines the degree to which counties had carefully thought-out
motivations for the adoption of performance pay systems, the degree to which they were using
objective measures to gauge whether it was achieving those objectives, and the degree to which
they believed it was achieving its intended objectives. Results indicated that adopting a
performance pay system is not something to be entertained lightly. It requires more work, more
discipline, more managerial courage, more training, more support, and will cause more heated
internal conversations about compensation than more traditional compensation system
alternatives. It is equally clear that traditional compensation systems create more rewards for
those doing the least effort and for those doing the least to advance an organization’s mission
than a performance pay system. The traditional system relies almost exclusively on the intrinsic
motivation of employees who seek employ in the public service. A well-crafted and executed
performance management system that incorporates best management practices designed to
thoroughly and constantly review the system’s efficacy and fairness, coupled with a marketdriven performance pay system, coupled with a robust set of additional strategies to create a high
quality of employee worklife (recognition programs, tenure recognition and other similar
environmental programs) does have the potential to create a higher-performing, more missiondriven focus linking employee performance to organizational results. But, if an organization
cannot or will not make the necessary investments for all of that to be true, a poorly administered
system will do more harm than good.
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CHAPTER 1

HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM
Since perhaps the dawn of time, loyalty to the sovereign has been rewarded and disloyalty has
been punished. It’s not really that difficult to understand why. Those with power tend to like to
keep it; with power comes perquisites such as more lavish lifestyles, ordering of society along
lines that most support your interests, and so on. To those who are disloyal or actively opposed
to what the sovereign wants done, the sovereign will takes steps, sometimes very drastic steps, to
minimize the degree to which that disloyalty can impede what the sovereign wants. This isn’t a
new concept; it has likely been this way since when man first organized themselves into anything
approaching organized clans.

In those earliest of days, the rewards and punishments could often involve the difference
between living relatively well or relatively poorly and even the difference between life and
death. As humans evolved into “higher” level creatures and organized into “civil” societies, the
means of rewards and punishments have changed and, generally, are not as barbaric as once
seen, with, of course, notable exceptions still present in the world today. In more civilized
societies, these rewards and punishments have evolved into what we understand as political
systems today.

This system of loyalty and punishments has existed within our own United States since its
earliest days as well. The original bureaucracy for the newly-minted Government of the United
States in 1789 consisted of a small number of employees who worked in three federal
departments: State, Treasury, and War. At that time, our first President, George Washington
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promised to hire people “as shall best be qualified.” Interestingly, however, the people he hired
mostly belonged to the budding “faction” referred to as Federalists—the group with whom
Washington most identified his own beliefs and policies as in alignment (The Bureaucracy: The
Real Government, 2014). So, while Washington professed to be hiring on the basis of merit, it’s
hard to conclude that was more narrowly defined to mostly be those best-qualified and in
alignment with his views. That’s not a shocking revelation, but maybe a revealing one for the
President most Americans would likely identify as being above politics.

What is more interesting is how Washington called forth in his Farewell Address a warning to
his fellow citizens about the dangers of “factions” or political parties to the roots of liberty and to
the republic itself:
“All obstructions to the execution of the laws, all combinations and associations, under
whatever plausible character, with the real design to direct, control, counteract, or awe
the regular deliberation and action of the constituted authorities, are destructive of this
fundamental principle, and of fatal tendency. They serve to organize faction, to give to
an artificial and extraordinary force; to put, in the place of the delegated will of the nation
the will of a party, often a small but artful and enterprising minority of the community;
and, according to the alternate triumphs of different parties, to make the public
administration the mirror of the ill-concerted and incongruous projects of faction, rather
than the organ of consistent and wholesome plans digested by common counsels and
modified by mutual interests.
However combinations or associations of the above description may now and then
answer popular ends, they are likely, in the course of time and things, to become potent
engines, by which cunning, ambitious, and unprincipled men will be enabled to subvert
the power of the people and to usurp for themselves the reins of government, destroying
afterwards the very engines which have lifted them to unjust dominion” (Washington’s
Farewell Address, 1796).
On the one hand, Washington had employed in federal service those who mostly agreed with his
views and, in parting, warned Americans of associations along just such lines as injurious to the
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health and long-term prospects for our nascent union. His views were either motivated by
experience with the effects of some of his own actions, an interest in cementing in place those
whose views agreed with his own for perpetuity, or more noble expressions of philosophy about
what he really believed to be best serving the common good. Regardless of the motivation, it is
difficult to read these words and not think about contemporary situations and reflect on how
prescient his words ultimately became.
During Washington’s term, Thomas Jefferson, a fellow Virginian, but a Democratic Republican,
had served as Washington’s Secretary of State. Jefferson frequently engaged in heated debates
with then-Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton, a Federalist, about what federal policy
should be and how far-reaching it should extend, so much so that it became a source of irritation
for President Washington. In what is most commonly used to associate Washington with the
Federalists, Washington most frequently came down on Hamilton’s side of the arguments, much
to the chagrin of Jefferson (Ellis, 2005).

Four years after Washington left office in 1800, Thomas Jefferson successfully ran for President
against incumbent President John Adams, also a Federalist, who had served as Washington’s
Vice-President. Not surprisingly, then, when Jefferson assumed office, he dismissed many of the
Federalists then serving as employees of the federal government and replaced them with people
who were members of his own party. In doing so, he first initiated the age-old process of
rewarding political loyalists and punishing political opponents with jobs in the service of the
sovereign to the American federal government. So began the patronage system of federal
employment, commonly referred to at the time as “rotation-in-office.”
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Because of the size of the federal government in those early years, this was not a sizeable
rotation. Over time, however, as the federal government grew, this rotation-in-office based on
political loyalty swinging on who occupied the White House and their political party preference,
became an increasing burden on the President. A newly-elected President was bombarded with
requests from across the country for federal employment, consuming an ever-increasing amount
of their time and even their schedules. In those earlier days of the republic, it was common for
Presidents to hold visitor hours and for many of the people who made appointments to see the
President to implore him for a federal job.

It was not until the time of Andrew Jackson, in 1829, however that this rotation-in-office was
very significant. Jackson is largely credited (or blamed) for cementing the patronage or “spoils”
system in place. Following the adage “to the victor goes the spoils,” when Jackson was elected,
he brought a whole new group of “Jacksonian Democrats” into office with him. Jackson argued
that the spoils system brought greater rotation in office and that this was healthy to the
bureaucracy to clear out government workers who had been employed by previous
Administrations to protect against them becoming corrupt (The Bureaucracy: The Real
Government, 2014). What was new about what Jackson did is that he had succeeded five
Democratic-Republican Presidents before him so he was not replacing the federal workers based
on loyalty to a party, he was replacing them on the basis of loyalty to the party as he defined it.
Thus began the system of political appointment based largely on the basis of political support
and work, as opposed to merit that is measured by objective criteria (Legal-Dictionary, 2014).

During the 1800s, the size of the federal bureaucracy continued to grow, though modestly by
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current standards. There were, however, expanding needs that citizens were expecting
government to provide. As America grew westward, new federal agencies grew up to support
the migration, land-granting, and serving new areas with postal services. During this period,
more and more federal jobs were filled based on patronage. With the onset of the Civil War,
federal jobs swelled as more and more people were needed in government positions to sustain
the war effort. Abraham Lincoln identified the job of filling federal jobs as a never-ending
demand on his time that he so preciously needed for more urgent matters (Kearns-Goodwin,
2012). As noted by Henry Clay, after an election, government officials are “like the inhabitants
of Cairo when the plague breaks out; no one knows who is next to encounter the stroke of death
(Ramos, 2006, p. 1).” And, yet the practice continued.

To be sure, the patronage system had its defenders and detractors. Defenders would routinely
point to how this system would encourage greater political participation by providing incentives
for helping in party-related activities. They pointed out that the patronage system guarantees
some turnover, thereby bringing in a fresh perspective which, they argued, was a healthy thing
and encouraged new ideas and creative thinking. In addition, the patronage system puts people
into government positions who agree with the governing philosophy of the person ostensibly
charged with running the government. They also held that it minimized the possibility of
entrenched workers becoming corrupt. Even critics of the patronage system have agreed that
patronage at the highest levels of government was appropriate so that an elected executive could
implement their philosophy of government by placing political appointees as the heads of
government departments, a practice which is still commonly used today by Presidents,
Governors, and Mayors. Critics, however, also pointed to the lack of qualifications needed for
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performing what were becoming more and more specialized functions. The high turnover also
contributed to no institutional memory and, therefore, mistakes of the past were more frequently
repeated than served the public’s interests. They also argued that when someone knew their job
was temporary, they had a greater tendency to manage their work to shorter-term purposes and
were more likely to try to extract as much personal benefit during their tenure than if they
enjoyed the prospect of longer-term employment.

Widespread disapproval of the graft and corruption rampant within the public service under the
patronage or “spoils” system grew steadily after the Civil War, but it was not until the
assassination of President James Garfield in 1881 that the patronage system ran into any kind of
organized resistance (Britannica, 2014). Garfield was killed by Charles Guiteau, who was a
deranged and disgruntled office-seeker to whom Garfield had denied a government job. After
Garfield’s assassination, Congress passed the Pendleton Act, which was the first institution of a
federal civil-service system where employment was to be granted exclusively on merit. The Act
provided for selection of federal employees through the use of competitive exams, rather than
ties to politicians or political affiliation (Princeton, 2014). In addition, it also made it illegal to
fire or demote federal employees for political reasons. This first undertaking was not very broad
and covered only about 10% of the federal workforce. The Act also created a Civil Service
Commission to administer the system. While the Pendleton Act was designed to neutralize
political influence over the Civil Service, it was not particularly effective because it covered so
few federal workers and most of them it covered were low-level positions. For instance, when
President Benjamin Harrison took office in 1889, 31,000 federal postmaster positions changed
hands (Legal-Dictionary, 2014).
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Over time, however, the influence of the Pendleton Act grew. Contained within its provisions
was one which allowed the President to expand the coverage of the Act to more and more federal
positions. Whether motivated by a desire to cement in place their own appointees for more
lasting influence beyond their term of office, or by a sincere desire to professionalize and
insulate the federal workforce from undue political influences, subsequent Presidents routinely
expanded the coverage of the Act. President Grover Cleveland, for instance, expanded coverage
of the Act to 40% of the federal workforce and, today, coverage is almost 90% (Pendleton Civil
Service Reform Act—American Studies, 2014).

All the while these changes are occurring, in the background there are compensation decisions
being made for employees, whether within the patronage system or the civil service system. The
purpose of pay (World Bank, 2014), of course, is “to compensate the employee for work done, to
motivate the employee to perform well and to retain the employee avoiding the need for
extensive recruitment and training for replacements.”

Compensation systems under the Civil Service Act were standardized around the concepts of
fairness and equity for positions of similar levels of responsibility or scope (Nelson, 2008). In its
earliest conceptions, the civil service compensation system would allow for annual increases in
the earliest years of employment and slower rates of increases in the later years; though, over
time, the increases in later years were accelerated to be annually as well. This model was
intended to pay a very senior person at the top of the market rate for a position making it less
likely that they would leave their position for another one for more pay; at the same time, it
created more rapid increases (at first) for those at the entry level so that their rate of acceleration
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in pay compelled them to stay in their position. The framework, as opposed to the pay rate
changes governed by political loyalties and rewards of the patronage system, was designed to be
a replicable structural framework, regardless of the political administration in power.

Patronage systems were not limited to the federal government either. Throughout American
history, state and local governments also employed large patronage systems. Big city political
“machines,” so termed for their mechanical efficiency in electing and re-electing party bosses,
were dominant features of the political landscapes of New York City, Boston, Chicago, Kansas
City, and many other places. In rewarding their supporters with jobs, these machines not only
rewarded people for their past political support, but also motivated them to contribute future
support as the primary means for them to retain their jobs. Machines were organized all the way
down to the lowest units of city blocks with someone assigned to talk to their neighbors regularly
about the benefits the “machine” provided, what a good job it was doing, and encouraging (and
in many cases intimidating) neighbors into going to the polls and voting for the “right” candidate
Legal-Dictionary, 2014).

Some of the most colorful stories and characters in American political history come from big city
machines and the “bosses” who ran them. Among the most colorful was the big city machine of
New York City, most commonly referred to as Tammany Hall, which dominated city politics for
about 75 years beginning as early as the mid-1850s (Wiles, 2014). The most famous Boss was a
man named William March Tweed, who was widely viewed as having used the machine to
advance not only the city’s political system, but also to line his own pockets. An estimated $75
to $200 million were swindled from the City during Tweed’s tenure as head of Tammany Hall
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from 1865 to 1871. Samuel Tilden, who ran for President against Rutherford Hayes in 1876,
was head of New York State’s Democratic party is credited with rooting out Tweed’s corruption,
though it took him an entire decade to do so.

The New York machine may be most colorfully known for a plain-speaking character named
George Plunkett who liked to deliver lessons in city government administration from his perch
on the shoe-shine stand. Plunkett stayed on top for seven decades in the rough and tumble of
New York City politics. When asked how he did it, he said:
“Tammany is the ocean, reform the waves and there is a lot of unofficial patronage to
ride out the storms if you know the ropes. Why don’t reformers last in politics? Because
they are amateurs and you must be a pro. Politicians do not have to steal to make a living
because a crook is a fool and a politician can become a millionaire through ‘honest
graft.’” Wiles, 2014, p. 2.
What Plunkett and Tammany excelled at was organization, integration of new immigrants into
their political system, and using patronage jobs to instill ongoing loyalty to the machine. During
this time in American history, more than half of New York’s populations were immigrants who
did not speak the language nor understand our laws. One valuable service the machines did
provide was the inculcation of those immigrants into the American political system in a way not
seen today. Largely, this was done through organizing efforts, not unlike what you see in
modern political campaigns, but these political organizations were glued together with the
public’s money: patronage jobs. People who were rewarded with a government job had a great
incentive to keep the machine in power so they would be block captains at the precinct level,
visiting with the people in the neighborhoods and making sure they knew the benefits the
machine was providing for them and their families. At any given time there were upwards of
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30,000 local precinct captains in the five boroughs of New York and each borough contained
roughly 12,000 municipal jobs creating a built-in network of loyalists paid for with someone
else’s money.

The benefits of the machine extended beyond simply employment. The highly decentralized
organization created a network of locally-connected advocates for when individuals had troubles
with the law (History, 2014). A criminal judge, for instance, who had been appointed or was
being kept in office by Tammany Hall, would give special heed to a local ward boss asking for
leniency for transgressions committed by people who may have been largely ignorant of the law.
Such efforts were rewarded by those individuals and their families with gratitude expressed at
the polls in support of the machine. Those not inclined to remember their benefactors in that
way would not be so lucky the next time around.

The machine was also the only potent social welfare institution during this time. The machine
was a source of food, coal, and rent money, as well as a job for the poorest of society, among
them the same immigrants who, upon arrival, had no place to stay and no way to support
themselves. As an example of the intimate involvement of the machine in people’s everyday
lives, in the course of one day, Tammany Boss Plunkett “assisted the victims of a house fire,
secured the release of six ‘drunks’ by speaking on their behalf to a judge, paid the rent of a poor
family to prevent their eviction and gave them money for food, secured employment for four
individuals, attended the funerals of two of his constituents (one Italian, the other Jewish),
attended a Bar Mitzvah, and attended the wedding of a Jewish couple from his ward”
(Wikipedia, 2014).

D i s s e r t a t i o n | 17

Through this use of highly-organized networks and the intricate system of rewards and
punishments, Tammany Hall absolutely dominated New York City politics. So much so that
between 1860 and 1930, anti-machine reformers only held the mayor’s office and control of the
City for a total of ten years (Wiles, 2014). This era is sometimes referred to as the Gilded Age,
however, because, while machines were good at winning elections, they were not as good at
solving underlying social problems. Governments at the national, state, and local level were
preaching laissez-faire policies that had the primary benefits of the economic and political
system accruing to the robber barons of the time and the least to the average American. In
addition, ironically, as a machine becomes entrenched, it tends to reserve its largesse for those
who are already within the system and have historically been unpopular with those marginalized
on the outside. The rise of racial minorities in urban settings brought this issue to the fore as
machines began to be seen as the last defense of white neighborhoods against growing black
populations (Britannica, 2015). So, while machines were dominant for a time, they did not last.
Ultimately, civil service reform efforts beat back the dominance of the machine, even Tammany
Hall’s dominance.

New York was not unique in that regard. Cities and even states across the nation mirrored New
York’s experience of both the rise and the fall of patronage systems of public employment.
Famous bosses and their political machines included Frank Hague of Jersey City, New Jersey;
Ed Crump of Memphis, Tennessee; James Michael Curley of Boston, Massachusetts; Huey Long
of Louisiana; Gene Talmadge of Georgia; Tom Pendergast of Kansas City, Missouri; Theodore
Bilbo of Mississippi; Arthur Samish of California; Richard Daley of Chicago, Illinois; and,
George Cox of Cincinnati, Ohio (Watkins, 2015).
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In fact, the Pendergast machine in Kansas City provided the political start for a young, failed
haberdasher named Harry Truman. In 1926, Truman was elected through the machine to be the
presiding county judge, one of the three administrators who ran the county agencies, in Jackson
County, Missouri outside of Kansas City and rode the city machine all the way into the U.S.
Senate (Truman Presidential Library, 2013). Pendergast’s machine was rife with corruption and
ties to organized crime and, while Truman was never effectively associated with that element of
the machine, he was dogged during his early tenure in the Senate with being “Pendergast’s man.”
In 1939, Pendergast was caught taking a $750,000 bribe and went to federal prison at
Leavenworth; and, while he got out on good behavior after serving just one year, he was
forbidden as a condition of his parole to ever engage in politics again (a fascinating condition in
and of itself given his First Amendment rights!). In an indication of the loyalty that the machine
could generate, however, despite all of that checkered history, when Pendergast died in January
of 1945, he was eulogized by then Vice-President and soon-to-be President Harry Truman,
saying “He was always my friend, and I have always been his.” Watkins, 2014, p. 45.

The vacillation between how much patronage in government serves the interests of the political
leaders to effectively govern while maintaining the professionalism and neutrality of the federal
workplace is an ongoing discussion today. In 1978, Congress, out of concern that the federal
bureaucracy was too independent and unresponsive to elected officials, including themselves,
eliminated the Civil Service Commission and replaced it with the Office of Personnel
Management, under closer control of the President. The Act also created the Senior Executive
Service, which granted Presidents greater authority in assigning top federal supervisory
employees to the agency of the President’s choosing (Legal-Dictionary, 2014).
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The major provisions in the Act included requiring performance appraisals for all employees,
merit pay on a variety of levels but focusing primarily on managerial levels, and modifications
for dealing with poor performers (Wikipedia, 2013). This first venturing into merit pay for
federal employees was a substantial break from the long tradition of automatic salary increases
based on length of service. Under the Act, those employees covered by these provisions
received only half of their annual increases automatically and the other half was tied to their
performance. A key part of this new system, however, was that it was designed to be revenue
neutral. As such, in order for anyone to benefit from this new performance-based upside salary
potential, someone else had to financially suffer.

The major positive impacts of the Act were that it clarified job expectations and began an
evolving process of defining goals and objectives for federal jobs. Its greatest failure was in not
effectively establishing its intended linkage between pay and performance. This failure had a
number of causes, not least of which was a lack of adequate funding. In addition, because the
Act focused primarily on establishing that link just for managers, it often produced results in
which managers found themselves receiving less pay than their non-managerial counterparts
because the counterparts were still under the traditional step-and-grade compensation system,
which produced higher wage inflation rates. In addition, these first efforts to define and measure
job expectations were not particularly well-refined. As such, some complained that the system
produced arbitrary results between and among managers’ ratings leaving many to view it as an
unfair assessment of performance. Finally, the public’s negative reaction to senior federal
executives who were assessed favorably and received large salary increases was unanticipated.
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Reform along these lines continued, however, with the adoption of the Performance Management
and Recognition System (PMRS) in 1984 (Wikipedia, 2013). Continued efforts to refine
performance expectations and measures contributed to greater accuracy in performance
evaluations. In addition, the Act provided limits on minimum and maximum levels of pay
increases to limit the disparity among those employees covered by merit pay provisions. A
Performance Standard Review Board was also created for each department to assist in
developing further credibility in the performance measures used for performance assessments;
the Act required that a majority of the members of these boards had to be employees covered by
the merit pay provisions of the Act.

Although this reform was seen as a significant improvement over the previous effort, PMRS
lasted only from 1984 to 1991. Critics continued to cite that the new system, even though
improved, still contained inadequate discrimination between and among performance levels, did
not contain adequate performance findings and had little demonstrable evidence that the system
produced improved performance. Interestingly, again, it was not the linkage of performance to
pay, per se, that contributed to the demise of these efforts, but rather that the linkage to pay
increased the importance of getting the performance assessment done with high accuracy and
credibility—when the performance assessment wasn’t good enough, the system could not sustain
itself.

Subsequently, various federal government agencies continue to dabble in variations on pay-forperformance compensation systems. More will be covered on that in the next section. As of this
writing, however, there has been no comprehensive system installed in the federal government to
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link pay with performance. That does not mean that the tension between civil service and
political appointment has faded into history. Policymakers continue to desire to have a highly
responsive delivery system for their preferred programs and services. Good government
advocate continue to desire protections for government employees from undue political influence
that could motivate them to advance their political superior’s political agendas instead of the
public’s. The debate is ongoing.

Contemporary evidence of this tension and movement between civil service employment
protected from undue political influence and at-will political employment that is hyperresponsive to political influence can be seen in recent news reports of delays in serving patients
at Veteran’s Administration hospitals throughout the nation, which ultimately led to the
resignation of the head of the Veteran’s Administration Eric Shinseki, and subsequent calls for
greater flexibility in disciplining and removing federal employees, especially senior leaders, who
fail to serve well.

Senior leaders in that instance were accused of covering up long patient waiting times and
inferior health outcomes, including premature deaths. When investigations showed that there did
seem to be a systematic white-washing of information to suit the demands of the department’s
politically-appointed leadership, the response was not to change the reporting relationships, but
rather to want to overhaul the people holding those leadership roles. The political appointees
were the first casualties, but subsequent calls for reform led to the adoption of provisions that
allowed lower levels of the Veterans Administration to be hired and fired more easily than other
similarly-ranked employees within other departments of the government, thereby extending the
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reach of at-will political appointment deeper into the grades of federal employment than has been
seen since the 1970s.

It is hard to conclude that there is one right mix of at-will political employment and protected
civil service employment. At-will employment is the dominant form of employment in the
private sector stemming from the belief that so closely tying the employee’s fortunes to that of
the enterprise is how to produce the best outcome for everyone. Verkuil (2015) argues, however,
that the goals for public service are not so clearly defined. Further, he asserts that healthy civil
service protections for public employee guarantees the institutional memory to survive changing
political administrations and is the equivalent in human infrastructure as roads and bridges are to
physical infrastructure in maintaining our system of governance. Yet, he also acknowledges that
we need both forms of infrastructure to be resilient to changing environmental conditions, both
political and environmental (hurricanes, terrorist attacks, and so on).

Those very types of reforms are frequently called for from among citizens and public policy
advocates as well. Recently, the Partnership for Public Service (2014) called for a dramatic
overhaul of the federal civil service system. In their report, they argued,
“There is an absence of clarity and consequence regarding individual and organizational
performance. Top performers seldom receive sufficient rewards, poor performers are
rarely fired or demoted, and managers are not held accountable for how well they manage
employees or the outcomes of the work they oversee.
What was once a unified civil service system with a set of common rules and procedures has
become deeply fractured, with numerous agencies having obtained special exemptions from
Congress that give them greater leeway in setting pay, classifying jobs, hiring and rewarding top-
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performing employees, even while other agencies are saddled with the outdated General
Schedule (GS) system created in 1940. As a result, agencies wind up competing among
themselves for critical talent, as well as with the private sector, and those organizations with the
added flexibilities end up having a distinct advantage.” Stier & Howell, Jr., 2014, p. 8.

Movements toward or away from pay-for-performance does not determine the right mix of atwill versus civil service employment for any point in time, but it is an issue that is contributing
very much to the dialogue at the periphery. The fundamental issue is how responsive our public
employment systems are to making a real difference on the objectives and goals that advance
public policy outcomes that the public wishes government to pursue. Note this is not the same as
saying the advance of public policy objectives that any given political leader wishes to advance.
What we are left with is a highly decentralized and disbursed leadership model, which makes it
more difficult for the civil service to be responsive. Compensation systems feed into that debate
in so far as they examine the degree to which various models of compensation systems can
effectively motivate greater advances to those objectives or not. Can the transparent debate and
clarification of the appropriate goals and objectives of the civil service through the pluralistic
political process ever well enough define performance expectations that are measurable and
achievable such that linking performance to pay has any hope of advancing them more than not?
Does linking compensation to a performance assessment process advance organizational
outcomes more than not doing so? It’s an age-old question that has no easy answer; but, as we
shall see, that has not prevented many from trying to do so.
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CHAPTER 2

BACKGROUND AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Background of the problem
Much has been written about merit-based or performance-based pay. While more of that
literature pertains to the private sector, there is still a considerable body of research regarding the
public sector. Little has been done empirically, however, to gauge the effectiveness of achieving
desired outcomes through the use of performance-based pay.

Performance-based pay has been defined in any of a number of ways by various scholars. For
instance, Risher (1999, Pg. 9) defines it as “a policy that links annual wage and salary increases
to employee performance over the prior year.” Hoerr (1998, Pg. 326) describes it, in an
educational institution, as “a system of teacher evaluation and remuneration that focuses on
teaching performance, not just teacher longevity.” England and Pierson (1990) refer to a merit
pay guide chart as a ‘look-up’ table for awarding merit increases based on (1) employee
performance, (2) position in the pay range, and, in a few cases, (3) the time since the last pay
increase. At the heart of the matter, a performance-based pay program is attempting to link
compensation, and specifically future increases in it, to continuing increases in organizational
and/or individual performance. As noted by Miller (2014), p. 1, “The message from the top
down, enunciated at strategy meetings and then emphasized in calibration sessions, is that
recommended rewards must reflect what the company is trying to accomplish.”

The philosophy of traditional compensation programs is rooted in a Frederick Taylor-like view
of the needs of a compensation program (Risher, 1999). Workers were viewed as an extension of
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the machines and the goal was to make them as efficient and reliable as the machines. What they
were supposed to do was often documented in lengthy job descriptions. In that era, managers had
a great deal of discretion to mete out rewards and punishments as they saw fit. As a result, the
exercise of their discretion to hire, fire, discipline, and increase compensation based on
favoritism or other reasons that would be illegal today was widespread. Understandably, workers
rejected this methodology and fought back in the form of the rise of the labor union movement.

Traditional compensation systems with steps and grades was a management response to the
outgrowth of labor unions, either in response to them forming or in an effort to avoid them
forming. It was an effort by corporate management to reduce discretion given to front-line
management in, among other things, compensation decisions. These systems were designed and
administered by human resource professionals. They were certainly a reflection of their time as
they were as rigid and structured as the work environments of their time. Their aim was to
standardize the rates of increases for employees to eliminate bias and favoritism on the part of
line managers.
As Risher (1999, Pg. 324) observed, “Since workers rarely moved from one employer to another,
it was natural to focus on internal considerations. The model for job evaluations was developed
by industrial engineers. In that environment, a worker’s performance was dictated by the
machine that he tended; as long as he obeyed the rules and performed adequately, he could
expect the standard pay increase.”

It would be difficult to argue that the needs and goals of that emerging industrial era are not
vastly different than the needs and goals of today’s globalized, information-based society. Those
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companies who were the cornerstone of the development of those kinds of compensation systems
are frequently now fighting for their survival. We have become a knowledge-based and servicebased economy in which “tending a machine” is the least important task. We now value
problem-solving skills and customer service skills to the particular disfavor of those who may be
more resistant to change. Edward Lawler, head of the Center for Effective Organizations at USC,
and probably one of the most respected compensation experts, has focused his work on criticisms
of the traditional compensation model. He probably did more to influence the demise of these
systems than anyone. Lawler’s points, as summarized by Risher (1999), are in Figure 1.

This transformation in philosophy did not happen overnight, but more and more corporations
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Figure 1 – Criticism of the Traditional Compensation Model


Reinforces the importance of the job hierarchy at a time when organizations are trying
to downplay their hierarchical differences to promote teamwork.



Overemphasizes salary grade changes and promotions as the basis for salary increases
rather than focusing on the need to develop and enhance job competence.



Motivates “game playing” and dishonesty as the basis for justifying a higher salary
grade.



Hinders organizational change and downsizing since all job changes have to be reevaluated under traditional compensation programs.



Perpetuates overly rigid and inflexible rules governing compensation.



Creates a sense of entitlement if pay is increased across the board.



Takes too much time and costs too much to maintain the program.



Requires excessive time to prepare for and make administrative decisions.



Perpetuates bureaucratic management.



Establishes implicit limits on what employees are willing to do since their pay is
based on the duties listed in their job description.



Creates tension between line managers and the human resources staff who are
required to defend the program principles and “police” the decision process.
Lawler, as quoted by Risher (1999, Pg. 326)

sought out alternative compensation strategies.

According to Risher (1999), the early and consistent favorite of the private sector has been
variations on performance-based pay programs to the point where today they are virtually the
universal favorite of the private sector. He reports that surveys of company practice show that
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97% of respondents have a merit pay policy, likening it to motherhood and apple pie within
corporate circles. The performance-based pay philosophy has so permeated the U.S. corporate
culture that we have coined the term “meritocracy” to distinguish our society from others.

The psychological basis for the wisdom of performance-based pay is contained in expectancy
theory, equity theory, and reinforcement theory. These psychological constructs, as outlined by
Lowery, Petty, and Thompson (1995), play a significant role in determining whether and to what
extent employees will embrace a particularly constructed compensation model, whether it be
performance-based or otherwise. Expectancy theory holds that reward systems that are
performance contingent should lead to higher levels of performance than systems not based on
performance. There are three key building blocks upon which this theory is based. First, the
effort-to-performance expectancy, which holds that employees have some expectation as to
whether a particular level of effort will lead to a particular, desired level of performance. People
have to believe that if they put out the effort, the performance will indeed follow. Second,
employees also have an expectation about the likelihood of a reward following a particular level
of performance. In order for a worker to be willing to invest the energy towards high
performance, they must believe that to do so will improve their overall conditions and that their
performance will ultimately be rewarded. Finally, the rewards must be sufficiently valued to
elicit the performance-improving behavior. If these conditions are met, according to expectancy
theory, then enhanced employee performance should result.

That said, there are, indeed, some obstacles to the successful application of the theory.
Employee effort may not result in improved performance for a variety of reasons, including lack
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of skills or poor management (Marsden, 2003). Performance may not translate into reward if it
is inaccurately measured or if there are budgetary constraints. In addition, the rewards may not
be as highly valued as in the private sector, perhaps because public employees are motivated by
other goals, such as the intrinsic interest of their work. Finally, the rewards, even if valued, may
not result in extra effort if, for example, employees’ jobs give them no authority or discretion to
increase their performance. The boxes marked ‘obstacles’ (Figure 2) provide a good outline of
the areas on which design of a performance pay plan should concentrate in order to maximize the
chances of a successful program.
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Figure 2 – Outline of the 'expectancy' framework

Obstacles:
• Inadequate s kills
• Weak goal s etting
• Poor coordination

Effort

Obstacles:
• Poor performance measurement
• Mgt. lack necess ary money
• Mgt.bad faith

Performance

Reward

Value of
reward
to employees

Obstacles:
• No s cope to increas e effort
• Very tight management
• Already work at max.

Obstacles:
• Performance rewards not valued
• Other motivators more important
• Con flicts with other motivators
• Mgt. motives dis trusted

Marsden, 1998, Pg. 3

Equity theory provides another vehicle for examining the effectiveness of pay on performance
and overall employee job satisfaction. According to this theory, also as outlined by Lowery,
Petty, and Thompson (1995), employees provide inputs to their organization through work effort
and in return receive outputs from the organization, such as pay. Employees will compare their
ratio of inputs to outputs to the ratio of inputs to outputs for other employees. If they perceive
that they are either over- or under-rewarded, if they feel that an inequity exists, they may adjust
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their performance in an effort to correct the inequity. Thus, if a compensation system, even one
based on performance, affects an employee’s feelings of equity, performance may be affected.
Therefore, according to Lowery, Petty, and Thompson (1995, Pg. 477), “a pay-for-performance
system which rewards higher performing employees with more pay based on their higher level of
inputs, relative to lower performing employees, should result in feelings of satisfaction.” Hyde
(2005, Pg. 5) calls this the true test of performance pay, indicating there must be “sufficient
variability in pay so outstanding performers receive large rewards, average performers get small
raises . . .and poor performers get no increase.”
As also noted by Lowery, Petty, and Thompson (1995, Pg. 475), “The concept of performancebased pay is so intuitively appealing that it seems almost ludicrous to disagree with it. Most
people would agree that people who perform at a higher level should be paid more than those
whose performance is not as high.” Yet, merit-based pay programs have had a significantly more
difficult time catching on in the public sector. In fact, they have frequently failed (Risher, 1999).

Reinforcement theory provides the third philosophical basis for performance pay systems.
Risher (2004) explains reinforcement theory as emphasizing the importance of reinforcing
desired behaviors by linking consequences with desired results or behaviors in as timely a
fashion as possible. This can mean quick rewards for the behavior you want to see more of or
swift negative consequences for the failure to produce desired results. Further, the theory argues
for a variability in the reward cycle such that a reward or “punishment” is not exacted every
time, which is likely more practical at any rate. This theory is classic behavior modification.
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In addition, there is other evidence that indicates that a pay-for-performance system will create a
greater sense of ownership and, therefore, commitment to the organization that is offering it
(Brown and Sessions, 2006). Brown and Sessions (2006) hypothesized a continuum of vesting
in your organization from those who are working on a fixed-rate to those who have the potential
for performance pay to those who are self-employed or own the business. They used an
experience-earnings profile to determine whether compensation and, by extension, positive
organizational outcomes are related to the way in which an employee is compensated. Their
findings did show a statistically significant difference that followed on their original hypothesis.
Specifically, performance pay does move an employee along the experience-earnings profile
from the fixed-rate employee, but not as far along the continuum as the self-employed individual.

Performance pay has, of late, become somewhat of a management fad among federal agencies.
It has become the announced compensation philosophy for the Department of Homeland
Security and the Department of Defense (Risher, 2004). Risher is doubtful, however, that these
federal agencies have the systems in place to make their programs succeed. Risher suggests this
is not because the employees are so different. In fact, he documents focus group findings from a
study of General Services Administration federal employees indicating:





Employees want to have their value or contributions recognized and rewarded.
Employees want to feel they are accomplishing something they view as important.
They will work very hard to achieve goals. It is the desire for a sense of
accomplishment or achievement that drives performance.
Employees want to grow in their jobs and to enhance their competence.
Employees look for opportunities to fully use their capabilities and look for
challenging jobs.
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Clearly, you could hear the same motivations expressed in a focus group of any private sector
pool of employees.

Obviously, in both the public and the private sector, these motivations are not values held by all
employees. Workers can get turned off at work from cumulative negative experiences and they
would then be less receptive to performance pay plans. Ironically, most of the triggers for such a
negative orientation are often the result of bad supervision in the first place (Risher, 2004).

In the rest of the federal service, it began slowly and primarily as an initiative to incent and
reward senior executives and has slowly worked its way down the food chain (Hyde, 2005).
Hyde (2005) indicates that while this movement has been progressing slowly for years, it has not
been without its setbacks. Historically, the performance appraisal process was based on
behaviorally anchored rating scales that were notorious for inflated ratings that were not
necessarily related to any positive organization outcomes. Reforms are now in process, but
progress remains slow. Hyde (2005) notes that in order for this effort to ultimately be successful,
gains in productivity, however those agencies may define them, must exceed the costs of the
performance measurement itself. Further complicating the task is that much federal work is
multidimensional, done in teams with multiple stakeholders and with multiple objectives. Hyde
(2005) references some studies that suggest that linking pay to individual performance may
undercut things like teamwork, levels of cooperation, and relationships among teams within
organizations. In the end, the success of this initiative within the federal civil service is far from
a settled question.

There are many reasons why the majority of the public sector has not embraced performance
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based pay plans as enthusiastically as the private sector. Greene and Scott (1991) suggest a
number of reasons why public organizations continue to use traditional time-based pay
programs. These include that time-based programs allow a public agency to predict its future
costs with more certainty, it avoids the difficulties associated with performance evaluation, it is
generally more acceptable to union leaders and in situations where employees do not believe
management has the ability to fairly administer a merit program, and it greatly reduces
disagreements (appeal/litigation) over evaluations of individual performance.

For instance, employee performance evaluations might arguably be more difficult to do in the
public sector where the more clear objectives of market share and net profit are not available to
guide decisions as to the quality of employees’ or team performance. There can be little question
but that the public sector is more heavily unionized than the private sector and therefore unions’
preference for the time-based programs will have a more heavily-weighted impact. In addition,
the presence of a political leadership might well contribute to a lack of faith in the ability of “the
system” to fairly and equitably administer a performance-based program. Finally, it is not hard
to conceive of the additional aversion the public sector has to appeals and litigations of salary
decisions that might be more likely to be opened up under a performance-based program.

It seems that these reasons would be enough to explain why merit-based programs are more
prevalent in the private sector than in the public sector, but it is more difficult to see how these
reasons alone can explain why they are nearly universally used in the private sector and used so
sparingly in the public sector. Risher (1999) suggests some additional reasons, including that
corporate pay programs remain, by policy, shrouded in secrecy where individual pay programs,
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pay increases, and pay levels are still confidential, making it easier to live with differences in pay
rates; corporate employees rarely have a protected right to file grievances or otherwise appeal if
they don’t like a pay decision. In addition, an intangible difference is the relative obsession with
performance in the corporate world where every corporate employee knows the bottom line and
the need to perform better than the competition—the need to sustain and improve high
performance is an accepted goal providing an unquestioned acceptance of merit pay.

Risher (1999, Pg. 10) argues, however, that probably the most important difference, albeit
intangible, is the way in which the public versus the private sector views the application of meritbased pay programs:

For reasons that go back in history, the public sector has often pushed for merit pay as a rationale
for denying increases to poor performers. In contrast, the emphasis in the corporate world is on
recognizing and rewarding the better performers. Few corporate employees are denied increases,
and that possibility is almost forgotten. The emphasis on granting extra money means that merit
pay is much more positively perceived in the private sector than in the public one.

There could be a variety of reasons for this, including the influence of the added political
environment at work in the public sector or, possibly, tighter budgets. Regardless the reason, it
can easily be seen that, if true, it would have a dramatic dampening effect on support for the
system. There wouldn’t necessarily be any benefit to satisfactorily performing employees or
high performing employees, but there would be a punishment for poor performing employees.
Where is the constituency to support this plan among employees? It is a case in point that an
elected body can substantially influence organizational culture and change initiatives but it
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cannot sustain them without some consent, even if only grudging, from the managed workers
themselves.

One finding of a study done by Seay, Smith, and Crews (1995), however, when taken together
with future demographic changes necessitated by the retiring of the Baby Boom generation and
the likely resultant workforce shortage, is that performance-based programs seem to be more
widely accepted by younger people. In a study examining superintendent versus school board
chair perceptions of performance based pay programs, the researchers found a statistically
significant difference in the responses of the interview subjects based on their age. They found
that, among superintendents, the age most favoring performance-based pay were those between
the ages of 31-40 years of age (how many superintendents do you really think there are younger
than 31?!) While the group who were the least in favor of it were 51 and older. This suggests
that the next generation of workers may come with radically different expectations about how
they expect rewards to be distributed in the future.

Opposition to performance-based pay in the public sector has been broad and fairly consistent. In
fact, the summer 2000 convention of the National Education Association, a teachers’ union,
rejected a rather weak proposal to use performance evaluations to pay bonuses to teachers
(Lewis, 2000). Nonetheless, there are examples in the research. One example is one adopted by
the Piscataway Township, New Jersey, Public Schools in 1991 (Geiger, 1993). This particular
program was adopted for the administrators in the school’s system. Another example, in a local
government setting, is the city of Normandy Park, Washington, in which a pay-for-performance
system is in place for all employees and was designed in a high-involvement way with
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participation and cooperation from their collective bargaining units (MacReynold and Hopkins,
1998). Scott, Markham, and Vest (1996) provide yet another example of a merit pay program
they are evaluating three years after its implementation at a public transit authority; it was
available only to non-union managerial, professional, technical, and clerical positions. There
are, of course, widely scattered examples across the country, including Hamilton County Ohio
Department of Human Services (County News, 2002), Fairfax County Virginia (ICMA IQ
Report, 2007), among others.

More recently, teachers in three Minneapolis schools and the school district in Waseca,
Minnesota agreed to participate in a pilot program in which merit increases would be offered to
teachers who achieve certain benchmarks of performance (Curriculum Review, 2004). The merit
increases range up to $8,000, which might explain the teachers’ willingness to pilot the program.
Subsequently, the Waseca school district ended its pilot program in 2006. Minneapolis, in
contrast, has expanded the program and now has 14 schools using the system (Office of the
Legislative Auditor, 2009).

Another Minnesota example is performance pay established within the Dakota County
Attorney’s Office (Backstrom, 2009). This system rates the work of the county’s assistant
county attorneys on a variety of factors, including performance on skills deemed fundamental to
the practice of public sector law, developmental skills, and personal motivational factors.
Further, the system establishes different performance levels expected based on the different
grade associated with the various attorney job classifications.

Yet another Minnesota example is in Scott County (Abboud & Kemme, 2010). This

D i s s e r t a t i o n | 38

performance pay system grew out of necessity from declining tax revenues brought on by the
crisis of the Great Recession, but was also the outcome of years of building a performance
culture. County leadership had spent years building trusting relationships with its union
counterparts, which led, in part, to securing union leadership for the transition. Even then, the
system is very difficult to sustain. According to Abboud & Kemme (2010, p. 44), “For this
system to work, it requires flawless execution, trust from employees, and leadership
collaboration. . . . [A] performance culture requires a clear definition of performance, a solid
goal-setting process, and a significant investment in education and communication to foster an
environment of trust. . . . Pay for performance is an extension of the organization’s culture,
which takes years to build.”

The trend toward performance pay does appear to be growing, but even that is not a universally
held view. W. Edward Deming was a consistent critic of performance pay and, in surveys of
workers, performance-based rewards and advancement potential often score low on features that
make up an attractive place to work (Risher, 2004). Other research suggests that employees are
not that significantly motivated by the prospect of higher pay (Crum, 2003). Crum further notes
that if the pool of resources for performance pay is insufficient, as he argues it frequently is in
the public sector, then to give the top 20% a pay increase of sufficient size to potentially alter
their behavior might mean that the next 60% of the workforce would get less than they otherwise
would have received, producing disastrous consequences for the organization. Finally, some
argue that the performance pay will not be adopted until there is a sufficient crisis that is
powerful enough to drive people to be more willing to experiment with new initiatives (Kramer,
1995). So while there is a theoretical basis for performance pay systems, it remains unclear to
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what extent employees will fully embrace them, especially in public service where the
connections between pay and performance may be more tenuous and the amount of the reward
more uncertain and unstable.

What little research there is available on public sector performance pay systems casts grave
doubts on the efficacy of such plans (Prentice, Burgess, and Propper, 2007). In fact, in a May,
2005 Policy Brief from the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development
(OECD)(Pg. 14), the opposite was found:

While performance-related pay appears to motivate a minority of staff in the public sector, a
large majority just do not see it as an incentive to work better. Extensive staff surveys, conducted
notably in the United Kingdom and the United States, showed that despite broad support for the
principle (emphasis added) of linking pay to performance, only a small percentage of employees
thought their existing performance pay schemes provided them with an incentive to work beyond
job requirements and in many cases they found it divisive.

Most government workers, particularly those in non-managerial roles, consider basic pay and
how it compares to the wider job market as far more important than supplementary pay increases
for performance. This is because performance rewards are often limited in the public sector, but
also because job content and career development prospects have been found to be the strongest
incentives for public employees. PRP (performance related pay) is unlikely to motivate a
substantial majority of staff, irrespective of the design.

Marsden, (1993) reports similar findings in that although many public employees thought that

D i s s e r t a t i o n | 40

linking pay to performance was a good idea (57% of Inland Revenue Tax Service staff in 1991
agreed performance pay was a good principle), very few agreed that it worked well to motivate
them within their own performance pay plan. Even worse, there was substantial percentages of
employees who said that the operation of their performance pay plan in fact caused jealousies,
undermined cooperation with colleagues and with management, and that management used
performance pay to reward their favorite employees. Apparently the feeling was somewhat
mutual as line managers who were charged with doing the appraisals reported some loss of
cooperation from among the rank and file.

It would seem that performance pay is an idea with broad appeal, but does it have broad
efficacy? Many studies have concluded that the impact of performance pay on performance is
limited, and can in fact be negative (OECD, 2007). Other studies by the OECD suggest that it is
very complex and difficult to implement. These studies also conclude that the impact of
performance pay at the managerial level had failed to achieve key motivational benchmarks for
effective performance pay, in part, because of poor designs and also because of implementation
problems. More importantly, however, the studies also concluded that these systems failed
because performance assessment is so inherently difficult in the public sector (Marsden, 1993;
OECD, 2007). Performance measurement in the public sector requires a great degree of
supervisory judgment. The definition of good performance itself is quite subjective and complex.
In the public sector, in particular, there is a great deal of difficulty finding suitable quantitative
indicators. In addition, performance objectives often change with government policy and with
changes in governmental administrations.
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The International City/County Managers Association (2007) also detailed a number of reasons
why performance pay programs can struggle in the public sector. Given limited budgets, if the
pool for merit increases is similar in size to the former method of step-and-grade increases, then
merit pay is a zero-sum game—increases given to some are at the expense of those withheld
from others. In addition, unless performance management has been done well, many years of
ineffective reviews or past merit pay abuses may also contribute to resistance. Evaluation rating
inflation over time, when performance reviews were not tied to performance may make the
transition very difficult when employees will need to be more accurately stratified according to
their real contribution to the organization’s success. Finally, the public sector is much more
heavily unionized and organized labor’s resistance is common. The International Public
Management Association for Human Resources (2007) lists lack of managerial trust as a major
contributor to failure of merit pay systems.

There is also an interesting new body of work called Self-Determination theory being advanced
that studies what motivates human performance from more of a Maslow’s hierarchy sort of
approach. Basically, the research suggests that people ought to be paid sufficiently to meet their
basic needs and then higher-order methods of motivation should be used to enhance performance
(Pink, 2011). In a meta analysis of 92 studies, Judge (2010) concluded that there is very little
correlation, less than 2%, between salary and job satisfaction. This was true whether controlled
for region of the world or for rank within an organization. This is consistent with research from
the Gallup organization (2006) showing no significant difference in employee engagement by
pay level. These works are suggesting that money does not motivate performance.
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Taken further, work by Deci (1999), synthesizing the results of 128 controlled experiments,
highlighted consistent negative effects of incentives—from marshmallows to dollars—on
intrinsic motivation. Intrinsic motivation, which is related to wanting to do a task for the sheer
joy or stimulation of doing it, contrasts with extrinsic motivation, which would be focused on the
completion of a task in order to achieve some kind of external reward unrelated to the task itself.
Deci’s work suggests that there may be some natural tension between intrinsic and extrinsic
incentives on human performance. For example, Deci’s found that for every standard deviation
increase in reward, intrinsic motivation for interesting tasks decreases by about 25%. When
rewards are tangible and foreseeable (if subjects know how much extra money they will receive)
intrinsic motivation decreases by 36%. Importantly, however, he also found that for
uninteresting (rote or repetitive) tasks, extrinsic rewards, like money, actually increases
motivation. Deci’s (Pg. 659) conclusion is noteworthy that “strategies that focus primarily on
the use of extrinsic rewards do, indeed, run a serious risk of diminishing rather than promoting
intrinsic motivation.”

Expanding on the question of whether extrinsic rewards versus intrinsic rewards make a
difference in the motivation to perform various types of tasks e.g. simple, less interesting tasks
versus more complex or interesting tasks, Weibel, Rost, and Osterloh (2009) also found that it
does. Overall, their findings indicate that there is a significant and positive correlation between
public sector pay for performance systems and organizational performance, but that this effect is
moderated by task type. For less interesting tasks, there was a greater positive effect and for
more interesting tasks, there was actually a negative effect. In a nursing home setting, for
instance, performance pay did improve quality indicators of nursing care that were especially
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routine (Weissert & Frederick, 2013).

A subsequent study found similar findings, except that the crowding out of intrinsic motivation
by extrinsic rewards was found to be linked to pro-social activities (Belle, 2015). In this study,
Belle found that for activities that have a visible prosocial impact that would maximize an
individual’s social standing, monetary reward were more effective if they are secret rather than
open. In other words, if an individual perceives that the pursuit of the monetary reward is
perceived by others as greedy, the motivation of the pay is drastically mitigated. Further, the
study found that non-monetary rewards did not seem to suffer the same fate.

This suggests that higher-order or social-order functions may be inhibited by a performance
based pay system whereas lower order functions are enhanced leading some to conclude that a
focus on performance management but without the linkage to performance pay may produce
better outcomes than linking outcomes to pay (Frey, Homberg, and Osterloh, 2013). For all the
debate about linking performance to pay, there seems to be much more clear agreement among
practitioners that the value of an effective performance management system by itself is clear
(Kavanagh, 2013). In fact, some suggest that an effective performance management system will,
by itself, improve strategic decision-making, but also note that other factors, such as effective
governance and funding diversity also play a role in that (LeRoux & Wright, 2010).

In addition, the connection between intrinsic versus extrinsic motivation and job satisfaction
does not appear to be a direct line (Stazyk, 2009). As might be expected, even if there is a higher
than average degree of intrinsic motivation among public employees, there is a range of the
degree to which this is a primary motivation. Stazyk’s (2009) work suggests that performance
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pay systems crowd out intrinsic motivation for public service primarily among only those who
had high intrinsic motivation to begin with. More importantly his findings indicated that this
crowding effect had no measurable impact on overall job satisfaction.

The evidence about this linkage, however, between an intrinsic, public-service motivation versus
an extrinsic compensation reward is not at all conclusive. French and Emerson (2014), found
that the level of intrinsic versus extrinsic motivation varied considerably from one person to the
next concluding that people come into public service for a variety of reasons, that the reasons can
be both intrinsic and extrinsic for any given individual, and that the proportion of intrinsic to
extrinsic can vary from one individual to the next. Their conclusion was that there is no overarching reason why people choose to work in public service and that people who seek security,
better pay, or better fringe benefits are also attracted to public service within various public
service roles.

Motivation is not the only factor either as there is also some evidence to indicate that public
employees who work in a performance pay system are less happy than those who do not (Choi
&Whitford, 2013). This seems to reinforce other findings suggesting public sector workers are
less in favor of tying their compensation changes to performance factors. In the private sector,
54% believe that their salary should reflect their own performance, 36% think it should be based
on inflation or the cost of living change, and 32% think it should be based on their experience
(CIPD, 2013). In the public sector, 55% of workers feel their pay should reflect inflation or
changes in the cost of living, 36% believe it should be based on individual performance, and
33% think it should be based on their experience. It is unclear, however, if these perceptions are
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based on the differences in experience and exposure of public sector workers versus private
sector workers to variable compensation systems in general.

Another recent study (Cho & Perry, 2011) also found a strong correlation between employee
engagement levels and intrinsic motivations. Analysing real-world data from a representative
sample of over 200,000 U.S. public sector employees, the results showed that employee
engagement levels were three times more strongly related to intrinsic rather than extrinsic
rewards, but that both motives tend to cancel each other out. In other words, when employees
have little interest in external rewards, their intrinsic motivation has a substantial positive effect
on their engagement levels. However, when employees are focused on external rewards, the
effects of intrinsic motives on engagement are significantly diminished. According to Cho and
Perry, this means that employees who are intrinsically motivated are three times more engaged
than employees who are extrinsically motivated, such as by money. Quite simply, these findings
suggest you’re more likely to enjoy your job if you focus on the work itself, and less likely to
enjoy it if you’re focused on money. Further, and more importantly, they suggest that the more
people are focused on their salaries, including an emphasis on pay for performance, the less they
will focus on satisfying their intellectual curiosity, learning new skills, or having fun, all of
which, arguably, are the very things that make people perform their best. Pink (2011) suggests
that extrinsic rewards, by their very nature, narrow our focus.

Of course, not all empirical evidence points to performance pay being a failure. Even if the
intended results aren’t always achieved, there is some data to suggest that performance pay
systems have often been positively correlated with a more general organizational strategy to
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redefine the objectives of public service work, to make it more responsive to the needs of
citizens, or at least, to be better adapted to the wide diversity of expectations placed upon it by
different groups of citizens (Marsden, 2003). When performance pay systems have a strong
focus on goal-setting and organizational objectives, they can provide a conduit through which
management can communicate the new set of objectives to employees. There is some evidence
to suggest that the new organizational objectives are better internalized by employees than in the
absence of the performance pay system. As Marsden notes (Pg. 7), “For example, in the British
tax service, one of the goals of the performance pay system introduced in 1993-94 was to get
away from defining job performance in relation to a set of fixed standards, and move towards
objectives that were agreed between line managers and employees. The latter could be more
easily adapted both to the abilities of individual employees, and to the varied needs of the
different parts of the tax service.” In essence, the move to the performance pay plan provided a
context within which individual objectives could be more meaningfully determined.

Most recently, advancement of performance pay in the public sector also appears to have been
significantly impacted by the effects of the Great Recession. A recent survey by the
International Public Management Association for Human Resources (IPMA-HR, 2012) finds that
organizations reporting the use of any form of variable compensation, the most prevalent of
which is performance pay, dropped from 45 percent in 2007 to 29 percent in 2012. Overall, this
appears to have been due to broad cost-cutting strategies related to controlling labor costs,
including freezing pay, layoffs, hiring freezes, and so on. This points to another issue with
performance pay in that changing economic conditions can radically alter the degree to which a
motivation can be created through compensation during periods when compensation increases
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are being strangled.

From an overall perspective, a study by the Office of the Auditor of the Metro Council of
Portland, Oregon (2004) details twelve factors that it says contribute to the success of
performance pay systems in public entities and nine factors that inhibit success. Those factors
that they indicate advance success are:






















A compelling, well-defined, fully-articulated and fact-based business need.
Employees who are highly motivated by monetary rewards.
Clear links between the organization’s objectives, employee performance, and pay.
Meaningful rewards consistent with individual, team and organizational achievements.
Structured and consistently-applied performance management systems.
Measuring the performance pay program itself for success.
Employee participation in design, implementation, and monitoring.
Full and consistent funding.
Continuous training for new and existing managers and staff.
Program proponents who lead by example.
The switch to performance-based compensation is positioned as an organizational
development initiative.
Continuous flexibility and refinement.
Those factors that they suggest inhibit the success of a performance pay program in
public entities are as follows:
Failure to link employee performance objectives to the organization’s objectives
produces weak support within the organization.
Invalid performance appraisals lead directly to program credibility problems.
Lack of adequate financial rewards and budget cycle barriers inhibit program success.
The performance reward connection is not clear.
The performance-effort connection is not clear.
Money may not be a prime motivator for some employees.
Performance pay can become an administrative burden.
Faulty assumptions by performance pay proponents lead to unmet expectations.

Finally, performance pay programs have failed when participants, policy makers, media, or
others publicly criticized one or more aspects of the plan, subjecting an entire system to a level
of scrutiny it could not withstand.
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Broderick and Mavor (1991) argued much the same up by saying,
“Our review of existing theory, diverse types of research, and clinical experience
suggests that there are certain preconditions that appear to be necessary (though not
sufficient) for pay for performance to do more good than harm: for instance, ample
performance-based rewards available to be distributed; participants who are
knowledgeable about the linkage between their actions and rewards received; credible
indices of performance; and incentives for those doing the performance appraisal to do it
well versus incentives for them to not differentiate among subordinates. To the extent
that some of these necessary preconditions may not be satisfied in many government
contexts, there is reason to question whether the prerequisites for beneficial effects are
satisfied.” p. 36.
Lawler (1990) probably best summed up the challenges with merit-based pay systems, whether
they are public sector or private sector. He points out that in order for a merit system to be
effective, there must be credible and comprehensive measures of performance and that without
these it is impossible to relate pay to performance. He points out that in most organizations,
performance appraisals are not done well and, as a result, no good measures of individual
performance exists. In addition, he notes that in many situations work performance is simply not
easily measured by focusing on an individual’s performance versus the team’s performance.

The ultimate conundrum of performance pay is thus accurately and objectively measuring
performance, something that should arguably be done well for a variety of reasons, including
giving employees credible performance feedback and creating benchmarks of organizational
performance. There are tools to assist organizations with doing this (Poister, 2003), but it
requires a commitment that many public sector organizations may not have the time, energy, or
inclination to pursue, especially after cutbacks in staffing in the public sector associated with the
Great Recession.
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Lawler (1990) further argues that in the absence of objective measures, most organizations rely
on the subjective judgments of managers and these judgments are often seen by subordinates as
unfair, invalid and discriminatory. As that perception persists, the system simply does not
deliver the change in performance that it was intended to deliver. Lawler suggests that these
problems are not insurmountable, but rather require careful planning and execution. A study by
the Metropolitan Council of Portland (2004) concluded that pay for performance for public
entities can only succeed “when the political climate is right, employees accept it, managers are
trained to implement it fairly and consistently and agencies monitor it regularly.” p. 2.

Theorists have also long noted that organizational performance is not simply the aggregation of
individual performance; organizations are complex social environments creating a mismatch
between the simplicity inherent in merit pay programs and the complexities of organizations
(Pearce, 1987). This question of the proper level of aggregation for performance incentives
versus group incentives is an interesting area for study all by itself. One study concluded that
Americans, for instance, dislike group incentives and prefer individual incentive programs
whereas Europeans workers appear to get satisfaction from group incentives as well as individual
incentives (Mogultay, 2013). Another study found (Haerter, 1992) suggests that there are five
factors which influence aggregation, which are outlined in Figure 3, below.
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Figure 3 – Factors Influencing Aggregation Level
Favors
Individual

Favors Group, Plant or
Total Organization

Technology

Low complexity;
individual tasks
that are not
interdependent

High complexity;
interdependent tasks

Trust

Good supervisor-subordinate
relationships
high trust of
supervisor

Good trust in organization
Good communication
about organizational
work objectives and
performance

Size

Large; individual
Lost in larger system

Small; individual can
influence and relate to
group and/or plant events

Information System

Good measures at
individual level

Good measures only at
group or plant level

Union Status

Non-Union

Union or Non-Union

Factors

Note: Factors influencing aggregation level on an individual level carry upward to the
group, plant, or total organization.
Haerter, 1992, Pg. 26

While the public sector has been slow to implement performance-based pay programs, there are,
indeed, enough instances of its implementation, most commonly among senior executives, to
take the notion seriously as a matter for study if, for no other reason, than to help discern whether
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“rising and falling tides of interest in the various incentive plans have more to do with changing
social, political, and economic fashions than with accumulating scientific evidence on how well
the plans work” (Blinder, 1990, Pg. 3).

The idea of this research is to define some bases upon which to begin to judge the degree to
which public managers are thinking of the full complexities of human motivation when
contemplating the pursuit of a performance-based pay system. Was a decision to pursue such a
system just a philosophical predisposition to pay being based on performance, as it seems to be
in the private sector? Was there any contemplation of the nature of public sector work versus
private sector work? Was there any contemplation of the impacts providing external rewards
might have on intrinsic motivation? Measuring the degree to which this is a thoughtful decision
by public managers should help to advance the dialogue by future public managers considering
the same course.

Statement of the problem
What are the motivating factors that lead a public manager to institute a performance-based
compensation system and do they take any steps to measure whether or to what degree they were
achieved?

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY
Research questions


What were the motivating factors for instituting a performance based compensation

D i s s e r t a t i o n | 52

model?


What measures, if any, were established to measure the success of the advancement of
those motivational factors for instituting the plan?



What are the results of those measures, if any? Did they achieve what they set out to
achieve?

Rationale/theoretical framework
There is much literature about the fact that performance-based pay programs are popular in the
private sector and why they are not as popular in the public sector. What is difficult to find is
good data to empirically indicate the efficacy of such systems, either in the public sector or the
private sector. Expectancy, equity, and reinforcement theory predict that a positive correlation
will exist between outcomes in organizations that have performance-based pay programs from
those that do not. Self-determination theory suggests that, especially where high-level complex
tasks are involved, the opposite will result. The private sector’s wild abandon in favor of such
systems is strong anecdotal evidence of such a correlation, at least for private sector
organizations (would so many be continuing to engage in the practice if it didn’t work?).
Intuition suggests that there should be a relationship. Yet, one wonders whether that is easier in
the private sector than in the public sector where sales figures are more easily counted versus the
number of social pathologies corrected.

Much of the data that does exist, albeit sketchy, is on performance-based pay in the federal civil
service. There are substantial differences between the federal civil service with its massive
breadth and depth of services to that of a local unit of government, such as a county. This
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remains true even if the local unit of government is a large, urban county. A large, urban county
is still much smaller, more nimble, and less bureaucratic than the federal government; and, as a
result, trying to determine the efficacy of performance-based pay in counties by looking at
results from the federal level does not necessarily produce valid results. Using statistical
techniques as directly applied to counties that use a performance-based pay system, however,
should produce results more useful to counties considering such a move and is relatively
unexplored territory.

The value of this research, therefore, will be to try to ascertain whether counties in selected areas
of the country that have pursued a performance pay system had a specific objective or sets of
objectives in mind when they decided to pursue the course and whether or to what degree those
objectives are being measured and met.

Hypotheses


There will be a specific set of organizational objectives identified prior to adoption of a
performance-based pay system.



There will be measures of the degree to which the adoption of the performance-based pay
system advanced the stated organizational objectives.



The measures will demonstrate advancement of prior-defined and key organizational
objectives.

Importance of the study
As mentioned in the literature review, public sector organizations have some significant
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institutional resistance to performance-based pay programs. Yet, the demographics indicate that
if public agencies want to attract the best talent, they may need to do a better job of rewarding
those who perform better than others. The difficulty of making such a transition in the public
sector is an extremely significant hurdle to overcome. Adding to the height of the hurdle is the
vacuum created by the lack of empirical data to show that the effort is worth it in terms of
superior outcomes after taking into account the energy necessary to pull it off. In the absence of
proof that indeed performance-based pay programs achieve better net outcomes, why would you
make this transition?

In the private sector, faith and intuitive belief may be enough; in the alternative, they may more
easily be able to see the improvement to their bottom line or sales figures, and so on. In the
public sector, it is more difficult to evaluate superior performance, which is precisely why this
study would be so important. There is ample evidence that a poorly designed and administered
merit system can do more harm than good (Lawler, 2000). While this will not end up being the
definitive study or the final one on the topic, it is necessary to lay a basic exploratory foundation
upon which further research can be done, the ultimate goal of which will be to determine and
improve the efficacy of such systems as they will undoubtedly become more prevalent in the
public sector.

Assessing the degree to which existing performance-based pay systems have been adopted with
specific organizational objectives in mind and with measurable results being tracked helps to sort
through the conflicting research on how to best design and to what purposes such a system
should serve. The study should help to shed light on the purposefulness with which existing
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practitioners have pursued performance-based pay and the degree to which they are thoughtfully
studying its actual impacts.

Definition of terms
For the purposes of this study, these terms will have the following definitions:
Organizational Outcomes: clearly defined measures of the organization’s primary objectives of
performance through measurable results regularly reported.
Performance-Based Pay Program: any compensation policy that links annual wage and salary
increases to employee performance on some predetermined period-over-period comparison.
Employees: the number of full-time equivalent (FTE) employees employed by the political
subdivision being examined.
Employee Engagement: The rate at which employees are willing to engage in discretionary
effort in their jobs as measured through the use of a survey at least once per year.
Employee Retention: the rate at which employees exit the organization measured as a annual
percentage of the total workforce.
Employee Satisfaction: the degree to which employees are satisfied with their work environment
as measured by a survey with standardized questions at least once per year.
Performance Distinction: a noted difference in the performance of two or more employees in the
achievement of key organizational objectives that the organization wishes to either reward or
punish.
Recruitment: the ability to attract new employees to come to work for the organization as
measured by some objective measure, such as time to recruit, number of applicants, and so on.
Stakeholder (Citizen) Satisfaction: the degree to which stakeholders or citizens are satisfied with
the quality of the public services they receive as measured by a survey with standardized
questions administered either annually in a randomized sample or to recipients of services
immediately following their receipt of the service.
Senior Executives: those managers, supervisors, or department heads who are paid in the top ten
percent of the organization’s compensation system.
Wage Inflation: the amount of increase in the total wages paid to employees, not counting new
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or eliminated positions, expressed as a percentage increase over the previous year’s base costs.
Research design
The research design will be a qualitative, exploratory pre-experimental design. Selection will
not be based on random assignment, but rather on whether a performance-based pay program is
already in place in the organization or not. The expectation is that the number of jurisdictions
that have a performance-based pay program in place already will significantly reduce the
availability of subject organizations for the study group. As such, selection will be based on
screening those that have a performance-based pay system into the study group based on prior
research to identify such. While such organizations are clearly the exception and not the norm,
there should be enough organizations so situated in the public sector that no difficulty is
expected in locating subjects for the test group.

Once located, test subjects will be given a standardized interview so as to allow for a probing
style of questioning that first requires the interviewee to volunteer information free-form so as to
really explore prior motivation, but become more specific to probe additional potential
motivators and the degree to which they have influenced decisions. Further, questions will be
asked about each identified motivator to explore what specific measures may or may not exist to
verify that the motivating factors are being achieved and, if so, to what degree.

Description of research methodology
The first step in the research will be to identify county government organizations with
performance-based pay programs. The plan will be to contact each of the study states’
membership associations for counties to identify which of their member jurisdictions meet the
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criteria of having a performance-based pay system. As each organization is identified, contact
will be personally initiated to set up an appointment with the human resources or chief
administrative officer in each organization with whom to conduct the interview. At the
conclusion of the interview, each participant will be asked if they are aware of any other county
within their state that has also developed a performance-based pay system to verify the
comprehensiveness of the counties that were identified by the state associations.

Incentives will not likely be used, depending instead on the extension of the professional
courtesy of one practicing (and researching) public practitioner to another as the incentive for the
interview to be conducted. At the conclusion of the interview, an offer will be made to share
research results with whomever they wish to designate within their organization. A follow up
letter thanking them for participation in the interview and, again, offering to share the results of
the interview will be sent post-interview.

Limitations of methodology
One of the limitations of this study will clearly be the degree to which the researcher can
construct perfected test groups. First of all, the number of counties using performance-based pay
programs will be limited. Secondly, finding them might become time consuming. As such, cost
of constructing a reasonably balanced test group might well be a limitation.

Since finding a good test study group might be time consuming and difficult, it will be
imperative that the ones identified willingly participate. Persistence and the pursuit of
professional courtesies will become a necessary strategy. Pursuing the interviews in the context
of the potential for this researcher to also implement a performance-based pay system for his
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present employer, which is in fact the case, will also help establish the need for good information
on which to pursue the extension of the professional courtesy.

Focus group follow-up would be an excellent way to delve more deeply into survey results to
provide a springboard for subsequent research topics; however, given how widely dispersed
geographically the test group is expected to be, it is unlikely that will be financially feasible.
Adequate records of the participants should be kept on file should some subsequent researcher
wish to follow up this research in that manner.

Study delimitations
One of the delimitations of the study is to focus on counties. This focus was selected as a way of
trying to better ensure a healthy independent study group and to work with organizations large
enough that their adoption might most likely be based on sound human resource strategies
designed to achieve well-defined organizational objectives. In addition, given their larger size
within local units of government, they might more likely have performance-based pay programs
in place and stabilized than other units of local government that may be, on balance, smaller in
size. In addition, the larger the public organization, the more senior executives that the
performance-based pay program might apply to and therefore the larger the potential population
as well. Finally, to limit the study to local governments including only counties allows for a
cleaner data set in so far as the work of counties are more similar to each other than to transit
authorities, schools and so on.

Another of the delimitations is the choice of outcomes for which the research will test. In
particular, the outcomes the research will analyze, for purposes of correlation, will be the factors

D i s s e r t a t i o n | 59

that are identified as having motivated the adoption of a performance-based pay system. At first,
the interview will be structured in an open-ended way to probe without bias what the interview
subject might volunteer as having been their motivation without any prompting. Following that,
prompted questions will explore the degree to which identified potential motivating factors might
have been behind adoption, to include employee satisfaction, employee retention, organizational
outcomes, stakeholder (or citizen) satisfaction, wage inflation, performance distinction, or
recruitment. As such, a delimitation from the identified potential motivators are the limits to
those offered to the interview subject from the list above. Finally exploration will occur about
the degree to which there are measures in place to verify the degree to which these motivating
factors have been achieved and, if so, to what degree, further delimiting the research to that
which the subject had put in place prior to adoption.

Another delimitation will be to limit the research to the states of Wisconsin, Florida, Virginia,
Maryland, Texas, California, and New York, the reasoning being that they probably have the
highest ratio of large counties. The research will also include Minnesota as the author has a
particular interest in what is happening within the state in which he practices. This may or may
not affect the external validity of the final results.

Finally, one other delimitation of the study is the results will need to be stratified by the state
within which the county is located. The stratification is necessary in order to make valid
comparisons of the degree to which state policy may be impacting the adoption rate or the
measurement of motivating factors related to the adoption of a performance-based pay system.
Additional analysis may need to be completed and/or adjustments may be need to be done to the
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final data collected to try to minimize the impact of other independent variables on the survey
results, e.g. differences in state preferences for particular types of services, different methods of
controlling for state-to-state variation in the duties assigned to political subdivisions, and so on.

Selection of subjects
Subjects will be selected for the test group based on the existence of a performance-based pay
program in their jurisdiction. They will be identified by contacting the membership associations
for each type of public organization in each of the target states to get contact information for
each member of theirs that meets the operational definition of an existing performance based pay
system. It is expected that the test study group will necessarily need to essentially self-select as
the population of organizations with such a program in place is expected to be relatively low.
Once the test group is so self-selected, a baseline analysis of critical characteristics, such as
population, annual expenses, numbers of employees, and so on, will be done to identify the
relative nature. Close care will need to be taken to try to minimize external variables which
might affect the outcomes. Being an exploratory design, however, such variability is expected to
a certain degree and should be dealt with more fully in subsequent research or a more
experimental design.

Instrumentation
Instrumentation will be through a survey that will be personally administered. The survey will
be one developed for this specific research and designed to capture information on the
motivating factors that led to the adoption of a performance-based pay system. In addition, the
survey will capture population, state, number of employees, annual budget, and how many and to
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which employee classifications (if appropriate) the performance-based pay program applies. It
will be pre-tested by administering it over the telephone to a selected group of the proposed
participants from the largest organizations involved. It will then be modified based on the
feedback received from them. Subsequently, it will be consistently used with all jurisdictions
meeting the definitional parameters of the study in the selected states.

Data collection and recording
The data will be collected via telephone interview with the study author recording all of the
responses. The interviews will be recorded to allow for the researcher to have a free-flowing
discussion and subsequently record the answers. Permission for the recording will be secured at
the beginning of the interview. The data will be tallied onto an Excel spreadsheet for later
statistical analysis.

Because the data has to do with compensation information of public sector organizations, which
should in all states be deemed to be public information, it is not anticipated that data privacy
concerns will be present. If necessary, a coding scheme will be developed to protect any
confidential information collected, though none is anticipated.

Data analysis
In analyzing the data, the jurisdictions will be stratified according to budget size (to approximate
different sized organizations) and state. Tallies of the response rates for each of the volunteered
motivational factors will be compiled, response rates for the suggested motivational factors will
be similarly tallied and numbers of valid measures of the achievement of the motivating factors
will also be tallied. Results will be analyzed and reported on the degree to which there were
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independently-volunteered motivations, the degree to which each suggested motivation was
acknowledged, and the degree to which verification is being monitored on the degree to which
actual achievement of the motivating factors is being done.

Final presentation of the data will be in a chart form summarizing the major characteristics of the
responses by stratified category. Relative frequency indicators will be included within each
stratified group to indicate the relative prevalence of the variables within any sub-groups.
Finally, a narrative presentation of the findings and conclusions will be written as part of the
completion of the study. It is anticipated that the final results will be in publishable form.

Discussion of reliability and validity of the study
As this is a qualitative, exploratory, pre-experimental design, this study is not intended to be
generalized to the population as a whole, but rather is intended to serve as a launching point for
more in-depth research. As such, it could not be considered to have a high degree of external
validity. In addition, the internal validity will need further research. It is possible that there are
alternative causes of fluctuations in the organizational outcomes measured other than simply the
performance pay program. This research should help to show, however, that there is indeed a
clear set of consistently identified factors that motivate managers to adopt a performance-based
pay program and to begin to point future researchers in appropriate directions about the degree to
which it effectively achieves the outcomes those motivating factors represent. In addition, it
should help direct future research toward establishing a clearer link and that more sophisticated
research is warranted to further isolate the performance pay program as the dependent variable
causing the changes in outcomes. If the hypotheses are proved incorrect, it will lend additional
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credibility to undercutting conventional wisdom on the efficacy of performance pay programs.

In terms of the reliability of the variables, the researcher expects a high degree of reliability in
the survey responses on the size of the organization. Reliability will not be as strong as it relates
to the motivating factors that organizations identify as prior-defined as there may be some
motivation for the organizations to represent better forethought in adopting a performance-based
pay system than actually existed, but it should still be fairly high.

Ethical and diversity considerations
Participation in the survey is voluntary, though most of the selected states could be expected to
have some public information statutes, which might statutorily require the release of the data
being requested. Incentives would likely improve the survey response rate, but are not planned
at this time. Recordings will be made of each telephone interview, but subject permission will be
sought at the beginning of each taping and, if consent to tape is not given, at the subject’s option,
either the interview will commence without taping or the interview will be cancelled. As such,
there are no ethical considerations with the recording of the interviews. There appears to be no
other diversity or ethical considerations involved in this research project.

Overview of proposal
This research is intended to begin to empirically establish the motivating factors for county
government organizations in adopting a performance-based pay system and explore to what
extent they employ measures to validate the success of the program achieving its intended
purposes and, if available, to what extent in the states of Minnesota, Wisconsin, Florida,
Virginia, Maryland, Texas, California, and New York. The target audience for this research is
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any public administrator or board contemplating the implementation of a performance-based pay
system. Funding to cover the cost of the research will come from personal sources. Additional
possibilities would include grants from foundations as well as contributions from similarlysituated counties, or their professional associations, who might also be interested in the results.

In the study, counties with performance-based pay programs will be interviewed and the results
tallied and analyzed to determine what the motivating factors were that led to the adoption of a
performance-based pay system; what measures, if any, were put into place to track and measure
the extent to which the program achieved its intended results; and, if available, to what extent
those results were achieved. The measures of success for the test are: Identifying what the
motivating factors were for the installation of a performance-based pay system; identifying what
measures, if any, were put into place to track the degree to which the intended results were
achieved; and, using those measures, where available, identifying the degree to which those
results were achieved. These measures are intended to identify what are the primary motivating
factors that lead to the adoption of a performance-based pay system for county governments and,
potentially, to show a positive, statistically valid correlation between those county organizations
employing a performance-based pay program and improved organizational outcomes. If, on the
other hand, no specific motivating factors can be identified, or, moreover, if no such correlation
is shown, it would lend additional credibility to those skeptics who see performance-based pay
programs as either an institutional fad, something that is counter-productive to organizational
outcomes, or as something that can more easily apply in the private sector, where widgets are
easier to count, than in the public sector, where outcomes are much more difficult to measure.
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Under either circumstance, there is no expectation of a definitive answer to this complex
question, but rather that this research will shed additional light onto the most productive path for
further inquiry.

CHAPTER 4

Data collection
Telephone surveys of the IRB-approved dissertation survey were conducted in January through
March, 2014. Hamline University’s IRB approval number for this study was received from
Matthew Olson, Hamline University IRB Chair, on June 20, 2013. 115 telephone surveys were
conducted using Survey Monkey to collect and store the responses. 16 respondents who had
been thought to have a performance based pay system in place indicated that they had no such
system in place, leaving 99 respondents who were able to complete the entire survey.

Respondents who were interviewed were identified by a number of methods. Contact was made
with state associations, as originally planned, within the states that were originally called out for
study: Minnesota, Wisconsin, Florida, Virginia, Maryland, Texas, California, and New York. It
was apparent early into the process of trying to identify counties within those states that had
performance based pay systems in place that Minnesota, Wisconsin, Florida, and Virginia were
states where that would be productive. Unexpectedly, Maryland, Texas, California, and New
York turned out not to be for a variety of reasons.

In the case of Texas, discussions with the Texas association of counties revealed that there was
only one county executive in the state in Tarrant County. The Texas association did not think
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there were any instances of pay for performance that existed within any county in the state.
Repeated contacts to Tarrant County to ask about their system went unanswered. In the end, no
surveys were produced from any Texas county.

In New York, repeated overtures to both the New York association of counties and the New
York chapter of the International City/County Manager Association (ICMA), including multiple
follow-up telephone calls, were unproductive. Throughout most of the period during which
interviews with counties were being conducted, no counties in New York had thus been
identified as fitting the study criteria since no information was forthcoming from the source of
that. Moreover, neither association responded to requests to send an inquiry directly to New
York counties asking if they fit the study criteria. In the end, through a conversation with the
staff at the New York ICMA, they suggested one contact person, Ian Coyle, County
Administrator of Livingston County. In contacting Mr. Coyle, he was pursuing his own graduate
studies and, hence, agreed to send out a survey to other ICMA member counties, which, as it
turns out, are only those counties in New York without an elected county executive. In the end,
the study did successfully include five counties from New York.

A similar experience ensued within California and Maryland as well such that in Maryland, only
one successful interview was conducted and, in California, only four successful interviews were
conducted. As such, within the target states identified at the onset of the research, only 60
successful interviews were completed and those in New York, California, and Maryland came
very late in the interview process and only after aggressive attempts to identify study
participants. As such, mid-way through the process of identifying counties to interview for
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inclusion in the study, it appeared that the numbers of successful interviews was going to be too
few in order to justify any appropriate conclusions, even exploratory ones, and the decision was
made to expand the scope of states to include in the research.

Inquiries were then made to expand the scope to include any state bordering on one of the
originally targeted states or those with an active ICMA chapter, which ended up including, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Washington, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio,
West Virginia, Colorado, Arizona, Iowa, Oregon, Delaware, New Jersey, Connecticut, Rhode
Island, Massachusetts, Vermont, New Hampshire, Maine, Alabama, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky,
interviews were conducted within the following states: South Carolina, Iowa, Illinois, Georgia,
Washington, Pennsylvania, Kentucky, North Carolina, Kansas, Idaho, Arizona, Michigan, and
Alabama. The proportion of respondents, by state is shown in Figure 4.
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Figure 4 – Proportion of Respondents by State

Characteristics of the county respondents show that performance pay is not limited to any
particular-sized organization or community. Figure 5, depicts the range of county sizes and
Figure 6, below, depicts the community sizes of the counties included.
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Figure 5 – Range of County Size

Figure 6 – Community Size of Counties
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Scheduling times for the interview at a time that would be mutually agreeable turned into one of
the most significant challenges and required multiple callbacks and messages. Consistent with
the IRB-approved plan, respondents were told that participation was voluntary and were asked
for their permission about recording, when it was used. It became apparent as interviews were
being conducted that all necessary information was able to be collected and input as the survey
was being administered and, as a result, recording interviews was discontinued early on in the
process and the question requesting permission to record was dropped. Interviews were
collected over a three month period.

During the course of the interviews, an unexpected delimitation emerged. The focus of the
research questions was on the original motivation for the pursuit of a performance based pay
system. In a small minority of cases, typically concentrated in those counties in Virginia, North
Carolina, and Minnesota where performance based pay systems have the longest established
history of use, the person that was being interviewed, usually the Human Resources Director
and/or the County Administrator, was not employed by the organization at the time of inception
of the program. In those circumstances, the interviewee was asked to answer the questions based
on the organizational history that had been passed along to them and to use their knowledge of
the organization’s culture to inform their best estimates as to the most appropriate responses.
Incidence of this delimitation was sufficiently low as to not be believed to have substantially
altered the findings.

One of the hypotheses about this study was that it would find that a substantial portion of the pay
for performance systems in place would show that the systems were dominated as being applied
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to only Senior Executives of the county. The hypothesis was based, in part, in the belief that
these were relatively new systems in most places and, therefore, there might be more
experimentation with them among non-union groups, especially among senior executives. The
results did not bear that out to be true. As figure 7, below, illustrates, the vast majority of county
pay for performance systems were applied not just to Senior Executives.

Figure 7 – County Pay Performance Systems Availability

This question of to whom pay for performance systems are applied became more interesting
when inquiring about the number of systems that were applied within collectively bargained
environments. As figure 8, below, illustrates, the rate of adoption in collectively bargained
environments is relatively low and those that are in place are primarily confined to Minnesota.
More importantly, the research design failed to take into account which states were “Right to
Work” states and which had more liberal laws protecting the rights of public employees to
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unionize.

Figure 8 – Pay Performance Systems Applicability to Collective Bargaining Units

This became quickly relevant in that Right to Work states rarely had to even consider the union
issues associated with a performance pay system as they rarely had unions to contend with in
advancing such systems. Not surprisingly, perhaps, the states with the highest percentage of
instances in which a pay for performance system was applied to 100% of its employees also
tended to be those states that were Right to Work states, which can be seen in Figure 9, below.
Interviews with practitioners in Minnesota clearly identified the speed of possible adoption and
resistance to it among public employee unions as major obstacles to overcome. So it is all the
more surprising to find that Minnesota was one of the states with the highest incidence of pay for
performance systems among those this study could identify.
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Source: National Right to Work Legal
Defense Foundation, Inc.

Figure 9 – Right to Work States

In addition, interviewees from Wisconsin also noted the dramatic impact that the adoption of Act
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10 in 2011 had on their adoption of performance pay systems. Most of the systems that have
been adopted in Wisconsin were systems that were put in place after Act 10 was adopted;
interviewees regularly cited the radical drop in public employee union membership in Wisconsin
as foundational in their decisions to revamp their compensation practices in line with
performance pay. It was clear in many of those conversations that there had been much greater
reluctance to go down that path while public sector unions were strong. Evidence from the study
strongly suggests that the prevalence of strong public employee unions has a chilling effect on,
but does not completely extinguish the adoption rates of performance pay systems.

In what might very well be a statement about the prevalence of and strength of public employee
unions in the targeted states, Figure 10 shows the percent of the workforce to which performance
pay is applied among the respondent counties. Clearly, the vast majority of systems applied to
almost all employees. The targeted states did end up being disproportionately right-to-work
states and, in the case of Wisconsin, just recently joined that group, but even in a state with
strong public employee unions, like Minnesota, where the organization decides to pursue a
performance pay program, it is typically looking for it to become the new standard for how it
compensates its employees. Moreover, Figure 11 results show that many of these performance
pay systems have been in place for a significant length of time. Many of those longer running
systems were in Right to Work states on the east coast, including Virginia, North Carolina, and
South Carolina, quite a few of which had been in existence for 20 or more years. In states like
Minnesota’s with strong public employee unions, it was much more likely for those systems to
be at 8-10 years or less. In those states with strong public employee unions, it became clear in
the interviews that a strong executive and board commitment to a compensation system other
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than the traditional step-and-grade system was a driving force behind the creation of those
systems.
Figure 10 – Percent of Workforce Where Performance Pay System Applies

Hypotheses Findings
The basis for this research was to test three hypotheses:


There will be a specific set of organizational objectives identified prior to adoption of a
performance-based pay system.



There will be measures of the degree to which the adoption of the performance-based pay
system advanced the stated organizational objectives.



The measures will demonstrate advancement of prior-defined and key organizational
objectives.
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During the interviews, respondents were asked to self-identify what they thought the motivations
were for the adoption of their performance pay system. Figure 12 details the rates at which
certain things were self-identified as being a motivation. Noteworthy, and probably not
surprisingly, distinguishing employees’ performance was, far and away, most frequently
identified as a motivation for the adoption of a performance pay system being cited by 83.9% of
respondents. The next highest self-identified responses were improved organizational outcomes
(47.3%), employee satisfaction (34.4%), limiting wage inflation (12.9%), with the rest of the
answers all at under 10%. The list of potential responses was fixed and the interviewer was
simply listening to hear if answers were volunteered within the established categories.
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Figure 12 – Performance Pay Systems Motivating Factors

When respondents were prompted with a listing of the same potential motivators and asked if
these items had been part of their motivation, answers changed, as outlined in Figure 13. When
prompted, respondents much more frequently cited performance distinction at 97%, followed by
employee engagement at 85.9%, organizational outcomes at 84.8%, employee retention at
73.7%, employee satisfaction at 71.7%, stakeholder satisfaction at 59.6%, limiting wage inflation
at 31.3%, and attracting Millenials was lowest at 19.2%. The order of the top answer did not
change, but employee engagement edged out improved organizational outcomes for second place
and limiting wage inflation fell from the third most frequently cited answer in the self-identified
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list to the second lowest cited answer in the list of prompted choices. This seems to suggest that
the motivations that respondents self-identified exhibited a significant tendency to over-simplify
their motivations for the adoption of their performance pay system; but, when given a range of
choices, frequently gravitated toward a multitude of motivations. This may highlight a
communications challenge with employees about the strategic organizational purposes that those
organizations adopting such systems are pursuing; if there are many reasons for the pursuit of
such a system, but only few are offered, might that not lead to more confused employees and
thereby create more difficulties in trying to achieve the true objectives?

Figure 13 – Performance Pay Systems Motivating Factors
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Figure 14 – Performance Pay Systems Empirical Measures

In examining the degree to which respondent counties are using an empirical measure to gauge
the effectiveness of its performance pay program at achieving the intended objectives, the results
are pretty stark. As Figure 14 shows, there is a nearly five-to-one margin of respondents who
have absolutely no measures in place to evaluate the degree to which their performance pay
program achieves the objectives they identify that it is intended to achieve. This seems
especially noteworthy given the trend of local governments toward a more outcomes-based, datadriven approach to decision-making in recent years. The adoption of a performance pay program
appears to be driven by something other than an empirical objective, which will be discussed
more in the findings section below.
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Figure 15 – Performance Pay Systems Meeting Objectives

The lack of empirical measures did not prevent respondents from forming or expressing an
opinion on whether they thought their performance pay program was achieving the objectives it
was intended to achieve. Figure 15 shows that a clear majority of over 60% believe that it is
achieving its intended objectives in whole or at least in part. Interestingly, however, there is a
notable percent of over 20 percent of respondents who did not feel as if the programs were
achieving its intended objectives, which will, as well, be discussed in the findings section below.

Finally, there was also a notably significant number of respondents that simply indicated that it
was too early to tell as their program was too new.
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CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Discussion of Hypotheses Findings
In nearly every case, respondents were able to quickly answer with a plausible set of answers in
regards to what objectives their performance pay program was intended to achieve at its
inception. There were often multiple responses that indicated that there had, indeed, been
discussion and thought put into why their organization had decided to embark on this path.
Moreover, their responses indicated that they had a good understanding of at least some of the
likely outcomes they could achieve and some reservations about the limitations of what such a
system could achieve.

Not surprisingly, when the question was posed as an open-ended question there were fewer
responses than when it was a closed-ended list of possibilities supplied to them. This could be
attributed to any number of factors. It could be that their recollections had faded and, especially
in the case of those counties whose systems were more than 8 years old, it seems as if that’s a
very likely reason for the disparity. It could also be that it is simply the difference between the
human mind’s ability to engage in recall versus recognition. It could, however, also potentially
reflect that there was not as thorough a consideration of potential objectives as respondents
would have liked to convey; or, that respondents wanted suggested objectives to have been part
of their initial deliberations whether that was, in fact, the case or not.

What is more interesting, perhaps, is how the responses changed between the open-ended and the
closed-end questions. In the open-ended question, only four results garnered response rates
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greater than 10%, which were, in order of frequency, drawing performance distinctions,
improved organizational outcomes, employee satisfaction, and limiting wage inflation. In the
closed-ended question, response rates for all questions exploded such that only one response had
a response rate less than 30%. Moreover the ranking of the top four responses changed. The top
four responses in the closed-end question were, in order, drawing performance distinctions,
employee engagement, improved organizational outcomes, and improved employee retention.
Limiting wage inflation which had been in the top four responses in the open-ended question
dropped all the way to second-lowest ranked answer in the closed-ended question.

It is interesting to note that the more altruistic values of employee engagement and employee
retention so significantly outpaced the more fiduciary value of controlling labor costs between
the two questions. Employee satisfaction, which was in the top four in the open-ended question,
was only narrowly knocked out of the top four answers in the closed-ended question. Both
drawing performance distinctions and improving organizational outcomes stayed in the top four
no matter which way the question was asked. An area of future potential study is the degree to
which the more altruistic value might represent the values that practitioners want to believe is
motivating them and to what degree the fiduciary value is actually driving them. These findings
do lend credibility to the theory that improving organizational outcomes and drawing
performance distinctions between and among varying levels of employee performance are
consistent motivations for the adoption of a performance pay system.

Maybe the most interesting finding related to the hypotheses of this study is the absolute dearth
of objective measures to evaluate the effectiveness of performance pay programs at achieving the
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objectives they were put in place to achieve. An overwhelming 80% of respondents had no
objectives measures in place and no efforts underway to acquire them. The strong sense in
conducting the interviews was that there was a much stronger philosophical basis for the
adoption of a performance pay program than it was something that needed ongoing evaluation.
For the vast majority, it was as though paying people on the basis of their individual
contributions was to be accepted as an article of faith without the need to demonstrate its
effectiveness. This seems to be a different standard than is being applied to many of the
organizational objectives of county governments nationwide where the development of objective
measures of the degree to which the organization is actually, in fact, advancing its mission is
becoming more and more commonplace. It does not appear to display the same intellectual rigor
in the two parts of our practice.

Among the small minority who were measuring the effectiveness of their system, the measures
they most frequently gravitated to did reasonably relate to at least one of their intended
objectives. For instance, there were a few who evaluated the performance rankings that were
given to employees at the macro level to examine the spread of employee ratings. In so doing,
they were effectively evaluating the degree to which the system was producing the kinds of
distinctions between and among employees that they had intended for it to achieve. This will be
discussed further in the section below on other general findings. The most frequently cited
measure reported, from among the less than 20 percent who cited having a measure at all, was
retention rates, which does effectively measure the degree to which the intended objective of
managing employee retention rates is being achieved.
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A couple of other respondents used annual employee satisfaction surveys as a measure of the
degree to which their system was advancing employee satisfaction. In these latter two instances,
however, while the measures are reasonably related to a stated objective of their performance
pay program, there are many other contributing factors to employee retention and satisfaction
such that it is much less clear to what degree their organizations’ performance pay program was
motivating change in those measures versus other unrelated factors, such as the economy, labor
shortages in particular job classes, quality of supervision, and so on.

Finally, some respondents in that small minority of respondents who indicated they were
measuring the effectiveness of their performance pay program cited measures that could most
generously be characterized as surrogate measures for the objectives that they stated they had
intended for the system to achieve. Among these were references to absenteeism rates, market
pay rates, and ties to performance-based budgeting. While these are important and laudable
things for an organization to measure, the research question here is whether they would be
reasonably related to the stated objectives cited for the adoption of their performance pay
program. That connection seems more distant and less clearly related than the others mentioned
by some respondents. That said, they may be decent surrogate measures for the intended
objectives, a practice fairly common in trying to evaluate the achievement of other organizational
objectives, such as environmental protection, protecting the most vulnerable in our society, and
so on.

Probably most importantly to these questions was how few organizational objectives
practitioners identified that they were attempting to achieve in their program; and, how few had
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measures of objectively evaluating the degree to which they we actually achieving it. Only 20%
could cite any measure and, among the 20%, extremely few could cite more than one measure
and no one had established a system of measurement that was directly linked to the stated
objectives they were pursuing. Within the context of managing to achieve specific results, the
evaluative practice was exceptionally thin.

Consistent with the clear finding that the adoption of a performance pay program was more a
philosophical article of faith, it was not so surprising to find that a strong majority of respondents
generally felt that it was achieving its intended objectives. For many, it seemed almost a selffulfilling prophecy or something to be taken on faith like the goodness of motherhood and apple
pie. It is hard to escape the conclusion that this confidence is more rooted in political principles
than it is in good human resources or organizational management practices. Many respondents,
for instance, talked about how this had been initiated by their governing board as a strategic
objective. There are many things, however, that are initiated through the political process, such
as protecting the environment, that have not necessarily led to the separation between the
achievement of the political objective and the good, solid administration of how that objective is
to be measured and advanced. Quintessentially, Woodrow Wilson’s politics-administration
dichotomy seems on display here, but there has not seemed to be the same degree of intellectual
rigor put into the administration end of the equation in relation to performance pay programs as
is regularly applied to other administrative advancements of political objectives. It seems almost
as if the administrators are so convinced of the rightness of the political objective that it does not
require as rigorous an administrative practice to prove the effectiveness of one compensation
strategy over another. There are now a sufficient base of performance pay programs in place
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among counties around the nation that the question of what type of employee compensation
system produces better organizational results is open to scrutiny and good practice. If the answer
to that question is already taken as an article of faith, then the concern becomes that we are
blinded to the need to empirically analyze it.

There were also, among some of the respondents who thought that performance pay programs
were not meeting their intended objectives, some who seemed just as philosophically predisposed against the success of a performance pay program and such an article-of-faith
conclusion is equally troubling regardless of which side of the argument the conclusion is leaped.

That said, there were some clear-eyed skeptics, both among those who identified that the
performance pay program was not achieving its intended objectives and, refreshingly, among
those who indicated that they thought it was. From among this small subset, some of the most
interesting and useful observations could be distilled and will be discussed more in the
discussion of general findings below. This was a group of questioning, doubting, cheerleading,
and thoughtful practitioners who anecdotally offered suggestions for other practitioners which
will be included here.

Discussion of
General
Observational
Findings

“You will get what you incent and, to that extent, we get what we ask
for. To the extent that we don’t always ask for the right thing, it can
be counter-productive. It does achieve the administration of an
effective compensation system that attracts and retains talent. It also
does help us focus employee energies where we want them to be; it
just requires us to be more strategic in what we direct them to and
that is mostly a good thing.”

Proponents of
performance pay seem to have a healthy recognition that performance pay is not a panacea.
Many responding proponents of performance pay systems discussed warping influences it had on
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human behaviors, such as spawning competition that was at times unhealthy, the tendency for
managers to engage in grade inflation, demotivating influences on those not being rewarded as
greatly, and so on. That said, many of those same respondents also argued that performance pay
could not be evaluated in a vacuum; it had to be compared to the alternative systems of employee
compensation and, among those alternatives, the traditional step-and-grade or flat-Cost-ofLiving-Allowance (COLA) systems also have warping influences on human behavior. These
respondents argued that you have to consider all of the pros and cons of each and, in so doing,
many of them concluded that performance pay systems had fewer negative warping influences
than other systems.

Some of the warping influences of traditional compensation systems frequently cited by
responding proponents of performance pay systems included that those employees who work the
least are receiving disproportionate rewards to their effort or results than those who are working
harder and/or achieving more,
“The step and grade system is equal pay for unequal
work and that’s just wrong.”

rewards are unrelated to the
advancement of organizational

objectives or advancement of the organization’s mission, a step-and-grade system coupled with a
COLA increase drives wage inflation above market norms, and so on.
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Responding proponents of performance pay systems also, however, widely acknowledged that a
step-and-grade system or flat-COLA system was substantially easier to administer and that an
organization should only pursue a performance pay system if it had the interest, was willing to
develop the capacity, and was willing to allocate sufficient managerial time and resources to do a
high-quality job. In the absence of
that conscious commitment, it was
widely agreed that a poorly

“Prior to implementing this, a lot of employee
evaluations were not completed. After going into this,
we’ve achieved much higher rates of participation.
Employees are also asking what they need to do to
achieve the higher level of pay.”

administered performance pay system
can do more harm than good. This was reinforced in the work of Daniel Pink (2011). It was
widely understood that the success of a performance pay system was significantly dependent on
the quality of the content and administration of the performance management system.
Importantly, respondents strongly indicated there was good reason for any organization to adopt
a high-quality performance management system regardless of whether they wished to link
compensation practices to it; but that, if you were going to link compensation practices to the
performance management system, it was essential that the performance management system
have high-quality content and be well-managed in its execution.

Some respondents from both among proponents and opponents of performance pay systems
indicated that they did not believe that compensation was a very effective motivator for future
performance, but proponents indicated they did think it was a good reward for past contributions.
Organizations with the most well-developed systems discussed broad ranges of strategies to
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reward past performance and motivate future performance. Among those strategies most
“There are clearly now objectives and measures that
if you achieve them you will be rewarded. I’m not as
sure or confident that this system means we are
achieving more in our organizational workplans or
advancing the mission.”

frequently cited, but beyond the scope
of this research, were employee
recognition programs, employee
service awards, employee tenure

awards, training and development investments, ensuring employees are given challenging and
stimulating work, appeals to the intrinsic motivations of public service work, appeals to the
nobility of the mission of county government, and so on. In short, this subset of proponents who
also reflected the limited efficacy of pay as a motivator reflected that performance pay systems
would not create a high-performing organization by itself, but that, when coupled with other
thoughtful strategies that take into account what we know about what motivates human behavior,
it can and should be a part of that constellation of strategies.

One of the greatest challenges in the performance pay movement over the course of the last
number of years has been the impact
“It hasn’t been funded for five years. Even before,
when we were funding it, the amount it was funded
was so minimal that it was hard to distinguish
between those who met expectations and those who
exceeded them. This really limits the motivation that
the differential provides.”

that the Great Recession has had on
wage movements of any kind in the
public sector. When the
compensation system is premised on

using an extrinsic motivator, the absence of the availability of resources to provide an extrinsic
motivator has had a chilling effect. Many respondents noted that they believed the Great
Recession had dealt their programs a setback in terms of their ability to continue to reinforce the
strategic aims of their systems. What this reinforced in the broader sense was that the amount of
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incentive that the reward can provide is directly linked to the perceived value of the amount of
the reward offered.

The most frequently cited problem associated with performance pay programs was the tendency
for managers to engage in grade
“We are suffering significant grade inflation and,
because it is inadequately funded, it has led
managers to abuse the review process to give passing
grade to employees in order to get them a raise that
they then sometimes want to fire for poor
performance. When that happens, the system is
impairing our ability to manage to truly good
performance.”

inflation. Many respondents felt that
some managers did this as a way of
motivating their employees by
making them feel better through a
more positive performance ranking,

and some respondents felt that some managers did this as a way to get raises to people who they
believed deserved pay increases, sometimes in contravention of organizational policy in regards
to the compensation system. It is important to note here that many of these behaviors are
frequently present (and maybe even more prevalent) in a traditional performance management
system that has no ties to compensation practices, such as performance pay. In systems where
there is an established linkage between pay and performance, however, these “alternative”
motivations for manager performance within the traditional performance management system
had the distinct effect of disabling an organization’s strategic linkages of pay to performance and
what that linkage was intended to advance in terms of higher performance or advancement of
organizational objectives.

Many respondents who noted this dysfunction toward grade inflation referred to this dynamic
using terms like “motivations” or “pressures within the system” or “checks and balances.” They
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argued that there were natural pressures built into a supervisor-subordinate relationship in which
the supervisor wants to reward people who work for them and recognize them for the assistance
they provide in essentially advancing the supervisor’s standing within the organization, career,
salary, department’s objectives, and so on. For a manager to be required to draw performance
distinctions, they suggested, can be disruptive to that relationship, something a manager
intuitively perceives. Interestingly, some perceived this pathology to be even more prevalent
among elected department heads. As such, these respondents indicated there needed to be
strategic counter-pressures developed within the system to offset this “natural” pressure. Among
the most frequently cited strategies:

A frequently cited best-management practice was to have a goal or target that the organization
expected in terms of what their performance rating system would produce. In other words, what
was the target or goal for how employee performance ratings would be distributed. Since this is,
in a performance pay system, then linked to compensation, there should be a goal for how the
ratings would be distributed in order to manage the financial impacts of the system. Some
referred to this as their bell-curve target, a reference to bell-curve grading in education, and, most
of those who spoke of this, spoke of intentionally weighting the bell curve toward a higher than
average rating. As an example of this type of weighting the system toward positive ratings, an
organization could plan to see a performance rating distribution of 5% of its employees scored as
exceptional, 15% as exceeding expectations, 70% as meeting expectations, 5% needing
improvement and 5% as unsatisfactory.
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Some used this target curve as a forced-ranking system in which each manager was only allowed
to give out a fixed number of “exceeds” ratings, a fixed number of “achieves” ratings, and was
required to have a fixed number of
“needs improvement/unsatisfactory”
ratings. This strategy is identical to a
bell-curve grading system in
education where the performance of

“The failure has primarily been that it has had to be
underfunded because of the Great Recession. The
underfunding has required us to put limits on the
number of really high performers. This has always
been a struggle within the public sector, even before
the Great Recession. We always had to place internal
limits on the number of superior performers.”

the group determines how the various performance rating levels of individuals must be graded.
This was the least frequently cited strategy as many felt that it forced an unnatural circumstance
that did not allow managers to take into account realities of performance in the day-to-day world
where project assignments or other circumstances might lead to a bona fide need or desire to rate
people differently than a forced-curve ranking would require.

The more frequent best-management practice cited was to use this target rating curve more
loosely as a guide to evaluate the performance of their managers within the context of how
closely each manager made their
“It provided a consistent method of completing
employee performance reviews and held managers
accountable to completing them. It achieved the
goals we had, but did cause some problems, such as
some Department Directors using this as a way to get
their employees’ more money so we developed an
internal review team to look at those with very high
ratings or very low ratings.”

targeted ranges, not as a forced
ranking, but as one evaluation criteria
in the performance rating of their
supervisors. In other words, one of
the key performance accountabilities

in the performance review process for supervisors was how well they had administered the
performance management process of their subordinates using the targeted goals for performance
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ratings distribution as a normalizing standard. Each organization gave different weight to this
performance expectation and in no case was it the only key performance indicator for their
supervisors, but it was a significant weight in most cases. In other words, each supervisor or
manager was held accountable to how closely they achieved the target curve, not in a strict sense
that it had to be done exactingly, but in a general sense, allowing for variation to some degree.

Another best-management practice cited was to analyze the results of performance ratings within
the organization and to cross-tab it by various criteria, such as by departments, by supervisors
versus non-supervisors, by male versus female, and so on to see if there were any enlightening or
disturbing trends that would suggest the system is not performing in expected ways such that
corrective action can be taken. Many organizations who use this best practice enhance it by
transparently sharing this analysis as part of management team meetings and openly discussing
its implications for their performance in the administration of the performance management
system. Many others also enhance this by doing the same with all employees.

Another best-management practice cited was to use the management team en-masse to check the
performance rating behaviors of individuals within the group by doing what was referred to most
frequently as “internal calibration.”
“The system we used before produced about 80% of
employees rated at “achieves.” We modified it and,
afterward, used the management team to calibrate
the results. We drove the results toward a bell
curve—not forced rankings—but pushed toward a
bell curve. It helped highlight who were the
superstars and also highlighted who were the
employees deficient in performance that we needed to
more effectively deal with.”

The model here is to assemble your
managers and require them to show
all their ratings and present
information to the group on the basis
for any of their “outlier” ratings, those
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that deviated from the middle or average or achieves ranking that a variation of a bell curve
would suggest is where most employees would reside. In so doing, if a manager was rating
disproportionately high, low, or average, it could be called out for open discussion about how
that conclusion was arrived at and whether it was justified by the facts. What the group is
looking for is that each manager is applying a consistent rigor, discipline, and managerial
courage to their rankings and, by using the group to review the rankings, the system should better
minimize supervisor bias or favoritism. According to Miller (2014), calibration makes it easier
for managers to deliver difficult performance reviews and creates camaraderie and broader
exposure among leaders and top talent within larger organizations.

The most robust performance pay systems utilized more than one and, in a few select cases,
almost all of the best management strategies listed above. The more best management strategies
that were employed, the more subtly nuanced was the discussion regarding the limitations and
influencers on human motivation in complex, dynamic organizational systems and the more
quietly confident were these particular practitioners that their performance pay system was
superior to the traditional step-and-grade system or a flat-COLA system.

Recommendations
The research demonstrates that those who pursue a performance-based compensation system for
purely philosophical reasons that dig no deeper than because they think it will improve
performance over the step-and-grade system are missing the most important considerations that
will lead it to success. Not surprisingly, the systems identified in the research that most
commonly failed were in circumstances in which the result of the existing performance
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assessment system, regardless of its own efficacy, were simply tied to compensation. What was
clear is that simply linking employees’ compensation to a flawed performance assessment
process will do little good and, probably, great damage to the advancement of an organization’s
objectives.

What came clearly through the research and the BMPs is that the quality of the performance
assessment system matters a great deal and that any hope of making an empirical difference in
advancing an organization’s objectives through this kind of system is dependent on a highquality performance assessment process. Yet, anything short of perfection in a performance
assessment process will create tensions and behaviors that will be detrimental to the
advancement of organizational objectives. It would seem, in the end, that there is a very real and
extremely delicate balancing equation here that must be struck: the performance assessment
system has to be very, very good—good enough that the advantages it brings in focusing and
marshalling the human talent resource toward the advancement of organizational objectives
produces more advancement of those objectives than the negative implications it will also bring.
As the quality of the performance assessment process improves, so, too, will its potential to, on
balance, do more good than harm; but, conversely, the lower the quality of the performance
assessment process, the greater the potential that linking it to performance will do more harm
than good.

To that end, the research pretty clearly points out the easiest thing to do: maintain the status quo.
Keep using the traditional step-and-grade compensation system to reward employees based on
their length of service. It does not require sophistication of measurement systems, it does not
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require defining the measurable outcomes that represent the value proposition that the public
expects public agencies to accomplish, it engenders many fewer employee issues and grievances.
In short, the manager’s life will be much easier.

But that gets to a rather fundamental question about what is the leadership role of public
administrators who are organizationally “in charge,” e.g. Chiefs of staff, Agency heads, city and
county administrators, school superintendents? There is, after all, a value proposition between
the public and its government: The public expects certain deliverables or outcomes and the
government attempts to deliver them in the best way they can. To be sure, there are vigorous
debates between and among citizens and elected policymakers about the size and scope of
government—to what ends should our government capacity be put? From a purely
administrative point of view, however, once that size and scope is defined by the duly-elected
representatives in this democratic republic, can we not all agree that the value proposition for
that size and scope ought to be as vigorously pursued as possible? How could leaders ever
conclude that good is good enough?

As the purchaser of the service—the master of the value proposition—how is the public to
understand the degree to which the public promise—that reverent covenant that the government
will, in point of fact, make a real difference—is achieved? Is it good enough to be able to
demonstrate that the public servants tried their hardest? Or does the public expect that their
government will actually achieve something, that public problems will be solved, that public
good is tangibly advanced?

Considering something tangible like roads and bridges, the answer is clearer. The public hired
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us to build and maintain roads and bridges. When bridges fall down, we fail. When roads don’t
get plowed after snowfalls, we fail. When engines fall out of cars because of the ride quality, we
fail. And so measurable ways have been developed to see that these things either don’t happen
or do happen in the way we want them to. There are bridge sufficiency ratings to measurably
evaluate the ongoing conditions of bridges; there are performance targets for when a road ought
to have dry pavement following a snowfall; and, there is a ride quality index to measure
inflections in road surfaces so we know how smooth the road is. Taken together and aggregated,
evaluation of our system of bridges, our snowplowing performance, and our road maintenance
performance take place against identifiable targets.

Findings then support that at, say, the level of a highway department, evaluation of the degree to
which the individuals that comprise that department are collectively achieving the value
proposition as it relates to roads and bridges. At the department level, we can effectively
measure and evaluate the degree to which we are achieving the outcome that comprises the value
proposition. It is still difficult to identify the degree to which an individual engineering aide or
snowplow operator has contributed to the department’s performance outcome. That requires
“unbundling” the contributory actions taken by the individual to the achievement of the
departmental outcomes. At the department level, you can focus on the outcome that is the value
proposition; but, as you move to the individually- contributing employee, you are more likely to
focus on the inputs they contribute that you know will produce a given outcome. This isn’t a
perfect science as there are other variables that influence the outcomes as well, e.g. weather
variations, cost of salt, oil prices, and so on, that also contribute to the outcome of effectively
maintaining roads and bridges, but it is better than paying no attention to the outcomes and what
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actions lead to us achieving more of them.

Realistically, this work is exceptionally difficult. There are few places where that is more true
than in any of the public sector’s human service fields, e.g. social services, public health, and
public safety. The public has determined, for instance, that chemical dependency has many
deleterious effects on society and wants limits placed on the actions of people whose dependency
leads them to anti-social behaviors, such as public drunkenness, crimes, child abuse or neglect,
and so on. Public agencies hire chemical dependency social workers and counselors to work
with members of the public struggling with chemical addictions in order to advance that value
proposition. How, in these circumstances is the public to know that their investment is making a
difference? How is the CD worker or Social Worker going to move the needle on the prevalence
of CD issues manifesting themselves in the society at large?

It could be expected that in an agency attempting to link pay to performance on such outcomes
for the Social Worker to balk and point out that they cannot control whether or to what extent
people choose to drink to excess. Conversely, however, if what the Social Worker is saying is
that they cannot move the needle, then doesn’t it beg the fundamental question as to why we are
asking the public for their precious resources to try? Conventional historical wisdom leaves this
tension unresolved. It suggests that we accept as an article of faith that the Social Workers
efforts will make a difference, and that, since it cannot be proven, we should accept their best
effort as good enough. Growing public distrust in its public institutions stems, at least in
significant part, from the perpetuation of this sloppy bargain—one in which citizens continue to
be asked for more and more of their hard-earned treasure to advance social experiments, the end
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achievements of which are all-too-frequently never shown. Where the achievements are more
easily verified and known, e.g. roads and bridges, while debate is still present, public support for
these investments runs higher.

And, yet, in the CD world, what prevents us from measuring chemical dependency rates at the
departmental level. To be sure, there are many contributing factors influencing those rates, but
the most productive avenues to advance that public value proposition are contained entirely
within the richness of that public dialogue. For the individual Social Worker, we do know the
inputs that we are asking them to achieve, inputs that we ask them to achieve because we believe
based on our knowledge, experience, and the latest research, that they are the best ways for us to
achieve higher success rates than other potential actions. We can measure those inputs and hold
the Social Worker accountable for the degree to which they achieved the inputs, both in terms of
quality and quantity. We can measure the societal addiction rates and hold departmental leaders
accountable to the degree to which they are applying efficacious strategies and adapting to
changing realities.

It is in this crucible that we see that what is key to the advancement of the public value
proposition is less about the mechanics of the compensation system or its tie to performance than
it is to the quality, intensity, and credibility of the performance assessment process. Isn’t it
interesting to note that none of the best management practices identified in the previous section
have to do with compensation system mechanics and all of them have to do with increasing the
credibility of the performance assessment process? Setting aside for a moment the linkage of
pay-for-performance, isn’t it critically incumbent upon every public leader to be able to hold a
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highly credible, high quality, thoughtful, interactive, and rich performance discussion with every
employee that works for them to convey how well the employee is or is not advancing the value
proposition they were hired to advance? Isn’t this a proper demand by the public paying for the
freight?

A common reason offered for the failure to advance this kind of highest-quality performance
assessment process is that public leaders are overwhelmed and do not have the time or the
resources to do it justice. It would seem that this argument has ruled the day—or, cynically, it
seems as if it has ruled every day. But what could possibly be more important than for a
supervisor to maximize the return on the public’s human capital investment? What could
possibly be more important? In the end, the failure to do so means that, arguably, the most
important and, interestingly, the most difficult of the supervisory leadership tasks is left to
languish to its own ends. It’s hard not to speculate as to whether it is because it is so very
difficult that it is so often avoided. To what purposes is a supervisor’s, a manager’s, a leader’s
day put that supervising, managing, and leading takes a back seat?

Moreover, in the absence of effective evaluative tools to measure the relative contributions of
each employee, then the normal variations present in every human endeavor will be allowed to
perpetuate leaving an uneven return on the human capital investment from one employee to the
next. This variation means that some measure of the public’s human capital investment is
wasted. Worse, it is accepted as unavoidable. Efforts in the private sector to LEAN out
processes or to apply Six Sigma strategies to reduce variations in customer experience are
designed to minimize this very type of variation in processes replete with the human experience,
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but efforts to do so in public agencies is negligible at best.

How can it not be argued that the failure to advance public administration practice to as
effectively as possible evaluate the achievement of the various public value propositions and the
maximizing of the single greatest investment made in it—the human capital investment—is the
single greatest failure in a discipline that claims to make government both more effective and
more efficient? Practitioners and academics have spent considerable energy debating the
effectiveness of linking pay to performance and very little on advancing the evaluation of actual
performance. If practitioners had a highly credible, high quality, interactive, and rich evaluation
process, would anyone seriously argue that those employees who advance the bargain more
shouldn’t be compensated more? When this research was begun, it appeared the right question
was whether employees’ compensation ought to be linked to performance. What is now more
apparent is that the compensation component is just the mechanics at the end of the performance
assessment process and that the success of those compensation mechanics to drive improved
performance will rise and fall on the quality of the performance assessment process.

Some will continue to argue that what counties do cannot be measured—then how would anyone
know if counties are making any difference? In the absence of knowing that, why would citizens
want to invest any more in counties and their work? What is clear is that if practitioners want to
advance pay-for-performance in the public sector, then they need to spend a lot more time on the
performance side of that statement than on the pay side of it. What is equally clear is that even if
practitioners do not want to link pay to performance in the public sector, then they ought to
spend a lot more time on the performance side of that statement anyway because maximizing the
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return on the human capital investment is, arguably, the most important thing they do—in fact,
the very thing they were hired to do. Advancing the public value proposition and maximizing
the return on the single greatest public investment in that value proposition—human capital—
demands no less. As for the public leader that can’t find the time to do that, it begs the question
of what they are spending their time on?

What this research reveals is that too many practitioners who are adopting performance pay
systems are doing so because they believe that it is philosophically right. They are not applying
the same rigor to testing whether this organizational objective is being actually achieved through
empirical measurement versus that they simply believe it is the “right thing to do.” At the same
time, what the research qualitatively also shows equally clearly is that there a very limited few
practitioners who are taking this practice so seriously that they are applying rigorous best
management practices to the application of this management technique. We can learn a great
deal from those limited few about how we can advance organizational outcomes through a
stronger performance management and assessment system regardless of whether we tie those
strategies to the additional management strategy of linking pay to it as well. Those who are
developing a rigorous performance assessment and management practice stood out in the
research as those who could actually discuss what they were accomplishing at something deeper
than a platitudinous level. What was fascinating to then note was that if you had rigor,
discipline, and best practices in the performance assessment and management process, how much
easier it was for those practitioners to link pay in with greater confidence that it would help the
organization and not hurt it.
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So, what can the research tell us about how to construct such a rigorous and robust performance
assessment and management process? All of the BMPs earlier identified speak to this very
question. In addition, one of the key findings of the research is that advancing organizational
outcomes was one of the primary drivers for instituting a performance based compensation
system; at the same time, there was remarkably little discussion about which specific
organizational outcomes were attempting to be advanced by the institution of the system or
which organizational outcomes were actually advanced by the institution of the system. There
were almost no systems that were being empirically tested to see if the system was achieving the
results it was intended to achieve. One of the key recommendations that this study advances,
therefore, is the clear need to be much, much more purposeful in the purpose and design of the
performance assessment process.

Seeing a comprehensive system in use may help to illuminate how such a system is both
constructed and administered. To that end, one organization’s system, designed and built using
some of the findings of this research is offered as potentially instructional and is therefore
presented here as a case study. It is still too early to tell if, on balance, this system does more
harm than good, but it will help to advance the research question and it is, therefore, offered as
such. The following recommendations come from that context and are presented here in that
format.

Crow Wing County, MN: A case study

Much of the discussion about effective performance assessment programs focuses on either the
forms used or the rating scale used. Interestingly, very little of either of these was mentioned by
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respondents to this research and, on reflection, that is likely with good reason. The most
important thing to remember in the development of a highly effective performance assessment
process is to create clear expectations for an employee about that which the organization wants
them to contribute and that those actions are reasonably related to and expected to advance
things that are linked to that which the organization is attempting to accomplish. Stated another
way, there should be clear expectations for the employee and a clear line-of-sight alignment
between what the employee is being asked to do and what the organization is trying to
accomplish.
There is no one right way to accomplish this, but the following is offered as one county’s
experience in designing, constructing, and implementing a robust performance assessment and
management process and linking that to compensation. Many of the practices and approaches,
though not all, were informed by this research. The research is not definitive on the ultimate
organizational value provided by linking pay to performance, but, for those practitioners who
believe strongly in that approach, the research was clear that having high credibility in the
performance assessment process was critical. In addition, the research identified clear
connections between what those interviewed perceived as highly credible practices, or BMPs,
and how they would operate in a system of practices to maximize the chances of success.

To that end, the experience of Crow Wing County is not offered here as the only path to pursue,
but, rather, it is offered here because its path was informed by this research. The BMPs
identified within this research were incorporated into their practice. The qualitative findings
produced in the research were incorporated into its system design. There were other resources
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drawn from, such as the Balanced Scorecard, that was not part of this research. The hope is that
in seeing it woven together and, maybe more importantly, how it was woven together will be
instructive to the reader about how they might go about creating a similar framework for their
organization.

Most importantly, conveying organizational meaning and alignment is key. To do that, it should
be easy to tell your organization’s “story.” Below is a framework for an organizational Strategy
Map (Figure 16) as a simplified way to begin to spread and inculcate your organization’s story:

Figure 16 – Organizational
Strategy Map
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As such, the beginning is the end. One must first start with the end in mind. What kind of future
are the leaders hoping to create through the work of your organization? They need not limit that
question to just the contributions of the organization, but may also think of their organization as
part of a larger community system and how their contributions will add to the work of others.
This seems especially appropriate to a public organization. In doing so, organizational and
political leaders contemplate the difference they hope to make through the efforts put forth
through their organization. How far into the future they choose to look is subjective, but it
should clearly reflect a future that is not yet here and will be a significant stretch for the
organization to accomplish. When properly constructed, this is the vision for the organization.

At this point, it also seems appropriate to suggest keeping it simple. The most effective vision
for an organization is one that is shared by everyone in the organization. While that is likely an
impossibility that everyone will share it, that is the goal and so the simpler you can keep this, the
further it will advance throughout the organization and the more impact and effectiveness it will
carry. The ultimate goal is broad understanding of what the organization is trying to accomplish
and subsequent alignment of the performance expectations with it.

The next question should reflect what the organization will do to achieve bringing about that
vision of the future. This is fundamentally the “what” questions that should define, at a very,
very high level, what your organization will do to achieve its future state. Finally, the
organization should define the “how” question very broadly. How will the organization go about
doing the things that it identified needed doing in order to bring about the future state it wants to
create. Typically, these are expressed as values that are the most important to the organization to
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hold dear as you travel the proverbial path.

Through this kind of exercise, a vision, mission, and values statement is created that should
quickly convey the most important things to know about the organization. This becomes your
organizational “brand.” There is a great deal of variation in the practice of setting the preceding
for organizations’ and a diverse consulting network upon which organizations can draw. As
such, there is no one right answer, there is only the answer right for your organization, but, again,
keep the end in mind. In designing this to create clarity and alignment in a performance
assessment system, keep it simple.

It is critical that this version of who the organization is should be spread far and wide and that it
be as close to a guidepost for daily action as it can be. To that end, many organizations create
attractive ways to convey it. Figure 17 is an example of how Crow Wing County’s mission,
vision, and values are conveyed:
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Figure 17 – Vision, Mission, Vales Statements

The vision, mission, and values of an organization should be thought as expansive. They answer
the question of why anyone would want to get out of bed in the morning to go and work in your
shop. They should inspire that the work you do is important and that it makes a real difference in
the world at large—otherwise, why bother? High performance organizations, private or public,
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are inhabited by highly motivated people who aspire to things greater than themselves.
According to Sinek (2011), “Great companies don’t hire skilled people and motivate them, they
hire already motivated people and inspire them. Unless you give motivated people something to
believe in, something bigger than their job to work toward, they will motivate themselves to find
a new job and you’ll be stuck with whoever’s left.”

In the end, however, no one can be all things to all people. There is a limitless supply of good
things to do and a limited supply of resources with which to do them, so you must choose.
Choosing what the organizational priorities are for an organization, the next step, can be seen as
that first exercise in disciplining the organization to working on only those things that you have
chosen to advance from among the infinite range of possible good things. And, so, the
appropriate question is, what are the most important things for this organization to do within the
scope of who we are that will do the most to advance us to our vision? (As an aside, you might
also consider that your organizational structure contributes greatly to how these organizational
priorities are driven and think about creating an organizational structure that is organized around
your organizational priorities to drive performance within business units that is aligned to the
organizational priority, but that is outside the scope of the design of this research).

From these organizational objectives, define strategies and subsequently tactics. This is the point
that many organizations fall into the trap of thinking that financial objectives are the only thing
that motivates the organization—a trap easier for private sector concerns to fall into than others.
The reality, however, is that there will be no financial success for any organization, including a
private concern, unless it identifies value that it will offer in exchange. Selling a poor product
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will not deliver financial return. Delivering a product at the right pricepoint for the value that it
delivers and having that pricepoint be profitable within the cost of producing it is what will
deliver financial success.

In the public sector, organizations can easily fall into that same trap: how do we have the lowest
property taxes? Well, the obvious answer is to do nothing because then you will not have any
property taxes. If you want to cut the cost of snowplowing in half, it’s easy: take twice as long
to plow the snow. Here, too, it is the intersection of competing priorities--finance being one of
them-- that defines the service/value “sweet spot” that is right for every community and the
pluralistic opinions contained within. It is because of these competing priorities that the
Balanced Scorecard methodology has become so attractive for so many organizations to ensure
that they have strategies to advance not just one priority at the expense of the others and to
achieve “balance” in their strategic perspective.

The Balanced Scorecard methodology does this by using four perspectives: Financial,
Customers, Internal Processes, and Learning & Growth. Returning, then, to the organizational
priorities that the organization decided to put the organization’s purposes to, within each of the
perspectives of the Balanced Scorecard, what are the things the organization must do really,
really well in order to accomplish your organizational priorities? The answer to that question
becomes your strategies. In the end of the design of the performance assessment process,
absolutely every employee performance measure should be tied back and “linked” to one of
these strategies and that linkage ought to be reviewed and revisited with employees every year as
part of their review. That said, it is equally important to know that the Balanced Scorecard
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methodology is only appropriate in the senior echelons of the organization where a holistic set of
objectives are actually expected. It does no good, for instance, for a custodian without budget
authority to have a financial goal.

Crow Wing County’s strategy map quickly and comprehensively tells the story of this
organization, who they are, what they do, how they want to be known while doing it, and what
they need to do to in order to do it well:

Figure 18 – Organizational Priorities
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A more updated version of this, designed to state these objectives in less jargon language,
produced the following strategy map:

Figure 19: Crow Wing County Strategy Map

This process of beginning with the end in mind is essentially one of cascading from what it is
that the organization is trying to achieve throughout the layers of the organization to what you
expect from each individual contributor. Once you have an idea of what the organization’s
purpose, priorities, and strategies are, you can now begin the process of asking the question, how
will we know when we’re making progress or have arrived? This is the beginning of the process
of defining key performance indicators for each of the organizational priorities.
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The most well-known method for setting key performance objectives is the S.M.A.R.T. method.
S.M.A.R.T refers to the acronym that describes the key characteristics of meaningful objectives,
which are Specific (concrete, detailed, well defined), Measureable (numbers, quantity,
comparison), Achievable (feasible, actionable), Realistic (considering resources) and TimeBound (a defined time line).

SMART objectives are the stepping stones to the achievement of individual, work group,
departmental and organizational goals and are detailed below.

Specific
Specific means the objective is concrete, detailed, focused and well defined. Specific means it is
results and action-orientated. Objectives must be straight forward and emphasize action and the
required outcome.

To set specific objectives it helps to ask:

WHAT needs to be done?
WHY is it important?
WHO is going to do what and who else need to be involved?
WHEN will it be completed?
HOW will it be done?
Diagnostic Questions




What exactly will be done, with or for whom?
What strategies will be used?
Is the objective well understood?
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Is the objective described with action verbs?
Is it clear who is involved?
Is it clear where this will happen?
Is it clear what needs to happen?
Is the outcome clear?
Will this objective lead to the desired results?

Measurable
If the objective is measurable, it means that the measurement source is identified and actions can
be tracked as progress towards the objective is made. Measurement is the standard used for
comparison. For example, a measurable objective may state 50% of the files are to be scanned
by a certain date. The measure is 50%. As it’s so often said if you can’t measure it, you can’t
manage it! It’s important to have measures that will encourage and motivate along the way.
This may require interim measures.

Diagnostic Questions



How will I know that the change has occurred?
Can these measurements be obtained?

Achievable
Objectives, unlike aspirations and visions, need to be achievable, a stretch, but not so great that
achievement is unrealistic.

Diagnostic Questions






Can it be done in the proposed timeframe?
Are the limitations and constraints understood?
Can it be done with the resources we have?
Has anyone else done this successfully?
Is this possible?

Realistic
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Realistic means that you have the resources to get it done. Resources, such as skills, time,
people, finances, equipment, etc. may be necessary and must be considered to ensure the
objective is realistic and achievable. While keeping objectives realistic, ensure they are a stretch
and keep in mind they may require a change in priorities to make them happen.

Diagnostic Questions




Are the resources available to achieve this objective?
Do priorities need to be shifted to make this happen?
Is it possible to achieve this objective?

Time-Bound
Time-bound means setting a deadline for the achievement of the objective. Deadlines need to be
both achievable and realistic. Timeframes create the necessary urgency and prompts action.
Timeframes may be stated in many ways including a specific date such as December 1st or a
quarter such as by the end of third quarter or annual such as by the end of the calendar year or
the end of the current rating period.

Diagnostic Questions



When will this objective be accomplished?
Is there a stated deadline?

So, for instance, for county government, it is not hard to imagine that the organizational priority
of providing a safe and effective transportation infrastructure is the responsibility of the county’s
transportation division, frequently referred to as a Highway Department (and interestingly so
since highways are not the only mode of transportation, but that, too, is a topic for another day.)
So what are the things county leaders should pay attention to that will help us to evaluate the
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degree to which a county highway department is creating a safe and effective transportation
system for it constituents? Put another way, what measurable outcomes would illuminate how
well they are advancing the value proposition that the public hired the county to achieve in
creating and maintaining a safe and effective transportation system?

Setting SMART goals is a good approach to defining performance measures in ways that will
convey meaning and understanding that is shared, realistic, and achievable. Using the SMART
methodology to set goals, however, does nothing to ensure that the goals that are set are smart
things for the organization to do. Put another way, a goal can be SMART, but not be wise. Care
needs to be taken to ensure that the well-defined goal is a goal towards something that really
matters to the organization. Will achieving the goal truly advance the organization closer to
achieving its mission and vision?

As such, there are no one set of right answers. They are the right answers for your organization
and you should consider them not in terms of a destination, but rather in terms of a journey. First
attempts at these will be less than perfect—the whole system will be less than perfect, so ask
whether what you are landing on is creating more good than more harm. Here’s an example of
Crow Wing County’s list of KPIs for their highway department (Figure 20):

Figure 20 – Highway Department Key Performance Indicators
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As noted earlier, human services KPIs are more difficult to construct. As such, here is an
example of the KPIs constructed for Crow Wing County’s balanced scorecard for its human
services field (Figure 21):

Figure 21 – Community Services Key Performance Indicators
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Cascading from these outcomes to contributory inputs at the contributing employee level is a
matter, once again, of creating and discussing alignment about what actions will most likely
contribute to what outcomes that the organization is seeking. By cascading, you are trying to
establish and follow the cause-and-effect linkages that lead from the desired goals for the
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organization to the actions that a contributing employee can reasonably take that will drive
positive change in that outcome. So, for instance, if the goal is a safe and effective transportation
system, what are the expectations of the public for when the roads should be plowed after a
snowstorm? By when should there be different variations on dry wheel paths? Does the
standard vary by traffic counts? Which snowplow route is assigned to which driver and how
well did each do on hitting the performance targets after each snow event.

It is sometimes helpful when trying to think about the cause-and-effect linkages to think in terms
of leading indicators versus lagging indicators. A leading indicator is something that would be
an input into a process—something that would be done so that something downstream would
happen. A lagging indicator would be something downstream in the process toward the end and
would tend to be closer to the outcome that was the desired result of the process. It is common
that the outcomes or lagging indicators are present the higher up the organizational ladder you
progress and the leading indicators are those closer to the contributing employee level.

As an example, if an outcome that you are trying to achieve is low rates of communicable
diseases in the population, then the lagging indicators would be things like rates of measles, or
mumps, or influenza—whatever specific objectives you are targeting for low rates among the
population. A mid-process indicator might be the number of vaccinations administered. A
leading indicator might be the number of immunization clinics held or the number of home visits
conducted. In other words, it is expected that the contributing employee will hold “X” number
of immunization clinics or conduct “X” number of home visits in the belief that in doing so they
will administer “Y” number of vaccinations and that, in so doing, the organization will impact
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the community’s rate of measles or mumps or influenza thereby reducing the rate of transmission
of communicable diseases within the community.

Simple examples such as these, where the cause-and-effect linkages are more obvious, useful as
teaching tools, but they do not adequately reflect the complexity of real life in county
government and the difficulty of establishing clear and compelling cause-and-effect linkages in
all cases. Doing so in areas such as child protection or chemical dependency are much less clear.
What actions, taken by contributing employees, will contribute to reductions in chemical
dependency rates in the community? What actions taken upstream of the need for a child
protection intervention could reduce the rate of child protection interventions? Complicating
matters considerably are the wide and deep array of other forces acting in society that also
impact those very same things. And, yet, if the organization does not think it can impact the
rates of chemical dependency or child protection interventions, then why would it invest limited
and precious public resources in doing so?

There must, at some point, be a leap of faith that the actions you take at the service delivery level
will impact those types of outcomes and there must be accompanying accountability to the
efficacy of those actions in order to create appropriate pressures for the system to be flexible,
adaptive, and creative in changing tactics that don’t do so in favor of trying new ones that may.
That accountability should be present throughout the system from top leaders to contributing
employees. Regardless of whether the system is tied to compensation, this kind of assessment of
the efficacy of effort to the stated objectives is necessary to avoid the creation of moribund
systems that never adapt—a chief criticism of public systems. Tying it to compensation simply
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ups the ante and reasonable people will likely disagree on the wisdom of doing so.

In terms of good performance assessment, the pursuit of perfection is the enemy of the
achievement of the good. In complex and dynamic systems of human interaction, perfection is
impossible. Creating a system with the best work you are capable of with the best knowledge
available at the time influenced by experience up to that point is key. Staying open to
adaptations that you believe will add credibility to the system is key. Recognizing that it can
never be perfect is key. Thomas Jefferson once said, “On no question can a unanimity be
achieved.” Remembering that improving the system towards its most perfect form while
recognizing that it can never fully achieve that should not dissuade you from the valiant effort
toward that lofty goal.
Toward that end, below is an example of Crow Wing County’s efforts to define organizational
objectives in snow plowing to the key performance indicators that will demonstrate the
achievement of public value for a highway department more specifically as it relate to their snow
plowing targets and the drivers assigned to each road:
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Figure 22 – Organizational Objectives for Key Performance Indicators

Figure 22 – Continued
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Figure 22 – Continued
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Figure 23 – Priority and Level of Service Planning
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Figure 24 – Priority and Level of Service Outcomes
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There are a variety of good reasons why throughout all of this process, organizations should seek
high employee-involvement processes and open, transparent dialogues in order to define all of
these things. First, and foremost, if credibility with employees is a critically key component in
the eventual success of the performance assessment process, then what better way to hard-wire
that in than to involve the people who are subject to it in its application? That applies just as
much in system design as it does on an on-going basis in system modifications going forward.
The Gallup organization (2015) estimates that as much as 70% of employee’s engagement in
their work—the degree to which they are willing to exert discretionary effort at the margin—is
based on their relationship with their direct supervisor so this is as much about return on
investment in employee productivity as it is in doing it because it’s the right thing to do. Second,
employees who perform work are always going to be most knowledgeable about what the work
entails. They may not be able to add perspective to the question of what the organization is
trying to achieve, but they do know best what they have been doing. The richness in the
dialogue is the degree to which those two things are or are not in alignment.
In addition, working in the public sector has some distinct advantages when designing “new”
systems as plagiarism is not only allowed, it’s encouraged. In the vein that there really are no
new ideas, practitioners in the public sector are regularly accustomed to other practitioners
asking if they have any experience with such and such. An inquiry through professional
associations will always return multiple results and those results, from multiple sources, can
inform the judgment of a practitioner and their colleagues about what might best represent your
organization’s desires. To that end, an example of Crow Wing County’s efforts to define key
performance indicators for a highway maintenance technician would be as follows:
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Figure 25 – Key Performance Indicator Matrix

Likewise, an example of key performance indicators for Crow Wing County Child Protection Social
Worker are as follows:

SOCIAL WORKER
Assessment:
Description:




Provide intake services as assigned.
Conduct client assessments as assigned.
Investigatory actions including interviews and site visits if needed.

Measure:
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Case Plans: Out of Home placement Plans will be completed within 30 days of placement and
case plans will be completed within 60 day of case opening.

Case Management:
Description:






Appropriate interventions to address client service needs and protect client welfare.
Formulate client service plans based on assessments.
Ongoing assessment and plan revisions to effectively address client needs to maximize client
functioning.
Manage active case load, providing counseling, advocacy, service coordination and assessment,
achieving service plan objectives and initiating modifications as necessary to achieve stated
outcomes, address client needs, maximize client functioning and protect client welfare.
Develop discharge plans including aftercare resources, ongoing support services and crisis
planning to effectively address client needs.

Measure:


TCM hits are 80% of eligible clients

Documentation:
Description:








Clear concise documentation to be maintained within the SSIS case record.
Ensure the accurate and timely recording, retention and retrieval of case files.
Ensure that written documentation and reports are concise and professional.
Comply with all regulations relating to client confidentiality, closely guarding the privacy of
client records and information to assure full compliance with MN data Practices, HIPAA and all
other regulations regarding client confidentiality.
Ensure compliance with agency and program financial parameters, completing required
documentation to account for service costs and maximize reimbursement in accordance with
program requirements to maximize the recapture of revenue associated with programs and
services provided.
Accurately completes and enters all required information into job specific software programs.

Measure (Mandatory):



SSIS Documentation (100% of time reporting will be completed by the 10th of the month).
All cases to be closed within a timely basis of the service/care coordination end date.

In addition to specific and measurable performance outcomes, the system should also construct soft skill
outcomes that the organization is going to value. Competencies for contributing employees to the
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organization may be different than for senior leaders such as in the following competency model
example:

Figure 26 – Professional Development Competency Model
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Competencies can also be developed for the organization that reflect soft-skill competencies that the
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organization will value for all employees. There are a variety of sources for those kinds of ways to
“brand” what your organization will value as important. Here is an example from one county that grew
out of this research using competencies from the Lominger Competency Series, 5th Edition:

Figure 27 – Core Competencies
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Once the key performance indicators are constructed for each of the job classes, they need to be
assembled into a coherent system that applies to all employees. Forms need to be designed or software
systems installed to capture and communicate the information. Expected supervisory practices such as
how often there should be status meetings with employees need to be identified. Coaching managers on
good performance coaching techniques needs to be provided. There are a myriad of tiny details to work
out to ensure that the system is executed institution-wide in a fair, consistent, and equitable manner.

To that end, it is important to design in safeguards to protect employees from issues of rater or supervisor
bias or favoritism. Two practices that are recommended for that purpose would be the calibration of the
results of the ratings between and among supervisors and managers in the system and an appeal process
for an employee to challenge the rating they have received with a neutral third-party. Both are important
practices to ensuring that the employee feels like they have some outlet to protect themselves from a
supervisor who they believe practices favoritism in their performance rankings. Below is an example of
one county’s performance assessment system framework containing these safeguards as well as tools and
resources for both employees and managers to navigate the process with clear and shared expectations:
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Figure 28 – Performance Management and Planning Process
Performance Management and
Planning Process

(Article 39 of the Crow Wing County Personnel Manual)
Introduction
Purpose
The purpose of this program guide is to provide a resource to help team members implement a
performance plan for those they supervise; a performance plan that clearly articulates performance
expectations and is aligned with the strategic priorities of the organization, department, workgroup and
the individual role.
This program guide is also intended to be a resource for performance plan participants, promoting an
understanding of the process, the role of the individual in performance planning and also guidance for
completing the self evaluation portion of the performance plan.
The County’s Expectations Regarding Performance Management
Aligning resources to accomplish organizational priorities is one of the most important functions of
managers and supervisors. The supervisor is accountable for ensuring each team member has clearly
defined performance plans including key performance measures, core competencies, department
and/or role specific competencies, project assignments and developmental initiatives.
As you prepare to develop a performance plan, begin with a review of the county’s mission, vision and
values. They are the foundation on which we build; the mission speaks to what we do, the vision speaks
to where we’re heading and the values reinforce how we work. These foundational pieces, together
with department specific mission, vision and values, help to align individual roles with organizational
interests.
Our organization uses performance tools such as the Balanced Scorecard to identify and communicate
key strategic priorities for the organization. We’ve selected the balanced scorecard approach because it
ensures focus on four important perspectives; our customer, our financial performance, our work
processes and our people. For information on Crow Wing County’s guide to the Balanced Scorecard
review the Managing for Results Implementation Guide.
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Figure 28 - Continued
Strategy maps are a component of the balanced scorecard. The strategy map identifies key strategic
priorities and objectives for the organization. The county’s strategic priorities and objectives are
developed as part of a strategic planning process involving the county board of commissioners, elected
officials and senior management. Understanding the organizations priorities is an important step in
developing the strategic priorities and objectives that are unique and specific to your department.
The county strategy map provides direction by identifying the big-picture goals for the organization.
This information is cascaded through the organization to create alignment, ensuring department
priorities and objectives support the important strategies of the organization. Department strategy maps
identify the strategic priorities and objectives for the department. The departmental priorities and
objectives translate into individual roles and include key performance measures, competencies and
assignments that are specific to the individual role and ensure the accomplishment of the departmental
and organizational objectives.
Individual roles are defined in job descriptions. The supervisor is accountable for creating job
descriptions for each individual role in their department. This includes determining what duties are
important to include in a job, what qualifications are needed to fulfill those duties and what level of
performance is needed to meet the strategic priorities and objectives of the department and
organization. Contact the Human Resource department for information relating to writing effective job
descriptions.
Performance management also involves filling the job with the best candidate, training new team
members and providing continuous coaching to clarify expectations. Management of performance is
important to being a good supervisor and introducing the performance plan early, when an employee
joins the department, serves as an effective means for communicating expectations and helping staff
understand how their role links to the strategic priorities of the organization and department. All
supervisors are expected to participate in a performance management program with their staff.
Performance Management Definition
Performance management is an ongoing, continuous process of communicating and clarifying job
responsibilities, priorities and performance expectations in order to ensure mutual understanding
between supervisor and employee. It is a philosophy that values and encourages employee engagement
and development through a style of management which provides frequent feedback and fosters
teamwork. It emphasizes communication and focuses on adding value to the organization by promoting
improved job performance and encouraging skill development. Performance management involves
clarifying the job duties, defining performance standards, and documenting, evaluating and discussing
performance with each employee.

Figure 28 - Continued
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Performance Management Objectives
Promote understanding of the mission, vision, values, strategic priorities, key objectives
and expectations for the department and organization.
Cascade the strategic priorities and key objectives of the organization to departments and
individual roles to ensure alignment with and achievement of important organizational
and departmental priorities.
Promote proactive performance planning and communication between supervisors and
employees.
Identify and resolve performance improvement needs through early intervention and coaching.
Recognize quality performance
Serve as a resource for administrative decisions such as promotions, succession
planning, strategic planning, and performance based pay.
Performance Plan Development
Performance management is considered a process, not an event. It follows good management
practice in which continual coaching, feedback and communication are integral to success.
The Performance Plan is primarily a communication tool to ensure mutual understanding
of work responsibilities, priorities and performance expectations.
The Performance Plan is job specific. The major duties and responsibilities of the job
are defined and communicated as the first step in the process.
The Performance Plan contains performance measures for each major duty/ responsibility.
The performance measures are clearly defined and communicated.
The performance planning process encourages employee involvement and participation.
The developmental initiatives section is used to identify opportunities for professional
growth within the assignment and for future career interests and succession planning.

Figure 28 - Continued
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Documentation of performance is an important component of performance management.
Quarterly and midyear performance discussions are encouraged.
The overall performance rating is intended to reflect the individual's actual performance
in relation to the performance criteria established in the performance plan for the entire
evaluation period.
Supervisors are evaluated on successful administration of the plan and ongoing
performance management responsibilities.
Training for supervisors and employees is available through the county’s human resource
representatives.
Content of the performance management plan must comply with all federal and state laws
addressing non-discrimination.
Supervisor's Responsibilities
Communicate and clarify major job duties, priorities and expectations at the beginning of
the year or when a new member joins the department.
Establish and communicate performance standards.
Monitor ongoing performance through observation, discussion, etc.
Document performance, identifying successes and opportunities.
Provide continuous coaching and constructive feedback in a timely manner.
Hold performance discussions throughout the year; quarterly and semi-annually
is recommended.
Correct unsatisfactory performance and reinforce effective performance.
Help employees develop skills and abilities for improved performance.
Provide necessary resources and information needed to ensure accomplishments of key results.
Available Resources
Human Resource staff are available to provide consultation with supervisors interested in developing
a performance management plan. Individual and/or group training on all aspects of Performance
Management is provided upon request.
Performance Planning Cycle
Common Review Date
The county’s performance planning cycle aligns with the calendar year. All employees receive an
annual performance appraisal that accounts for performance in the preceding calendar year. The yearend appraisal is completed in January. The calibration and rating approval process occurs in February.
Rating communication occurs in March and performance based pay awards, for participants in the
performance based pay program, are processed the first pay period in April and effective retroactively
to January 1. The planning calendar is outlined below:
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Figure 28 - Continued
June – December: Budget planning begins in June and concludes with adoption of the final
budget during the last board meeting in December. Budget planning generally identifies resources
available and resources needed, including organizational, departmental and role specific projects
and initiatives.
Developing your individual employee performance plans in coordination with the budget planning
process ensures the performance plans align with important goals and commitments identified for the
coming year.
January: Performance results from the preceding year are summarized in January. Employees
complete their self evaluation and supervisors finalize their evaluation. Performance plans for the
coming year are finalized.
February: Performance rating recommendations are made by the supervisor and the approval and
calibration process is completed. The calibration process requires supervisors to support rating
recommendations with data that demonstrates a basis for an exceeds or exceptional rating. This also
applies to an in-development or unsatisfactory rating. This process ensures rating equity across the
organization. The calibration process is facilitated by the county administrator or his/her designee and
may include elected officials, senior managers and leadership team members. All performance plan
ratings require approval of senior manager in charge.
March: Rating communications occur; performance results from the preceding year are finalized and
discussed with staff. Performance based pay awards are communicated.
April: Performance based pay awards, for participants in the performance based pay program, are
processed the first pay period in April. First quarter progress reports are completed.
Quarterly Progress Reports
Quarterly progress reports are recommended. These are update meetings to check progress, readjust as
needed and ensure performance is on track to meet critical goals. Quarterly progress reports generally
occur in April, July and October; year-end results are finalized in January.
New Hires
Staff joining the organization during the first three quarters of a calendar year will receive a
performance evaluation at the conclusion of that calendar year, consistent with the performance
planning cycle. Staff joining the organization during fourth quarter, will be eligible to a full
performance
evaluation at the conclusion of the following year, consistent with the performance planning cycle.
Transfers, Promotions and Job Changes
Staff changing jobs and/or departments during the year will receive a performance evaluation from their
current supervisor. The evaluation will incorporate feedback from the prior supervisor and the rating
will reflect the combined performance.
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Figure 28 - Continued
In determining performance standards, consider the following:
What does a good job look like?
How many or how much is needed?
How long should it take?
When are the results needed?
How accurate or how good is acceptable?
Are there budget considerations?
Are there safety considerations?
Are there legislative or regulatory requirements?
What results would be considered satisfactory?
What condition will exist when the duty is well performed?
What is the difference between satisfactory and unsatisfactory performance?
Common Standards Applicable to all Crow Wing County Roles
The county has identified four core competencies that are common to all jobs. The core competencies
identify standards and behaviors that are expected from everyone. For example, all team members are
expected to demonstrate customer service excellence. This is only one of the four core competencies
that are common to all county jobs and contained into each employee’s performance plan.
Common Standards Applicable to Everyone in a Particular Group
There may be one or more competencies identifying common standards and behaviors that are
expected from everyone in a particular workgroup or role. For example, compassion is a core
competency for all community service jobs and referenced in each member’s performance plans.
Technical learning is a competency assigned to all technology positions and referenced in each
member’s performance plan.
To assess competencies and determine which are important to your workgroup or a given role, review the
competency listing found in the Lominger resources including the FYI Book or the competency sort
cards. These resource materials are available in most departments and also the human resource office.
Putting It All Together
Introduce the Performance Plan
The performance plan is introduced at the beginning of the calendar year and when a new employee
joins the department. The performance plan provides focus and direction, helping to ensure team
members have a clear understanding of key priorities, performance measures and outcomes expected
for the coming year. The performance plan can be updated as the year progresses to accommodate
changes in project assignments, key priorities and/or performance measures.

Figure 28 - Continued
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Document Job Performance
It is important to document performance over the entire year. Good documentation procedures help to
reduce the possibility of rating errors, as referenced in the next section. Be sure to make notes
of performance successes and items to recognize as well as opportunities and performance that
did not achieve expectations. Good documentation is important in justifying evaluations and
resultant administrative decisions. Effective documentation is:
Accurate
Specific
Consistent
A record of a discussion – never done in isolation
Factual, not inferential
Performance documentation may focus on:
Actions of the employee:
"Joe’s month end documentation was incomplete, missing important data and leaving the department
unable to prepare accurate utilization reports. This matter has been discussed with Joe on two prior
occasions. Immediate and sustained improvement is necessary.
Results of job performance:
"A mentoring program pilot for at risk families was initiated during the current rating period; a program
that would not be possible without Mary’s expert work in securing $250,000 in grant funding.”
Documentation should be in written form and shared with the employee.
Evaluate Job Performance
In evaluating performance, always compare actual performance to the performance standards as
determined at the beginning of the evaluation period. Review the performance measures, competencies,
project assignments and developmental objectives contained in the performance plan. Compare the
stated objectives to the actual results achieved, using your notes, the employees notes and other sources
of feedback to obtain an accurate accounting of performance.
Sources of Feedback
The most common source of performance feedback is the supervisor and the emplo y ee’s self assessment. Performance feedback can also include reviews from peers and customers or anyone in
contact with the employee.
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Figure 28 - Continued
Factors Impacting Performance
Before discussing performance assess factors that may have had an unanticipated negative or positive
impact on performance. Consider:
Unanticipated events that redirected work activities
Staffing issues
Lack of proper equipment
Excessive work load fluctuations
Working conditions
Delays from internal or external sources
Unclear objectives or performance standards
Policy changes
Assigning the Performance Rating
The county uses a five point rating scale. A five point scale is the most commonly used rating format.
The overall performance rating should be reflective of the performance in its entirety for the rating
period. For information relating to the county’s performance rating click on the following link:
Performance Rating.
Approval Process
Prior to communicating the performance rating to the review participant the performance plan and
recommended rating is subject to review and approval. This process is designed to minimize the
potential for rating errors. For additional information regarding the approval process click on the
following link: Calibration.
Common Rating Errors
Leniency: Giving everyone high ratings regardless of actual performance
Central Tendency: Clustering all employees in the middle performance categories.
Recency: Focusing on a recent performance rather than the entire rating period.
Halo Effect: Letting one favored trait or work factor influence all other areas of performance.
Horns Effect: Allowing one negative incident to unduly influence more positive
performance elements.
Contrast: Evaluating an employee in relation to another rather than actual performance
in relation to job duties, goals and stated performance standards.
Past Performance: Rating on past performance rather than current year performance.
Biased Rating: Allowing personal feelings toward employee to influence rating.
High Potential: Confusing potential with performance.
Guilt by Association: Evaluation influenced by employee's associations rather
than performance.
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Figure 28 - Continued
Hold Performance Discussions
The performance review discussion is one of the most important processes a supervisor completes. This
is a time to have a more formalized discussion about performance and it should reflect the day to day
coaching that has transpired throughout the year. It should be undertaken with great care and
preparation, as the way you handle it can have significant impact on the morale and future performance
of your staff members. Formal performance discussions should be held at least once a year. Coaching
should occur on a frequent basis. Informal performance update discussions are also valuable and
recommended quarterly, at a minimum semi annually.
Prepare for the discussion
Establish date, time and suitable private location. Notify the participant well in advance; providing the
date, time, location and what to prepare. Consider providing an outline of discussion items:
What questions do you have about your job such as priorities, the purpose of
particular activities, goals for the future?
What barriers affect the performance of your job?
How do you spend the majority of your time?
What are you doing that you think doesn't seem to add value?
What do you think you should be doing that you are not?
What ideas do you have about processes that could be changed to provide better customer
service, eliminate waste or make work easier?
How can I help you succeed?
Review responsibilities and expectations. Compare actual performance to the performance
standards. Consider the following:
What has performance been over the entire evaluation period?
What performance expectations were met or exceeded; list specific examples.
What performance standards were not met; list specific examples. What can be done
to improve performance?
Were expectations reasonable and attainable?
What factors may have affected performance or been beyond the employee's control?
What has informed my opinions about the employee's performance? Have I been fair
and objective?

Figure 28 - Continued
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Conduct the Discussion
Schedule the performance review meeting in advance to allow both parties sufficient time
to prepare for the meeting.
Conduct the performance discussion in a private area with no interruptions.
Provide a relaxed setting. Clearly explain the purpose and format of the discussion.
Start on a positive note; this is an opportunity for recognition and coaching,
identifying successes and improvement opportunities.
Discuss each component of the performance plan. Use documentation to discuss
specific instances of performance.
Give credit for achievement and work done well. Give specific examples and mention
resulting benefit to the organization.
Focus on important performance measures and goals. Minor infractions of little significance
can be discussed when they occur and dropped unless you see a trend developing.
Apply effective communication skills. Encourage engagement by asking open-ended
questions gaining insight to the employee's assessment, comments and suggestions.
Focus on performance, not personality. Describe behaviors, not personality traits or attitudes.
Constructive feedback focuses on the specific behavior or action not the individual. Discuss
positive as well as unsatisfactory performance. Provide specific examples and explain why
these behaviors are problematic or how they benefit the organization.
Avoid comparisons between employees.
Seek to understand the presence of any barriers or constraints impacting performance.
Work for understanding, rather than complete agreement. Be supportive and seek
to understand what you can do to be of greater help.
Avoid surprises; performance problems need to be addressed at the time of occurrence. If
performance has not improved, discuss it again and develop an action plan. The
performance review discussion is not the place to mention it for the first time. If poor
performance is significant, a performance improvement plan should be considered.
Avoid common rating errors in forming your opinion of performance. Receive feedback
in a constructive manner. Listen carefully and seek to understand what is being said.
Don't interrupt. Ask questions – get more information.
Review the major job duties and performance standards to determine if changes need to
be made for next year.
End the Performance Review Discussion on a positive note.
Appeal Process
The county offers an appeal process as a method for addressing and reconciling differences relating
to the performance rating. Click on Appeal Process for additional information.
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Figure 28 - Continued
Crow Wing County Performance Plan Document
The following instructions relate to completing the performance plan document. The participant’s
self- assessment process is explained in greater detail at the end of this section.
Position Objective
This section helps create focus, using a few key sentences to highlight the primary purpose of the
position, the reason it exists. This information is generally contained in the job description in the
position objective section. You’ll likely find a few sentences that serve to define the primary
purpose of the position. These can be used to complete this section of the performance plan
document.
Strategic Goal Alignment
Aligning people and resources to meet the strategic priorities of the organization, the department and
the work team are critically important. Use this section to reflect critical goals and priorities that are
relevant to the position. Review the county strategy map, the department strategy map and related
mission, vision and values statements to identify important priorities that help guide the focus of the
position and ensure strategic priorities and critical goals are achieved.
Key Performance Measures
Using performance tools such as the balanced scorecard has increased the county’s focus on results that
matter. These are performance measures that help to ensure that critical goals and priorities for the
organization and department are achieved. The job description describes the work that is performed; the
accountabilities assigned to the role. Most often these responsibilities are described as tasks such as
process mail, perform reception duties, operate equipment, or prepare reports. The performance
measures speak more specifically to the outcomes expected. These generally contain a clearly
articulated benchmark or performance target that provides clarity as to what is expected, how much,
and by when. Look to the department scorecards and key performance measures for identification of
the important priorities. Translate those into actions required from each of the roles you supervise, for
example, “answer all calls by the third ring” or “return messages within one business day” or
“accurately process all applications within three business days”.
Core Competencies
The four core competencies speak to the culture at Crow Wing County. They shape how work gets
done, what’s valued and important. For us it is about results, relationships, work processes and service
to our customers. Every performance plan contains these four core competencies. Our organization
uses the Lominger Competency Set. Resources such as the Lominger Leadership Architect
Competency Sort Cards and For Your Improvement, a developmental guidebook, provide clear
definitions on skilled versus unskilled behaviors for these four core competencies as well as
developmental coaching tips.
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Figure 28 - Continued
Department or Role Specific Competencies
This section identifies additional competencies the department has identified as being important to the
operation or individual role. Often these identify skills or abilities the department would like to develop
or holds as critically important for the success of their operation. As a general rule, there should be no
more than 1- 4 department or role specific competencies. Competencies such as functional/technical
skills, decision quality and priority setting are examples of department or role specific competencies.
Resources such as the Lominger Leadership Architect Competency Sort Cards and For Your
Improvement, a developmental guidebook, are tools for identifying department and role specific
competencies.
Project Assignments
This section is used to identify important projects that require completion or have milestones that will
be due during the performance plan cycle. Project assignments may include individual projects, team
projects, department and potentially county-wide initiatives. Projects are generally closely related to
the work assignment and involve something that is in addition to the day to day accountabilities.
When completing the project assignment section it is important to identify what is expected to occur
and by when. The acronym SMART is used to provide guidance for clearly communicating project
assignments. Click SMART to link to more information on writing SMART goals.
Project assignments are often initiated by the individual staff member. These would be job related
initiatives the staff member would like to commit to during the coming rating period. The project
should be something of value that benefits the organization and supports the departments and/or
organization’s strategic priorities and/or objectives.
Developmental Initiatives
This section is used to identify training, experience and skill development opportunities for both the
current role and future career interests. Consider succession planning including the development of
internal candidates for future staffing needs. Developmental initiatives may include traditional
educational tracks including post secondary education, seminars and workshops. Development also
includes processes such as cross training, mentoring assignments and project assignments that build
skills and increase knowledge. When communicating developmental initiatives use the SMART
process as a guide for clearly stating the expected action and outcome.
Review of Job Description
Keeping job descriptions current and relevant to the work assignment is an important component of
performance communications. At the beginning of the performance planning cycle a review of the job
description will help promote common understanding of the position purpose and accountabilities.
Changes should be noted as they occur to ensure the description remains relevant and a clear
representation of the role. At the conclusion of the performance planning cycle it is again important to
review the job description and alert human resources of any changes needed. In situations where there
are significant and material changes in the job duties refer to the Compensation Administration Guide to
assess whether a reevaluation of the position is appropriate.

Figure 28 - Continued
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Performance Rating
The county uses a five point rating scale. A five point scale is the most commonly used rating format.
The overall performance rating should be reflective of the performance in its entirety for the rating
period. The “achieves” rating is reflective of “A” level performance. It is used to describe performance
that has achieved expectations, where key goals and performance outcomes have been achieved after
considering any environmental factors that may have had a positive or negative impact on performance.
The performance rating is applied at the end of the performance planning cycle, covering the period of
January 1 to December 31. The rating period would be less for individuals who start their employment
during the year, representing year to date performance for those whose employment started prior to
fourth quarter. Individuals who start their employment in fourth quarter will not receive a performance
rating for the current year; their performance planning cycle will incorporate the fourth quarter of the
current year and a full year for the upcoming performance planning cycle.
The rating definitions are contained on the performance planning document. For reference, the
“Achieves” rating is representative of effective performance; think of it as being the equivalent
of receiving a letter grade “A” rating.
The ratings of “Exceeds” and “Exceptional” are reserved for those situations where performance
has surpassed expectations. Often this involves work products or activities that have gone beyond
the scope of the assignment and have had a positive impact on the work unit or organization.
The “In Development or Needs Improvement” applies to situations where performance is not achieving
expectations; one or more critical goals are not met. Previous discussion regarding the performance
improvement needs should have occurred prior to the rating assignment. A follow-up review is required
in six months.
An “Unacceptable” performance rating identifies situations where performance is not meeting
expectation and has not adequately progressed following coaching. A follow-up review is required
in three months and again in six months.
Calibration
Performance ratings require the approval of the supervisor and senior management member who
oversees the department. This oversight is intended to ensure consistency among raters. Supervisors
are required to present objective data for ratings that are above or below the “achieves” level.
Appeal Process
An appeal process is available to staff members who disagree with the performance rating. For
represented staff the appeal process involves the business agent, a county representative and third
party neutral from the bureau of mediation services. The three person panel will receive up to ½ hour
of presentation from the employee and ½ hour from the rater. The panel will issue a bench decision
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Figure 28 - Continued
which will serve as the final and binding rating. The non contract staff will have access to a
similar appeal process; the panel will include the county administrator, an elected official and
personnel committee representative.
Completing the Self-Assessment
The self assessment is an important component of the performance management process. It serves as
your reflection on the contributions of the past year as well as your thoughts on the future. This is an
opportunity to inventory your accomplishments, include feedback and recognition that has been
received throughout the year as well as areas for improvement and opportunities for further
development. The self assessment helps keep us focused on the mission critical priorities and the key
objectives associated with our role, the department and the organization.
Self-Assessment Paper Work
As the year begins use your copy of the current year’s performance plan to log self assessment data,
recording accomplishments, milestones, notes and recognition received as well as opportunities and
developmental activity as they occur. Capturing performance accomplishments and opportunities in
real time makes the year end completion much smoother. We highly recommend adding comments to
your copy of the performance plan throughout the year.
You will be notified when your self-assessment is due. When preparing your self-assessment allow for
a couple of hours of quiet uninterrupted time. Review the performance plan document, any notes you
made throughout the year, and documents or records that you have to reflect on. Consider projects or
assignments that you would like to commit to in the coming year, also consider developmental or
training opportunities to build needed skills and prepare for future assignments or career opportunities.
Using an electronic copy of your performance plan, enter your self assessment comments under the
employee comment section for each area of the performance plan. Refer to the instructions for The
Crow Wing County Performance Plan for further information.
Forward the completed self-assessment to your supervisor. The supervisor will add their assessment
comments and arrange for a time to meet and discuss the evaluation content. At the review discussion it
is important to clarify the points of difference and ensure understanding of performance expectations
for the future.
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Figure 28 - Continued
Performance Based Pay Administration
For Performance Based Pay Participants

Wage Adjustment Matrix
For performance based pay participants, (consult labor contract for eligibility), the wage adjustment
matrix is developed annually. It represents the annual wage adjustment opportunity. The adjustment
amounts are designed to be market competitive, considering local market data, regional and national
data. Sources such as the economic cost indicator, local and regional surveys of private and public
agencies and local economic conditions are considered in the development of the annual wage
adjustment matrix. The wage adjustment matrix is subject to collective bargaining for represented
positions. In the case of multi-year labor agreements, a wage adjustment matrix is established for each
year of the agreement.
Effective Date
Performance based pay adjustment awards are processed the first pay period in April and effective
retroactively to January 1.
Prorated Performance Based Pay Awards
Staff, in a performance based pay eligible position, who join the organization during the first three
quarters of the year, are eligible for a prorated performance based pay award based on the number of
full months worked during the year. For example an individual who started their employment in mid
march would have 9 full months of employment. The prorated formula applied to the wage adjustment
would be as follows: 9/12 = 75%.
Staff receiving an “in development or needs improvement” rating during their annual review may be
eligible for a prorated wage adjustment after 6 months. If the mid-year evaluation reflects improvement
to an “Achieves” performance rating or above, the individual is eligible to receive a prorated portion of
the corresponding wage adjustment reflected on the current year wage adjustment matrix. The mid-year
prorated formula is 50% representing a wage adjustment earned for ½ of the current rating period.
Staff receiving an “Unacceptable” rating during their annual review may be eligible for a prorated
wage adjustment after 6 months. Eligibility for a wage adjustment requires two consecutive quarters of
an “Achieves” rating or above. The proration formula is either 50% or 25% of the annual performance
based pay award, depending on the quarter in which two consecutive “Achieves” awards are attained.
Resources
Contact the human resource department for additional information and resources relating to the
performance management and planning process.
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In addition, because the calibration process is so important to the overall credibility of the rating system
for the organization, there should be additional guidance provided on the calibration process. Crow Wing
County’s is as follows:

Figure 29 – Calibrating Performance
Calibrating Performance
Calibration Purpose: Calibration is a process that brings various team leaders together to jointly review
rater assessments to ensure ratings across the organization are consistent, appropriate and properly
distributed. Calibration is not to be confused with forced ranking where managers are required to force
ratings to achieve specific rating percentages. While the county has a predicted rating model to help
forecast salary budgets, there is no forced ranking requirement at Crow Wing County.
Calibration sessions typically include supervisors who are responsible for conducting performance
evaluations, reviewers which are the next level of management responsible for reviewing the content
and closely examining the employee evaluations, the department head or senior leader accountable
for the workgroup and a calibration leader to facilitate the session.
The calibration process provides a forum for the discussion of employees’ performance with the goal
of ensuring supervisors apply similar standards for all employees and eliminate biases to the greatest
extent possible. Calibration relies on an honest and confidential dialogue among supervisors,
reviewers and the responsible department head.
Calibration Timing: Calibration occurs after a supervisor has: (1) received the employee selfappraisal; (2) completed the supervisor appraisal comments and ratings; (3) routed it for approval;
and (4) addressed any revisions requested by the reviewer. The calibration occurs BEFORE the
reviewer approves and returns the evaluation to the supervisor. In all cases, calibration occurs
before the scored performance evaluation has been shared with the employee.
Pre Calibration Process: December 1 – January 31

Employee
completes se;fappraisal

Rater adds
comments,
scores and
forwards to
reviewer

Reviewer
examines content
and ratings for
accuracy

Prepare for
calibration
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Figure 29 – Continued
Step 1. The performance appraisal is opened for scoring on December 1st. Departments assign
specific due dates for employees to complete their self-appraisal.
Step 2. The supervisor completes their portion of the appraisal including the performance ratings
and routes the appraisal to their reviewer for approval. Departments are accountable for managing
this process by assigning specific completion dates.
Step 3. The reviewer reads the appraisal, looking for constructive supervisory comments and
ensuring evaluations are thorough and logical and contain specific examples of performance, results
achieved and behaviors. If the reviewer decides a supervisor should alter a particular evaluation, the
reviewer sends the evaluation back and waits for revision.
Step 4. The reviewer prepares for calibration by viewing Trakstar Reports for their reporting area
examining the ratings distribution, performance history and rater bias reports to highlight any trends
that warrant follow-up. The reviewer, or supervisor as assigned, prepares the documentation needed
to report on his/her employee performance ratings at the calibration session.
January 31st is the target date for completion of this initial process. When completed, the
reviewer contacts human resources to schedule a calibration meeting. A calibration meeting is
scheduled between the designated reviewer, the department head or senior leader accountable for
the workgroup and a calibration leader to facilitate the session.
Supervisor’s attendance at the calibration session may or may not be required based on the
department structure and perspective of the reviewer and/or department head. In all cases it is
essential that calibration participants have an in-depth understanding of the performance ratings for
their employee appraisals.
Calibration Process: February 1 – March 1
Review
ratings
distribution

Present
individual
ratings

Discussion
and
feedback

Ratings
distribution
review

Update
appraisals

Meet with
employees

Step 1. At the calibration meeting participants look at ratings distribution for all participating
departments as an early indicator of rating trends. This helps ensure use of the ratings are being
consistently and fairly applied to all employees irrespective of reporting relationships and/or
departmental assignments.
Step 2. The reviewer presents the individual employee ratings. The discussion content includes
performance relating to key performance measures and rating; core competencies – those with the
highest and lowest ratings; progress on key projects and goals, the overall rating and closing
comments.
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Figure 29 – Continued

Step 3. Calibration meeting participants may ask questions about specific ratings or interpretation
of ratings and may suggest adjustments based on the discussion of performance, results and behaviors
considered and documented when determining the rating or their own experiences with the employee.
Step 4. Re-review ratings distribution report against the predicted ratings model. If distributions trend
higher or lower than the predicted model, revisit employee ratings that were on the cusp between
ratings to determine if they are rated appropriately.
Predicted Ratings Distribution
In Development
or Unacceptable
5 - 10%

Achieves

Exceeds

Exceptional

60-70%

15-20%

5%

Step 5. Following the discussion, reviewers send any appraisals requiring revision, back to the
supervisor. After the supervisor makes the revisions, the appraisal is sent again to the reviewer for
approval.
Step 6. The reviewer approves the evaluation and forwards it to the supervisor who meets with the
employee to review the content and ratings. If changes are needed, the supervisor reengages the
approval process with the reviewer prior to completing the appraisal. When the process is complete,
the appraisal is approved by the supervisor and employee.
Calibration Tips
 Communicate County/Department Goals. Goals for each area should be communicated in
advance and as thoroughly as possible so employees understand how their daily work
contributes to the success of the county/department, and so that employees understand the
measures on which they will be evaluated.
 Educate supervisors. Ensure supervisors understand what calibration is, why it is necessary,
how it works, and what their roles are.
 Understand the ratings. Understand the performance ratings and their intended application.
 Support the process. Be open about the process, but maintain confidentiality outside of the
calibration meeting.
 Do your best. The calibration process is new to us; there will be a learning curve. It is our
commitment to helping each other in building a performance management and rating process
that has a high level of integrity and reliability across the entire organization.
 Get the right people involved. Make sure that the calibration participants can adequately
represent the employee appraisals being discussed by articulating what the employee has
accomplished and can respond appropriately to questions or challenges from the group. If
questions arise, make sure the supervisor is available to clarify them.
 Set appropriate ground rules for meetings. Participants must feel open to challenge and
debate. They must also feel comfortable asking their peers for advice if they need help in
determining or communicating a rating.
 Leverage the information gathered during the process. The power of calibration goes
beyond performance ratings. These discussions yield important insight into the county’s
talent and overall development needs.

Figure 29 – Continued
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Calibration
Benefits
 Calibration ensures supervisors are well versed in the definitions and the application of
the rating scale.
 Calibration ensures supervisors have objective and measurable examples of performance,
results and behaviors that support the basis for the particular rating assigned to an employee.
 Calibration prepares supervisors for improved performance discussions with their
employees.
 Calibration exposes talent to a larger group of managers, promoting internal
development and succession planning.
 Calibration supports our performance based pay process by ensuring consistency in our
differentiation of performance levels.
Rating Definitions
(E): Exceptional An Exceptional performance rating identifies situations in which performance
significantly surpasses expectations and where the work product and results achieved represent
exceptional and unique contributions, those having or very likely to have a significant and positive
impact on work unit, department or organization. The Exceptional rating is generally reserved to
recognize unique and extraordinary performance, most often associated with a specific accomplishment
of great significance.
Think of the Exceptional rating as one that distinguishes an exceptional performance accomplishment
– the top 5% county wide. Using the golf analogy it’s like scoring an eagle. It is a career highlight,
performance accomplishments that are highly unique and impactful. Expect a fair amount of churn in
those receiving the Exceptional rating. It is reserved for the individual who is leading innovative
practices that have a significant impact on county and/or department performance. It implies that all
of the criteria under the Exceeds rating were met plus the frequency, size and/or scope of the
accomplishments more than exceeded expectations; they demonstrate extraordinary initiative,
extraordinary innovation and extraordinary pro-active leadership for the role. The rater should easily
be able to identify the accomplishments that caused this individual to stand out from the rest – what it
was that placed them in the top 5% of all employees.
(EE): Exceeds Expectations An Exceeds Expectations performance rating identifies situations in
which performance meets and frequently surpasses expectations and where the work product and
results achieved represent contributions to the work unit, department or organization that are
significant and beyond the traditional expectations of the role. The Exceeds Expectations rating is
used to recognize performance that extends beyond achieving the performance requirements and
general expectations associated with successful performance in the role. It will often involve
project work or other contributions that extend beyond the critical goals and performance measures
established for the role.

Figure 29 – Continued
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Think of the Exceeds Expectations rating as one that applies to a unique and impactful
accomplishment. Using the golf analogy it’s like scoring a birdie. It implies that all of the criteria
under the Achieves rating were met plus there were accomplishments that demonstrated significant
initiative, innovation and pro- active leadership for the role. The rater should easily be able to
identify the accomplishments that caused this individual to stand out from the rest – what placed
them in the top 20% of all employees.
(A): Achieves An Achieves performance rating identifies situations in which performance
consistently achieves expectations and where the work product and results achieved are reflective
of successful performance. The Achieves rating is awarded to recognize highly effective
performance where the most critical goals and performance measures have been successfully met.
Think of the Achieves rating as being the equivalent of a letter grade A or a par score in golf. This
is representative of really good work, a strong contributor to the organization, one whose
performance is aligned with department and county vision; whose project assignments were
effectively completed and whose performance was aligned with the core competencies. The
Achieves rating is a mark of highly effective performance.
(I): In Development or Needs Improvement An In Development or Needs Improvement
performance rating identifies situations in which performance did not consistently achieve
expectations in one or more areas, and/or one or more of the most critical goals were not met. A
development plan to improve performance must be outlined, including timelines, and monitored to
measure progress. A six-month review to evaluate progress is required.
(U): Unsatisfactory An Unsatisfactory performance rating identifies situations in which performance
was consistently below expectations in most areas of responsibility, and/or reasonable progress
toward critical goals was not made. Significant improvement is needed in one or more important
areas. A plan to correct performance must be outlined, including timelines, and progress reports
completed monthly to measure progress. A three-month review to evaluate progress is required.
Employees New to the Role When rating performance it should be relative to expectations given,
time in the job and experience on entry. For example, a new employee whose learning curve is
progressing as expected in all areas might receive an overall performance rating of Achieves in year
one even though there are ongoing training and development needs relating to job mastery. On the
other hand, a wellexperienced new hire who is not progressing as expected may receive an In Development or
Unsatisfactory
performance rating. It will be important to set performance expectations at hire with clear milestones
for first year performance.

Figure 29 – Continued
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Calibration Meeting Agenda

1. Desired Outcomes of Meeting
2. Confidentiality
a. It should go without saying that the information discussed and the resulting outcomes should be kept
confidential by all managers involved. Nonetheless, participants should be reminded of the expectation
regarding confidentiality at the start of the meeting.
3. Clarify Standards
a. Review of the rating scale/s and scale definitions used in the performance evaluation process.
4. Performance Trends of Group
a. Examination of the performance distribution of the business unit, including how the
distribution compares to the previous performance period and/or desired distribution.
5. Alignment with Business Unit Results
a. Discussion of the linkage between initial performance ratings with the results produced by the business
unit.
6. Individual Presentation
a. Review of each employee’s performance rating/s and the supporting rationale behind the rating/s.
7. Rating Adjustments
a. Modification of ratings, as necessary, to accurately reflect performance over the
performance period.
8. Next Steps in the Performance Management Process

All of what has preceded in this section of one county’s choice for recommended components of an
effective performance assessment program—something that can compellingly be argued should be done
by every organization that mobilizes human talent toward some kind of shared idea of what you want to
accomplish. What remains are the components of an effective compensation framework that is based on
the outcomes of that performance assessment process. After the voluminous parts of the performance
assessment process, it is shockingly simple how easy it is to tie compensation to the outcome of the
performance assessment process. Here are the relevant provisions from Crow Wing County’s
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compensation policy that support their performance based pay program:
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Figure 30
ARTICLE 2.0: SALARY ADMINISTRATION
2.0 Pay Matrix
The pay matrix is a compensation schedule establishing pay grades and rates of pay for each
grade level. The pay matrix may be adjusted by the County Board to reflect:


The prevailing pay rates in both public and private sector competitive labor markets.



The financial condition and fiscal policies of the County.



Other pertinent economic considerations.

The human resource director will annually review the grade structure, applicable salary ranges,
market data and other relevant data to assure market competitiveness. Recommended changes to the
compensation schedule due to organizational modifications, external market factors, programmatic or
administrative considerations or other relevant issues will be proposed to the County Board for
approval.
2.02 Wage Adjustments
For performance based pay participants, (consult labor contract for eligibility), the wage
adjustment matrix is developed annually. It represents the annual wage adjustment opportunity. The
adjustment amounts are designed to be market competitive, considering local market data, regional and
national data. Sources such as the economic cost indicator, local and regional surveys of private and
public agencies and local economic conditions are considered in the development of the annual wage
adjustment matrix. The wage adjustment matrix is subject to collective bargaining for represented
positions. In the case of multi-year labor agreements, a wage adjustment matrix is established for each
year of the agreement.

Figure 30 – Continued
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Performance based pay adjustment awards are processed the first pay period in April and effective
retroactively to January 1. Performance based pay adjustment awards are processed the first pay period in
April and effective retroactively to January 1. Staff in a performance based pay eligible position, who join
the organization during the first three quarters of the year, are eligible for a prorated performance based
pay award based on the number of full months worked during the year. For example an individual who
started their employment in mid-March would have 9 full months of employment. The prorated formula
applied to the wage adjustment would be as follows: 9/12 = 75%. Annual wage adjustments for bargaining
unit staff shall be implemented in accordance with the applicable labor agreement.

That salary matrix that supports this compensation system is also pretty simple and straightforward.
Crow Wing County’s example supplied below will show a traditional step-and-grade system on the top
portion and a performance-based system on the bottom:

D i s s e r t a t i o n | 158

Figure 31 – Current Salary Ranges
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Significance of Findings
Performance based compensation in counties across the nation is concentrated in a few key states and,
overall, is still quite rare. As frustrations with issues associated with the traditional step-and-grade
compensation system and the attendant wage inflation it produces grows, there seems to be a very slow
incline in the number of counties gravitating toward performance based compensation systems.
Conceptually, the idea of basing compensation on performance is intuitively quite appealing to
practitioners, but the reality of doing it well is a significant barrier to its more widespread adoption.
Moreover, the idea of basing compensation on performance is widely appealing but the reality of
designing a high degree of credibility and acceptance into the performance assessment process is not
frequently even on the radar of those who aspire to such a system. The research demonstrates quite
clearly that the idea or philosophy is more frequently embraced much as one might embrace motherhood
and apple pie as good in the abstract.

The research makes equally clear that the reality of a performance based compensation system is much,
much more dynamic, complex, and enormously difficult. Moreover, few organizations seem willing to
invest the significant time and the rigor necessary to design, implement, and operate a performance
assessment and management system that will truly advance organizational outcomes. The research
revealed that those few who are and who do stand out as beacons for good practice in the dark. Not
unlike the difficulty that Social Workers face in trying to stabilize families that have mental health and
chemical dependency problems which manifest themselves in child abuse or neglect. Not unlike local
government planning professionals trying to protect environmental assets that are being bombarded with
impacts, both natural and unnatural, from an environmental system that is far too complex for us to begin
to understand. Not unlike local government public health professionals who are trying to impact
population-based health behaviors like getting people to exercise more, stop smoking, or eating better.
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Not unlike local government transportation planners trying to design highway systems that meet the needs
both of those who want fast and effective transportation systems with those whose backyards such
systems are being proposed to run through.

The reality of local government is that they regularly hire trained professionals and expect them to make
positive impacts in environments that are enormously dynamic, complex, and difficult. These people are
regularly hired and then asked to make a tangible difference on social outcomes that are difficult to
measure and that are simultaneously being impacted by countless other influencers. Despite that, local
government professionals do it anyway. It is done so in the belief that well-trained, competent
professionals can positively impact the outcomes in all of those public policy arenas despite the
seemingly insurmountable obstacles. They do it anyway. Those embracing well-constructed and wellexecuted performance assessment systems seem to be doing the same. Those tying such well-constructed
and well-executed performance assessment systems to the employee compensation system seem to be
saying that if we believe that an individual Social Worker can make a difference, then we should expect
the same of the person charged with supervising them, though to slightly modified ends. Those creating
and overseeing such systems seem to be saying that unequal work for equal pay in the traditional stepand-grade system is the equivalent of giving up on supervisors trying to make a difference.

The mechanics of the performance assessment system are quite difficult, but the mechanics of the
compensation portion of a performance-based compensation system are relatively easy. The driving force
for the connection between them has much more to do with philosophy and, when done well, drive than it
does with the pursuit of the perfect system. After all, no system can be perfect; each will have pros and
cons, strengths and drawbacks. Only time can tell, ultimately, if the drive and the philosophy produce
more good than harm in comparison to other alternatives, such as the step-and-grade system. In terms of
future opportunity for study, it would seem that testing the efficacy of the various compensation systems
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and trying to isolate their relative contributions to the advancement of specifically-identified
organizational objectives would help to determine whether or to what extent the competing philosophies
do or do not make a bigger difference at what the organization is pursuing.

Conclusion
Adopting a performance pay system is not something to be entertained lightly. It requires more
work, more discipline, more
managerial courage, more training,
more support, and will cause more
heated internal conversations about
performance ratings and

“It is a huge culture change and it takes time. Some
employees really appreciate that it does allow for
recognition of their extra efforts. Having leaders in a
role where compensation makes a difference requires
a lot of training. Constantly trying to tweak the
system is necessary. It probably takes three to five
years for people to understand what it is and what it
isn’t and to train leaders to differentiate well.”

compensation than more traditional
alternatives. You must be able to live with more tension. It is equally clear that the traditional
systems create more rewards for those doing the least effort and for those doing the least to
advance an organization’s mission than a performance pay system—they will also create more
harmony. The traditional system relies almost exclusively on the intrinsic motivation of
employees who seek employ in the public service. A well-crafted and executed performance
management system that incorporates best management practices designed to thoroughly and
constantly review the system’s efficacy and fairness, coupled with a market-driven performance
pay system, coupled with a robust set of additional strategies to create a high quality of employee
worklife (recognition programs, tenure recognition and other similar environmental programs)
does seem to have the potential to create a higher-performing, more mission-driven focus linking
employee performance to organizational results. But, if an organization cannot or will not make
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the necessary investments for all of that to be true, or cannot live with an environment in which
creative tension is not only allowed but encouraged, it is equally clear that a poorly administered
system has the potential to do more harm than good.

Maybe even more importantly than that, as pointed out by Risher (2015), what government
leaders have failed to appreciate is that management systems do not deliver effective
management. Government agencies need a talented, committed team of executives to deliver the
promise of mission statements. Risher suggests that the most important ingredient is not the
management framework, but rather it is the leaders within the system and the culture they
nourish routinely within it. He suggests that the softer skills, those most difficult to define, such
as being able to deftly manage large groups of people and organizations with varying and
competing interests are the kinds of skills necessary to succeed in this endeavor. It may seem
that cobbling together such a team of talented executives is impossible in the public sector; but,
one wonders if, like running the 4-minute-mile was once thought of as unthinkable, whether
someday this could become the norm. If society ever hopes to develop high-performing public
organizations that can become more than just subject to the latest management fad du jour, we
best hope that it does.
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Appendix A: Proposed Cover Letter to State Associations:
Date
724 1st St. SE
Little Falls, MN 56345
Laurie Klupacs
Acting Executive Director
Association of Minnesota Counties
125 Charles Avenue
St. Paul, MN 55103-2108
Dear Mr. Mulder:
My name is Timothy Houle and I am a doctoral candidate in Public Administration at Hamline
University in St. Paul, MN and also the County Administrator for Crow Wing County in northcentral Minnesota. I am in the process of conducting my doctoral dissertation on the prevalence
and efficacy of performance-based or merit pay in county government jurisdictions. I am
requesting your assistance in identifying any organizations within your association that may fit
that criteria. I am writing to let you know in advance I will be calling within the next week to
ask for your assistance with identifying counties within your state that might fit that criteria in
the hopes that the advance notice might make it easier to find that information.
Specifically, I am interested in identifying any county that has a performance-based or merit
based pay program in place and contact information for the person that might best be able to
answer questions as to the basis for its adoption and its subsequent effectiveness in the
achievement of organizational outcomes.
The content of this research is limited to the states of Minnesota, Wisconsin, Florida, Virginia,
Maryland, Texas, California, and New York so your assistance is very important to advancing
my research. This is an important study in advancing the dialogue within public sector
organizations using empirical data to support or dispute advancing performance-based or merit
pay in the public sector. In return for your participation, I would be happy to supply you with a
copy of the research report with findings. I know your time is limited and valuable so I am all
the more grateful. As such, I want to thank you in advance for your assistance. I may be
reached with any questions at thoule01@gmail.com. Please expect my phone call within the
next week.
Sincerely,
Timothy J. Houle
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Appendix B: Letter to Selected Jurisdictions:
Date
724 1st St. SE
Little Falls, MN 56345
Will Volk
Employee Relations Director
Dakota County
1590 Highway 55
Hastings, MN 55033-2372
Dear Mr. Volk:
My name is Timothy Houle and I am a doctoral candidate in Public Administration at Hamline
University in St. Paul, MN and also the County Administrator of Crow Wing County in north
central Minnesota. I am in the process of conducting my doctoral dissertation on the prevalence
of and efficacy of performance-based or merit pay in county governments. Your organization has
been identified as one of those that fit my research criteria. I am writing to ask your assistance in
supplying information about your organization’s practices relative to my research topic.
Specifically, I am writing to request your participation in a brief telephone interview that, along
with similar interviews from other similarly situated counties, will be compiled and analyzed as
part of my research project. I will be calling within the next week or so to try to schedule the
interview at a time that works for you and am writing to give you advance notice regarding the
nature of my call.
The questions that I propose to ask will have to do with the circumstances that led you to
adoption of the system and how it is working in actual practice. I expect the survey to take
approximately 60 minutes or less to complete. Most of the information for the responses to the
interview questions will be readily at your disposal as I will be asking about your experience.
There is a possibility that a small amount of data may need to be compiled by you or others
within your organization, depending on the answers to the questions and the ready-availability of
that data. Most of the research information will be garnered from your answers to the questions
in the interview.
This is an important study in advancing the dialogue within public sector organizations using
empirical data to support or dispute advancing performance-based or merit pay in the public
sector. In return for your participation, I would be happy to supply you with a copy of the
research report with findings. Thank you in advance for your assistance. I know your time is
limited and valuable so I am all the more grateful.
Sincerely,
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Timothy J. Houle
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Appendix C: Survey Instrument Performance-Based Pay Survey
Notice to the Participants: I would like to tape record this interview so that I might refer back to
it as source material beyond that which I can write during the interview. It would also allow me
to more fully participate in the interview if I do not have to write your responses while we are
having our conversation. The recording will be used exclusively for the purposes of my
research. I would not share the recording with anyone else for any other purpose and, at the
conclusion of publication of my dissertation, I will destroy it. I will not be identifying any
interview subject by name without their expressed permission by an e-mail sent to me
authorizing the same. If you would prefer I did not record the interview, I will respect those
wishes and we can conduct the interview without it being recorded. May I have your permission
to record the interview?
Yes or No
Organization Name:________________________________________ State:________________
Name of Person Completing Survey:_____________________________________________
Title:____________________________________________________ Date:________________
Population of Jurisdiction (2010 Census):_______________________
Annual Budget:____________________________________
Number of FTE Employees:______________________________
Definitions of Terms:
Organizational Outcomes: clearly defined measures of the organization’s primary objectives of
performance through measurable results regularly reported.
Performance-Based Pay Program: any compensation policy that links annual wage and salary
increases to employee performance on some predetermined period-over-period comparison.
Employees: the number of full-time equivalent (FTE) public employees per capita employed by
the political subdivision being examined.
Employee Engagement: The rate at which employees feel valued, supported, and connected to
their organization as measured through the use of a survey at least once per year.
Employee Retention: the rate at which employees exit the organization measured as a annual
percentage of the total workforce.
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Employee Satisfaction: the degree to which employees are satisfied with their work environment
as measured by a survey with standardized questions at least once per year.
Performance Distinction: a noted difference in the performance of two or more employees in the
achievement of key organizational objectives that the organization wishes to either reward or
punish.
Recruitment: the ability to attract new employees to come to work for the organization as
measured by some objective measure, such as time to recruit, number of applicants, and so on.
Stakeholder (Citizen) Satisfaction: the degree to which stakeholders or citizens are satisfied with
the quality of the public services they receive as measured by a survey with standardized
questions administered either annually in a randomized sample or to recipients of services
immediately following their receipt of the service.
Senior Executives: those managers, supervisors, or department heads who are paid in the top ten
percent of the organization’s compensation system.
Wage Inflation: the amount of increase in the total wages paid to employees, not counting new
or eliminated positions, expressed as a percentage increase over the previous year’s base costs.
Does your organization have a performance-based pay program (Y or N): ____________. If yes,
go to question 2 and, if no, are you considering one (Y or N) __________.
If no again, thank them for their time.
Is this program available only to Senior Executives (Y or N):______________________
Is this system applied to any collective bargaining units (Y or N):___________________
Approximately what percentage of employee classifications is this system available
to:_______________
How long ago did you adopt your first version of this system?
 Less than one year

 1-2 years

 3-4 years

 4-5 years

 6-7 years

 8 or more years
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Open-Ended Question: What would you identify as the motivating factors that led to the
adoption of your organizations performance-based pay program?
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________
Check any of the list of motivating factors listed below that are independently volunteered:
 Employee Satisfaction

 Employee Retention

 Organizational Outcomes

 Stakeholder Satisfaction  Limit Wage Inflation

 Performance Distinction

 Employee Recruitment

 Employee Engagement

 Attracting Millenials

 Other:_______________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________Would
you identify any of the following as having been one of your motivating factors? If so, please
explain:
 Employee Satisfaction

 Employee Retention

 Organizational Outcomes

 Stakeholder Satisfaction  Limit Wage Inflation

 Performance Distinction

 Employee Recruitment

 Employee Engagement

 Attracting Millenials

 Other:_______________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
In your opinion, is the program achieving its intended outcomes? How do you know? Please
explain:_______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
Have you put into place any specific measures of key organizational performance that you would
suggest would support your conclusions? If so, please explain. Can I get a copy of any
summary data from the most recent completed annual period? What do those results show?
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
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______________________________________________________
Can you send me a copy of any policy or source material that would outline your jurisdiction’s
performance-based program, if applicable, including eligibility criteria and/or to what sub-sets of
the organization to which it would apply? Yes or No
Are there any questions you have of me?
______________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
Do you wish me to send you a copy of the research when it is completed? If so, I will need an email address to send it to:
E-mail address: __________________________________________________________
I want to thank you sincerely for taking the time to allow me to interview you for my research.
Your participation in this survey is critically important to the validity of the research results. If,
upon reflection, you have anything else you wish to let me know about or follow-up on, please
direct any questions you may me at thoule01@gmail,com or 218.330.5032. Thank you so much
for taking a moment out of your busy day to help me!
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Appendix D: List of Counties Interviewed
The Efficacy of Performance-Based Pay in Selected County Governments:
What Motivates Adoption and Is it Achieving What was Expected?
List of Counties Interviewed
State
Wisconsin
Wisconsin
Wisconsin
Wisconsin
Wisconsin
Wisconsin
Wisconsin
Virginia
Virginia
Virginia
Virginia
Virginia
Virginia
Virginia
Virginia
Virginia
Virginia
Virginia
Virginia
Virginia
Virginia
Virginia
Virginia
Virginia
Virginia
Virginia
Virginia
Virginia
Maryland
California
California
California
California

County
St. Croix
Waukesha
Washington
Iowa
Marathon
Manitowoc
Chippewa
Albemarle
Arlington
Augusta
Botetourt
Campbell
Carroll
Chesterfield
Culpeper
Fairfax
Frederick
Greensville
Hanover
Isle of Wight
James City
Loudoun
Montgomery
Pittsylvania
Roanoke
Rockingham
Stafford
York
Montgomery
Sonoma
Santa Barbera
Marin
Napa

Contact
Tammy Funk
James Richter
Joshua Schoemann
Curt Kephart
Brad Karger
Bob Ziegelbauer
Frank R. Pascarella
Lorna Gerome
Jeanne Wardlaw
Faith Souder
Mary Blackburn
Shameka Davenport
Michelle Dalton
Scott Zaremba
Stacey Bertsch
Leslie Amiri
Paula Nofsinger
Alice Whitby
Janet Lawson
Brandy White
Rona Vrooman
Jeanette Green
Karen Edmonds
Kim Van Der Hyde
Joe Sgroi
Steve Riddlebarger
Shannon Wagner
David Gorwitz
Kay Beckley
Lynn Durrell
Jeri Muth
Larry David
Suzanne Mason

Title
Human Resources Director
Human Resources Director
Administrative Coordinator
County Administrator
County Administrator
County Executive
County Administrator
Director of Human Resources
Compensation Division Chief
Human Resources Director
Human Resources Director
Deputy Director HR
Human Resources Director
Human Resource Programs
Human Resources Director
Human Capital Devel. Director
Human Resources Director
County Administrator
Human Resources Director
Human Resources Director
Human Resources Coordinator
Human Resources Officer
Director of Human Resources
Finance Director
Director of Human Resources
Director of Human Resources
Human Resources Manager
Human Resources Director
Business Operations Manager
Human Resources Analyst
Human Resources Director
Director of Human Resources
Director of Human Resources

Complete
1/27/2014
1/23/2014
1/16/2014
1/16/2014
2/17/2014
1/16/2014
1/16/2014
1/17/2014
1/17/2014
1/22/2014
2/7/2014
1/22/2014
1/27/2014
1/27/2014
3/5/2014
1/22/2014
1/22/2014
1/27/2014
3/20/2014
3/13/2014
1/17/2014
2/21/2014
1/17/2014
3/13/2014
1/22/2014
1/22/2014
1/21/2014
1/17/2014
3/13/2014
1/24/2014
3/17/2014
1/22/2014
1/22/2014
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Minnesota
Minnesota
Minnesota
Minnesota
Minnesota
Minnesota
Minnesota
Minnesota
Minnesota
Minnesota
Minnesota
Florida
Florida
Florida
Florida
Florida
Florida
Florida
Florida
Florida
Florida
New York
New York
New York
New York
New York
South
Carolina
South
Carolina
South
Carolina
South
Carolina
South
Carolina
South
Carolina
South
Carolina

Ramsey
Scott
Carver
Anoka
Yellow
Medicine
Dakota
Aitkin
Nicollet
Olmsted

Gail Blackstone
Jack Kemme
Kerie Anderka
Melanie Ault

Human Resources Director
Employee Relations Director
Employee Relations Director
Human Resources Director

1/27/2014
1/17/2014
1/17/2014
1/15/2014

Personnel Coordinator
Employee Relations Director
Human Resources Manager
Human Resources
Human Resources Director

1/15/2014
1/15/2014
1/16/2014
1/15/2014
1/15/2014

Sherburne
Lyon
Monroe
Citrus
Manatee
Marion
Leon
Sarasota
Lake
Hillsborough
Pasco
Pinellas
Madison
Yates
Cattaraugus
Wayne
Livingston

Ashley Sornie
Nancy Hohbach
Bobbie Danielson
Jamie Haefner
Dale Ignatius
Roxanne
Chmielewski
Carolyn McDonald
Kevin Madok
Brad Thorpe
Karen Windon
Dr. Lee Niblock
Vincent Long
Joanie Whitley
Robert Anderson
Helene Marks
Dr. Marc Bellas
Robert LaSala
Ryan Aylward
Sarah Purdy
Jack Searles
Jim Marquette
Ian Coyle

Human Resources Director
Human Resources Director
Director of Strategic Planning
County Administrator
Deputy County Administrator
County Administrator
County Administrator
Human Resources Director
Director of Human Resources
Chief Financial Officer
Human Resources Director
County Administrator
Director of Labor Relations
County Administrator
County Administrator
County Administrator
County Administrator

1/15/2014
1/22/2014
3/3/2014
3/13/2014
3/3/2014
3/6/2014
3/18/2014
3/7/2014
3/4/2014
3/18/2014
3/4/2014
3/6/2014
3/21/2014
3/21/2014
3/27/2014
3/24/2014
3/13/2014

Aiken

Dorothy Simmons

Human Resources Director

1/16/2014

Anderson

Phyllis McAlister

Human Resources Director

1/16/2014

Greenville

Debra Ham

Human Resources Director

1/16/2014

Greenwood

Rhonda McAlister

Human Resources Director

1/16/2014

Lexington

Joseph Mergo, III

County Administrator

1/16/2014

Orangeburg

Venyke Harley

Personnel Director

1/24/2014

York

Lisa Davidson

Human Resources Director

1/16/2014
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Iowa
Iowa
Iowa
Iowa
Iowa
Iowa
Iowa
Iowa
Illinois
Illinois
Illinois
Illinois
Illinois
Illinois
Georgia
Georgia
Georgia
Washington
Washington
Washington
Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania
Kentucky
North
Carolina
North
Carolina
North
Carolina
North
Carolina
North
Carolina
North
Carolina
North
Carolina
North
Carolina
North
Carolina

Black Hawk
Bremer
Buchanan
Butler
Johnson
Polk
Linn
Scott
McLean
Peoria
Kendall
Lake
Champagne
McHenry
Gwinnet
Fulton
Cobb
Lincoln
Island
Whatcom
Bradford
Lycoming
Monroe
Dauphin
Boone

Jerald Clyde
Shelly Wolf
Cindy Gosse
Liz Williams
Lora Shramek
Tony Bisignano
Lisa Powell
Mary Thee
Bill Wasson
Lori Curtis Luther
Jeff Wilkins
Barry Burton
Deb Busey
Peter Austin
Elizabeth Bailey
Valerie Handley
Tony Hagler
Shelly Johnston
Melanie Bacon
Karen Sterling Goens
Mark Agutter
Ann Gehret
Bonnie Ace-Sattur
Faye Fisher
Jeffrey Earlywine

Human Resources Director
County Auditor
Auditor
Auditor
Human Resources Director
Human Resources Director
Human Resources Director
Human Resources Director
County Administrator
County Administrator
County Administrator
County Administrator
County Administrator
County Administrator
Human Resources Manager
Interim Personnel Director
Human Resources Director
Auditor
Human Resources Director
Human Resources Manager
Human Resources Director
Director of Administration
Human Resources Director
Human Resources Director
County Administrator

1/22/2014
2/7/2014
1/22/2014
1/22/2014
1/22/2014
2/7/2014
1/24/2013
2/10/2014
2/7/2014
2/24/2014
3/13/2014
3/6/2014
3/5/2014
1/27/2014
1/24/2014
2/27/2014
1/22/2014
1/22/2014
2/10/2014
2/11/2014
2/21/2014
3/4/2014
3/13/2014
2/26/2014
3/5/2014

Scotland

Susan Butler

Human Resources Manager

3/17/2014

Union

Mark Watson

Executive Director of HR

3/17/2014

Craven

Amber Parker

Human Resources Director

3/13/2014

Transylvania

Sheila Cozart

Human Resources Director

3/10/2014

Franklin

Kelly Faulkner

Human Resources Manager

3/7/2014

Yadkin

Lisa Hughes

Deputy County Mgr-Finance

3/14/2013

Catawba

Cynthia Eades

Human Resources Director

3/13/2014

Durham

Troy Joyner

Sr Human Resources Analyst

3/21/2014

Forsyth

Karen White

Asst Human Resources Director

3/17/2014
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North
Carolina
North
Carolina
North
Carolina
North
Carolina
North
Carolina
North
Carolina
North
Carolina
North
Carolina
Kansas
Kansas
Kansas
Kansas
Idaho
Arizona
Arizona
Arizona
Arizona
Michigan
Michigan
Alabama

Granville

Michael Felts

County Manager

3/7/2014

Guilford

John Dean

Human Resources Director

3/10/2014

Halifax

Tony Gupton

Human Resources Mgmt Dir

3/27/2014

Mecklenburg

Julissa Fernandez

Class and Comp Director

3/14/2014

New Hanover

Mark Francolini

Human Resources Director

3/13/2014

Surry

Sandra Snow

Human Resources Officer

3/7/2014

Cumberland

Fred Starling

Human Resources Consultant

3/11/2014

Wake
Cowley
Finney
Harper
Douglas
Kootenai
Yuma
Pinal
Coconino
Yavapai
Kent
Washtenaw
Baldwin

Dennis Schoch
Jeremy Willmoth
Randy Parkington
Al Roder
Craig Weinaug
Skye Reynolds
Felicia Frausto
Cathy Bohland
Erica Philpot
Wendy Ross
Holly Hartley
Verna McDaniel
David Brewer

Human Resources Manager
County Administrator
County Administrator
County Administrator
County Administrator
Human Resources Director
Human Resources Director
Human Resources Director
Asst Human Resrouces Director
Director of Human Resources
HR Mgr for Benefits & Comp
County Administrator
County Administrator

3/21/2014
3/10/2014
3/13/2014
3/10/2014
3/13/2014
3/21/2014
3/18/2014
3/18/2014
3/18/2014
3/18/2014
3/18/2014
3/27/2014
3/27/2014
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Appendix F: Dissertation Proposal Defense Certification
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Appendix G: Curriculum Vitae

Timothy J. Houle
________________________________________________________________________
EDUCATION:
Little Falls Community High School, Little Falls, MN, 1981
Hamline University, St. Paul, MN
Bachelor of Arts in Political Science, 1985
Master of Arts in Public Administration, 2004
Doctoral Candidate in Public Administration, Expected Graduation 2014
Special emphasis on English Writing, Political Science, Public Speaking, Philosophy and
Ethics.
EXPERIENCE:

Crow Wing County, Brainerd, MN

2008 – Present:
County Administrator. Chief Administrative Officer for the County.
Provide dynamic, vibrant, strategic vision for the future of Crow Wing County
government. Statutory clerk to the County Board. Primary advisor on administrative
issues affecting all facets of county government. Responsible for strategic planning,
budgeting, public relations, organizational results produced and accountability
management. My position requires the ability to confidently switch from one
professional situation to another with ease. I frequently analyze overall organizational
trends, synthesize these into concepts and language the public understands, and respond
accordingly.
Key Accomplishments with Crow Wing County:
Average annual levy increases for budgets during my tenure 2009-2013 is .356%
increase. Levy change for budget years 2011-2013 reflect a reduced levy of 4%.
In response to economic crisis and resultant State of Minnesota budget crisis, reduced
2010 operating expenses by over $4.0 million (from a $70 million budget base) and
eliminated 49.8 FTEs (from a 451 FTE base). Positioning the County for further budget
cuts of approximately $3.5 million for 2011 budget.
Reorganized structure and form of entire county government. Created department
structures centered on the customers’ served: Land Services, Community Services, Public
Safety, and Transportation. Proposing creation of Administrative Services restructuring
at present. Instituted Senior Management Team and Leadership Team to replace
traditional Dept Head model.
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Led renewed focus within organization on customer service excellence as a component of
overall strategy toward organizational excellence. Customer service satisfaction survey
results typically reflect 90% of customers satisfied with the quality of services received,
both internally and externally.
Launched initiative to manage for results with performance standards, measures, and
accountabilities for the organization, divisions, managers, and employees. Key
outcomes-based performance measures have been identified for every employee countywide and been integrated into their annual performance reviews. This has positioned the
organization for discussions with bargaining units about instituting pay-for-performance,
which has been a County Board priority, to replace the existing step-and-grade
compensation system. It also positions the organization for movement from a traditional
rule-bound workplace to a more result-oriented workplace facilitating a transition to a
ROWE workplace with more flexibility in staffing, hours, and methods.
Instituted LEAN six-sigma process improvement methodology within business units
leading to substantially improved customer results while lowering costs. Initiating such
processes has become a key performance indicators for senior managers.
Created priority setting process to rank county “books of business” to inform the
judgment of policymakers as they made budget reduction decisions.
Morrison County, Little Falls, MN
1994 to2008: County Administrator. Chief Administrative Officer for the County.
Provide dynamic, vibrant, strategic vision for the future of Morrison County government.
Statutory clerk to the County Board. Primary advisor on administrative issues affecting
all facets of county government. Responsible for budgeting, human resources, labor
relations, public relations, pursuing legislative goals, purchasing, and building
maintenance.
Key Accomplishments with Morrison County:
Led national award-winning citizen-based public/private partnership to reduce
methamphetamine use in Morrison County resulting in reduced drug arrests and reduced
meth arrests even with stepped up interdiction efforts. Project was selected by the
National Association of Counties as one of 12 national winners of a Sustainable
Communities Award, also selected as among top four.
Successfully secured public support for and County Board approval of a recreational
trails master plan for the county. Sought and received numerous grants to support trail
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projects.
Worked successfully with state and federal legislators to secure funding and
authorization for a channelization project on the Mississippi River upstream of the Little
Falls dam.
Led the county through its first strategic planning process in ten years.
Successfully implemented many new technologies to Morrison County, including fully
integrated GIS/parcel data systems, digital telephone system, county-wide local area
network, data imaging system, voice mail, and so on.
Successfully led transition out of the direct provision of home care services.
Successfully negotiated repeated contracts with four different collective bargaining units.
Successfully led transition of county employees from a traditional vacation/sick leave
program to a combined flex leave program.
Successfully reorganized to create and staff a separate Information Systems (IS)
Department.
STAR TRIBUNE, Newspaper of the Twin Cities, Minneapolis, MN
1986 to 1994:
Primary Market Area Resource Manager/Field Team Leader.
Responsible for resource allocation, budgeting and financial tracking, human resource
administration, and department leadership for an organization with annual total budget
of $30 million. My position required creativity and consistency to fairly manage and
administer complex policies and procedures such as hiring, progressive discipline,
termination, and so on for both union and independent employees. Participated in long
range strategic planning including the collection and analysis of pertinent information.
Key Accomplishments with the Star Tribune:
Led transformational change of the division from a very traditional, hierarchical
organizational structure to self-managed work teams. Measures of cost went down
significantly. Measures of service improved dramatically. Employees’ quality of work
life was measurably improved.
Center for Rural Policy and Development, St. Peter, MN
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2007 to Present:
Board of Directors. Appointed by Governor Tim Pawlenty and
reappointed by Governor Mark Dayton to serve as a county representative.
Organization works to provide high-quality, non-partisan research on issues of
importance to Greater Minnesota, such as broad-band access, challenges associated with
increasing diversity, best practices for rural school districts in the face of declining
revenues, and so on. Chaired the Executive Search Committee to replace a vacancy in
the Executive Director’s position. Currently Chair the Research Committee.
Minnesota City/County Managers Association, St. Paul, MN
2005 to Present:
Second Vice-President; Past Co-Chair, Conference Planning
Committee. Served multiple years on Executive Board helping to plan and lead
professional association to provide for networking and professional development needs
of city and county administrators throughout the State of Minnesota and currently in line
to become President in 2014. Past Chair of 2007 conference planning committee to plan
and organize annual MCMA Spring Conference.
Minnesota Association of County Administrators, St. Paul, MN
1997 to Present:
Past President(2000). Executive Committee. Served with the Board
of Directors (1997-2001) to plan, implement, evaluate, and participate in training and
professional development opportunities to enhance the professional standards and
performance of the administration of county government statewide.
Key Accomplishments with MACA:
Led strategic planning process for the statewide organization to ensure maximum benefit
to county administrators and their member counties in training, professional networking,
idea exchanges, and so on, and to operationalize this planning to ensure its application
into the future.
Standardized the organizational structure under an organizing model using an Executive
Committee and standing committees focusing on Professional Development, Technology
Applications, and Legislative Involvement.
VOLUNTEER
ACTIVITIES: Crow Wing County United Way, Current Board of Directors President
Morrison County United Way, Board of Directors, Past President
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Brainerd Lakes Area Economic Development Corp, Ex-Officio, Board
Brainerd, MN Rotary Club
Crow Wing County FEMA, Board Chair
Catholic Charities of the Diocese of St. Cloud, Board of Directors, Past President
Morrison County Healthy Communities Collaborative, Board of Directors
Community Technology, Inc., Board of Directors
Past Church Trustee

